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ABSTRACT
Autobiography in curriculum theory and practice is being more and more
acknowledged a s a major force leading toward the development of reflectively
analytical teachers, reflexive practitioners, and discursively self-aware
individuals. I look to two vital aspects of self-narration to explore.
I speak firstly of memory, without which narrative continuity would be
impossible. Memory is as involved with learning as it is with storytelling, and I
agree with Krell (1978) that “inquiry into memory and the theory of pedagogy go
hand in hand” (p. 131). I eschew the models of memory provided by the
behavioral sciences, empirical psychology, cognitive psychology, and the
memory-as-a-mechanism model of neurophysiology for all these models end
up vanishing into metaphor. I embrace metaphor and attempt a more openended approach through phenomenology to the experience of memory. I freely
employ the literary arts for their evocation of long-term memory (as opposed to
the basically short-term studies of psychology).
I maintain that memory is encoded as deep within language as the self
and that it leads finally to the primordial narratives we call myths. Secondly,
then, myth as foundational to both how and what we remember, and myth as
present in the seam s between words, is traced through language and the work
of archetypal psychology. Remembering mythically is epistrophe (Hillman,
1979a). I use such memory and such myth to suggest the insubstantiality of the
ego and of the subject which remembers, and to explore the meaning of a
memory which must recoil against action to see through the self.

C hapter 1: introduction

T h e fact is that we have forgotten what memory is
and can mean; and we make matters worse by
repressing the fact of our own oblivion.”

(E. S. Casey, Remembering: A Phenomenological Study, p. 2)

§A pproaches. Someone seem s to have noticed that we are plunging into
the future without a backward glance. Though we retain private memories,
they have come to be structured within larger semiotic memory-forms
(Barthes, 1957/72; Lyotard, 1984). Individual memory is absorbed by history,
and curriculum becomes drafted into the production line. Such an ethos may
well be perfectly acceptable as just another cultural quirk, were it not that the
“backward glancing" of memory tells us not just where we have been but also
gives us a sense of who we are. Without remembering, we exist only to
serve the vehicle of our conveyance which is left, in effect, to choose its own
course. To remember memory, two questions must be posed: what is
memory and, more importantly, what is the experience of its action?
John Dewey should be given full credit here at the beginning for
valorizing the mindfulness of the individual, opening the way to "qualitative”
research in schooling and thus to lifewriting in curriculum through his ideas,
including that of the organic unity of self and society (1929). Graham (1991)
sums up Dewey’s pragmatism as, first,
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a theory of process based on a notion of activity in which both people
and objects are a result of the process. Second, mind or
consciousness itself is a social product brought about through the
continuous interaction of free agents. And third, all ends are
provisional, changing; it is a process that allows, a s in classic
evolutionary terms, for novelty, and one that invalidates the idea of
fixed goals, (p. 49)
Though the ideas of Dewey have remained influential in the
curriculum field, in the schools they have been reduced to an undercurrent in
the school-as-factory paradigm which gained ascendancy through two world
wars and a prolonged cold war (Apple, 1979). Dewey anticipated much of
the work being done now in autobiographical curriculum writing, a writing
which usually claims continental influences (Pinar & Grumet, 1976). His
understanding of the self was never akin to the student-as-empty-vessei
syndrome still commonly employed by those who seek to m easure success
by the accumulated information a student has retained.

Dewey clearly

opposed "self-discovery” by accumulation in his Ethics of 1932:
Except a s the outcome of arrested development, there is no such thing
as a fixed, readymade, finished self. Every living self cau ses acts and
is itself caused in return by what it does. AH voluntary action is a
remaking of the self, since it creates new desires, instigates to new
modes of endeavor, brings to light new conditions which institute new
ends. Our personal identity is found in the thread of continuous
development which binds together these changes. In the strictest
sense, it is impossible for the self to stand still; it is becoming, and
becoming for the better or the worse. (In Graham, 1991, p. 44)
Dewey’s realization of the social self does not seem to imply that the
individual is powerless; quite the opposite in fact. Compare Dewey’s (1929)
statement: “All education proceeds by the participation of the individual in

the social consciousness of the race” (p. 3) with that of the last lines of
Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus in Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: “I go ... to
forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race.”
Understanding that the self is capable of transformation and not just
accumulation, curriculum studies have opened a broad perspective into a
variety of qualitative approaches which question the school-industry
paradigm (e.g., Eisner & Peshkin, 1990; Short, 1991; Schon, 1991;
Haggerson & Bowman, 1992). These approaches usually call for more
interpretation, less measurement, more description, less generalization,
more experientialism, less depersonalization, and more personal
involvement. In short, moving from the general to the specific, from the
socially standardized to the personal and unique, assumptions about the role
and place of memory have become engaged: public memory, professional
memory, personal memory, and sometimes even expressive (or "fictional”)
memory.
It is memory that I wish to explore in this essay. The areas of inquiry
that most directly call upon the resources of personal memory are to do with
the exploration of the lived realities of the persons who are teachers or
students. This exploration calls for the narrativizing of experience, though
this narrativizing may take such varied forms as ethnographic inquiry
(Janesick, 1991), teacher lore (Schubert, 1991), narrative dialogue (Witherell
& Noddings, 1991), teachers’ life histories (Goodson, 1988), teacher stories

(Pagano, 1990), narrative inquiry (Connelly & Clandinin, 1991), voices of
teachers (Aoki, 1990), or, most important for my purposes, autobiography as
research (Butt & Raymond, 1989) or methodology (Pinar & Grumet, 1976).
The list is incomplete and too abbreviated to be fair to the intent of the
authors, but an idea of the variety of approaches may be suggested.
All the above will be referred to generically, when necessary, as
“lifewriting in curriculum.” I take the term “lifewriting” from a 1991 seminar
with Jam es Olney on “Lifewriting and Memory,” in which lifewriting was used
in the broadest sense possible to encompass poetry (T. S. Eliot’s Four
Quartets, 1944), case studies (Luria, 1968,1972; Sacks, 1985), novels

(Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! 1936/86; Hurston’s Their Eyes Were
Watching God,1937), and various experimental autobiographies which shall

be discussed in a later section. Lifewriting, then, is any writing which
expresses, investigates, or seeks a memoried life—whether objectively or
subjectively or intersubjectively, symbolically or factually. In autobiography,
itself, the question of memory is inescapable, as it is generally taken to be the
dividing line between it and “purely" fictional literature, whether memory is
construed as historic or aesthetic. I shall suggest that it is also heuristic.
It should be noted that curriculum inquiry often calls on the memory
that plays a central role in all phenomenological and hermeneutical
discourse (Willis, 1991; Smith, 1991), though this memory may be
understood as both personal and social because of the mutual implication of
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the personal and social in the hermeneutic circle (Gadamer, 1975).
Furthermore, as curriculum theory draws inspiration from so many other
fields, it regularly assum es ideas of memory drawn from the processor
paradigm of experimental psychology (e.g., Ross, 1992), the narrative
schem ata of cognitive psychology (e.g., Bruner, 1987), not to mention
psychoanalytic approaches from Freud (1900/65) to Lacan (1977). The
mention of Lacan opens out language itself a s a container, or producer, of
memory, especially in the fields of semiotics—as found, for example, in
Barthes (1957/72)—and linguistics (Kristeva, 1989, among others). All of
these traditions will be recalled in later chapters.

§Memory, Narrative, Myth: Self, Imagination, Metamorphosis.

Memory, self, and imagination seem to be entwined in ways that even the
most arduous experimental techniques could never disentangle. Of course,
definitions could be created within which conceptual data could be made to
fit or not to fit. The problem with defining the above triumvirate is that each is
so intimately involved with each other and with language that som e say they
are as much a manifestation of language a s language is of them (Lacan,
1977; Kristeva, 1989). Kerby (1991) states that “semiotics ... shifts this
whole epistemological-metaphysical debate onto another level by firmly
rejecting extralinguistic reference" (p. 10). It is not my purpose to disentangle
these terms through incisive definitions and, as I say, I’m not sure it could be

done. But life histories, narrative inquiry, and autobiography all proceed with
some notion of a referent—no matter how nebulous or disputable—for each
of these terms.
This inquiry into the central concept of memory will proceed through
the interpretation of several related concepts which are pivotal to its
understanding. The concepts need to be explored in order to understand
their substructures of inference. It is assum ed that our language today has
attained a particularity and complexity which was heretofore unknown
(Bloomfield, 1982). Our dependency on an increasingly complex and
expanding technological network has demanded a nominative heterotaxis—
an abnormal structural arrangement of language—because of the need to
continually give new names to the new sub-concepts and “things” emerging
from the science industry and hyper-technology. Language has become
such a heterotaxis because for the first time the development of nouns or
names has preceded or eliminated the need for verbs. Philology has

demonstrated that previously nominatives usually derived from verb forms,
which are still hidden within most the names we employ today (Watkins,
1982). As a result, much of our speech and writing seem s to be more
concrete and objectively referential than it may have been before. However
“practical" this may be, a side effect is that language in general use seem s to
have largely lost its sense of nuance, the reverberations from the subtle

interplay of meanings within a larger web of inference. Terms become things
with a certainty which renders them “inert” (Whitehead, 1970).
This commonsensical view that language “means just what it says" is
subverted by poets and other writers of literature who “play” with language—
or allow language to play—beyond a strictly referential sen se (Frye, 1957).
The echoes and implications within speech and writing are employed to
point away from concrete understanding to a de-literalized sen se of
inference. Language is purposefully used to suggest that which is not
present (L6vi-Strauss, 1966). Its “meaning” is contained in the subtext of
associations from the past—the memory contained within language—or in
the deferral of meaning into the future. This sense of the infinite regress or
indefinite postponement of meaning seem s to be what is implied in the
Derridean neologism “differance” (1978). Aside from literary endeavours, it
may be that the texts of post-structuralists (and other “post” genres) are the
only place to find language being used to consciously to avoid strict
reference or to hint at meanings beyond themselves, either in the subliminal
aw areness of metaphorical sources (Frye, 1957; Olney, 1972) or in the
“traces” of memory’s absence (Derrida, 1978).
It is my contention that writing which expects both author and reader to
participate in the univocal assumption of meaning through representation of
objective referents is more open to misunderstanding and the abuse of
mixed m essages than is writing which is openly inferential, but not inferring

anything but more inferences. When the author and reader expect certain,
specific denotations and connotations, they are more likely to project
aspersions on each other when they find their meanings do not agree. In the
latter case, meaning may seem at first unclear or elusive until that very
elusiveness is felt, in a sense, a s meaningful. It is only by returning language
(and therefore life) to its “original difficulty” (Caputo, 1987), or to a sen se of
fluidity (Grinnell, 1973) and process (Whitehead, 1978), that a se n se of
richness and depth can enliven our aw areness of phenomenal reality. This
approach accepts the uncertainty of private connotation and mutual meaning
may be felt through language’s “re-mystification,” a s in poetry.
A major part of this richness and depth is found in the echoes of the
past contained in the words of the present. This does not just imply that there
are fewer and simpler base-words at the “root" of our present plethora of
referents, but that words reach back to a rhizomatous network which spreads
over, finally, the unknown. Heidegger (1987) has said that “language can
only have arisen from the overpowering, the strange and terrible" (p. 171).
Heidegger, of course, w as a metaphysician who himself spoke the
poetry of being and who w as claimed by phenomenologists and
existentialists alike (Wahl, 1949). He approached philosophy with what
G adam er (1975) called the hermeneutical imagination, seeking out origins.
The inquiry into the suggestion that language already has an intrinsic
memory is reason to seek memory beyond mind. Furthermore, there are also
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memory within the body and the memory of “intersubjective participation,"
according to Edward S. Casey (1987b). Memory even functions to a limited
extent in matter, a s suggested by Bergson (1912) and largely corroborated
by particle physics today (Wheeler, 1974; Toben & Wolf, 1982). Could it be
that memory is not a mental faculty at all but one of the primordial forces, of
existence: “writing’s law of gravity” (Gunn, 1982, p. 5)?
Within the mind, however, memory produces both narratives and
images—images implying all things sensory or somehow “felt." Smith (1991)
says of Gadamer that “his hermeneutics supports all of the recent work in the
study of narrative and story ... which proceeds from an affirmation of the
traceably constitutive nature of human understanding and its roots in
recollection and memory” (p. 194).
Aspects of memory, then, are understood to be found in stories, the
nature of which leads me to my second central concept: narrative. Narrative
is seen in this sense as the form taken by the foundational structures of selfaw areness (Kirby, 1991), which we encounter consciously through memory,
recollection, reminiscence, or reverie (Casey, 1987b). Kirby (1991)
straightforwardly states: “The self, as implied subject, appears to be
Inseparable from the narrative or life story it constructs for itself or otherwise
inherits. The important point is that it is from this story that a sen se of self is
generated” (p. 6).

If words have memories, and memories often have a narrative
structure, then the subconscious or peripherally-conscious narrative
substructures of those structures can be designated as meta-narratives, as
Lyotard (1984) refers to the determinants of culture and tradition; Kirby
(1991) calls them prenarrative structures when referring to a less
circumscribed, more “primitive” level of quasi-narrative (Crites, 1986).
Prenarrative experience is already somewhat determined by the place, time,
and traditions of one’s life, and, at a deeper level, by the reverberation of
ancient etymological and present phonetic entanglements. It also includes
the repressed “unsaid" behind language (Lacan, 1977; Derrida, 1978).
This “unsaid" is the unspeakable of both past and present. It is the
stuff of dreams, myths, and madness. Usually held repugnantly away as
language’s derrtere, it is nevertheless as much a creative resource as are the
“praiseworthy” official traditions. Kirby asserts that “self-narration is both a
receptive and a creative activity, receptive in relation to embodying or
expressing our prenarrative experience and creative in the way our
conscious narratives inevitably refigure and augment the prenarrative level
of experience” (p. 9).
Whether culturally formative, subversively chaotic, or aesthetically
inspiring, I hope to reveal these narrative substructures to be identical with
what has been called mythology (Kolakowski, 1972/1989; Connelly &
Clandinin, 1991). As I shall define it as my third central concept, mythology is
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com posed of myths which have been identified as the aural components of
archetypal images (Kugler, 1978; Rasula, 1979). Words and myths “are twin
creatures, springing from the sam e tendency to see reality imagistically or
symbolically. Both language and myth are part of the sam e basic mental
activity” (Avens, 1980, p. 88).
These th ree—memory, narrative, myth—will be shown to be the social
components of our concept of self or, to put it another way, the self-concepts
which we glimpse objectively: in passing, as it were. The three concepts can
be imagined a s pointing inward to a postulated essential self, and so to be
components of it, or only to imply it through their activities (Kirby, 1991). An
image of the self, then, can be said to have been discussed a s long as I was
inquiring into the three aforementioned concepts. Self, then, is the fourth
major conceptual question of this study, even if, upon closer investigation,
this self seem s to waver or disappear entirely a s an object of perception
(Lacan, 1977; Foucault, 1988; Sprinker, 1980; Lejeune, 1989) leaving us
with the se n se “that we are not real” (Avens, 1980, p. 72).
This perception of the self, so dependent on the fantasies bred within
our cultural framework and the myths we live (Hillman, 1975b; Campbell,
1990), may largely determine our openness or closedness to experience. A
W eltanschauung does not simply arrive one day; we grow within it and may
find the possibility of experience outside of it incomprehensible. Imaginative
production may be understood to be channeled by the above limitations, so

that perception is itself > ^aginatively guided and limited by that
Weltanschauung (Heidegger, 1962; Whitehead, 1978; Perlman, 1988). The
source of imagination—if such an idea has any sen se to it—is then the only
“true” subjectivity, though it can only be undifferentiated unconsciousness
without the forms supplied by the world (Avens, 1980), including those forms
of particle motion and organic instinct (Portmann, 1954/64; Wheeler, 1974).
But imagination is understood to be more than a cause: It is that which
apprehends through and beyond the body’s perceptions (Whitehead, 1978).
As prenarrative combines with creativity to produce self-narratives for Kirby,
the mythic images of the life-world may be thought to combine with the
creative source to embody imagination —both public and private (Hillman,
1977)—and this is the fifth primary concept of this inquiry.
Imagination is the wellspring of fantasy, according to the architect of
archetypal psychology, and all our phenomenal constructions, perceptions,
and attributes are fantasies (Hillman, 1983a). These fantasies may, more
often than not, be less personal than the archetypal images that a world-view
views. Hillman understands that the withdrawal (or possibly theft) of
archetypal projections from the world in our era of objective science has led
to the fantasy of an interior region which has been psychologized a s the
subconscious or unconscious (Freud, 1900/1965; Hillman, 1975a).
Psychologizing is identical to what Hillman m eans by pathoiogizing.

The fantasies behind our experiences of discrete phenom ena are not all to
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be understood as handsome flying horses (imagination taking wing) or
wonder-full daydreams, but also as the pathological underside of our
daylight hopes. (How similar Hillman’s talk of ingressed images is to Lacan’s
of ingressed speech!) At night, our dreams reveal this death lure, this
pathologizing of archetypal contents, as Hillman (1979a) describes:
The imagination at night takes events out of life, and the bricoleur in
the service of the death instinct scavenges and forages for day
residues, removing more and more empirical trash of the personal
world out of life and into psyche for the sake of its love. (p. 128)
In the day, our fantasies usually attempt to put the world together in a
meaningful fashion, to imagine integrated purposes, but fantasy—
imagination—both constructs and destructs:
Imagination works by deforming and forming at one and the same
moment. .. . The pathologized or deformed image is fundamental to
alchemy and to the art of memory, both of which present complex
methods of soul-making. It is the pathologized image in the dream,
the bizarre, peculiar, sick or wounded figure—the disruptive
element—to which we must look for the key to the dream-work. Here
is where the formal cause of the dream is best doing its deformational
work, striking its type into the plasticity of the imagination, (p. 128)
This “deforming” of daylight’s imaging is understood to be alchemical
(Jung, 1971): a reduction first to the basest substance to dismember memory
and a potential transmutation through a return to the dark source. This idea
of alchemical transmutation—a dramatic shift of aw areness—is what I refer to
as metamorphosis (Ovid, 1976; Brown, 1966, 1970), my sixth and final central
concept, and surely the raison d'etre of lifewriting.

These six central concepts have deep etymological, and psychic roots
and are subterraneanly interwoven. In a sense, I have imposed a linear
perspective upon them so one seem s to lead to another: memory leading
vertically downward to the springs of imagination, which, according to
Hillman (1979a, 1979b, 1983a) is the realm of soul-making, the depths of
soul merging into death. It is in the position of such absolute otherness that
metamorphosis is thought to take place. New being now returns vertically
upward —metaphorically speaking—to emerge in a new world under a new
sun. Such new being brings soul into the world—Hillman’s soul-making—so
it may be paradoxically envisioned as the recuperation of “old” being.

§Caveats. This thesis stated so baldly should be open to much criticism: If
it is truly new being, with a different sort of memory, in what sense could it be
said to be the same person who had begun the process? If the process is
seen as a vertical descent, does this imply that each individual, regardless of
temporal-geographic-cultural circumstances, has the potential for the sam e
soul-making regression? Are memory, story, myth, darkness (deformed
imagination) the necessary steps or the exclusive formula for this “ritual"? If
some souls prefer ascent or horizontality to such an atavistic-sounding
regression, must they be understood to be incorrect? If I am quite content
with the world out there and my self in here, am I under some compulsion to
leave my city and enter into the wilderness?
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Sound questions which would destroy the ideation of these six
concepts if they were to be taken as literal and necessary. But they are not.
At this stage, my purpose has been to state in advance the area and nature
of my inquiring, not to proclaim any sort of universal guide to new being. In
fact, I hope to show that the springs of imagination are more within the realm
of memory than memory in the realm of imagination. “New” being cannot be
known from here, if indeed there are such things to know.
Graham (1991) has suggested that autobiography “exists as yet in the
mind of the educational community at large in an undertheorized state” (p. 2).
I wish to sketch the outlines of a memory-theory in support of the varied
autobiographical endeavours underway in curriculum studies. However,
here at the beginning, I must clearly state what my theorizing, speculating,
and conjuring within memory do not imply.
This is not an experimental study with a control group and numerical
data collection; memory will not be “designed” from the outside in. This is not
a comparative review of all the curriculum theory which has made reference
to memory, though representative selections will be reviewed. This is a
review of neither all the philosophers’ writings on memory nor of all the artists
expressing its purview. I am not going to “come into the fields and spacious
palaces o f ... memory, where are treasures of countless images of things of
every manner" (Augustine, 1948) and research the myriad works of historical
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autobiographers, though, of course, some of these will be present to some
degree.
It is my purpose to seek a deeper understanding of the processes and
“objects" of remembering through the application of the hermeneutic
imagination and some journeying through my own “spacious palaces” and
perhaps around some of my memorial lacunae. The phenomena of memory
will be portrayed from speculative philosophical, hermeneutical, and
narrative positions. The dynamic of the past conceptualized tends to
emplace the assumed conceptualizer within it. Instead of merely reciting my
memories, however, I shall attempt also to remember remembering: to seek
out images of memory which may be called preconceptual. In this way I
intend to examine memory by remembering its effects on me and, perhaps,
my affects on it. Memory, like the sense of a moving present which it has
been thought to evoke (Bergson, 1912; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/78), may be the
medium through which we experience the world since it is finally of the world.
This position has been suggested and defended by Bergson (1912,
1911/83), Whitehead (1978), Heidegger (1962, 1977, 1987), and Jung
(1963,1971), among others. Of course, we, ourselves, are also of the world,
but it is one of the themes of this document that therein precisely lies our
amnesia, our “oblivion." Memory, itself, may have been subjugated in the
subjectivism of a culturally-imposed individuality.
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With this possibility opened, memory can only be approached, it
seem s to me, phenomenologically. circuitously and experientially, but
without advancing the expectation of discovering within an authentic self
which does the remembering—though psychic images of such a self may be
found to abound. “If so, then the only adequate approach to im ages—which
provide the primary content of ‘psychic experience’—will be phenomenology,
which is designed precisely to describe ‘immediate experience’ in detail”
(Casey, 1987a, p. 102).
What does it mean to remember? What “idea” of memory do we
already hold? Do all peoples hold a similar idea? How do I experience
memory “working”? Does memory “create” the self, the future? Is there nonrepresentational memory? To attempt a response to such questions, the
poets’ voices may have more legitimacy than those of the philosophers or
psychologists because they experience memory in a less personally
circumscribed, more receptive way. There may even be two separate roots
(Dunne, 1988) or m odes (Casey, 1987b; Kolakowski, 1972/89) of
remembering, which I will speak of shortly and in the conclusion. If different
memories create different selves, curricula may need less enclosure.

§Autobiographical Self; Autobiographical Truth.

It is persuasively

held that the self is a composition of memories without which it could not
possibly exist (Campbell, Jeremy, 1989; Casey, 1987b; Sacks, 1987).

18

Furthermore, these memories may only exist for the self in the present as
stories or narratives, and action and experience may take place a s a plot
advancement of these narratives (Frye, 1957; Crites, 1986). The question
then arises whether the self actually makes decisions about present actions.
If the self is remembered for each decision, can it then take the action of
choosing its own narratives of memory? Is such reconceptualization all that
is needed for transformation? Or is the self merely another fictitious role in a
larger, ongoing drama over which it has no control—is “every self the
articulation of an intersubjectivity structured within and around the discourses
available at any moment in time" (Sprinker, 1980, p. 325)?
The understanding of the self in lifewriting will have determinative
effects on what kind of writing is produced and also in the manner in which
memory is understood. The Freudian (1900/65) understanding of the self as
an ego complex which develops as mediator between the libidinous desires
of the id and the social controls of the superego has provided the
superstructure for much later theorizing on memory and self. The ego
complex is usually understood to have been subsumed by the social
conscience—the superego—through which it attempts to redirect the needs
of the id in a socially accepted manner. Because of the repression and
suppression of those desires which ego finds unacceptable, the unconscious
develops a s the container of “irrepressible” memories and dreams. Worth
noting here is that both dreams and memories—especially neurotic
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memories—are often disguised in symbolic form so that for Freud historical
memories cannot always be separated from fantasies.
Madeleine Grumet, writing in “Psychoanalytic Foundations" in 1976,
seem ed to conceive of the currere project in similar terms: “In our discussion
of currere a s an application of ego psychology we are looking at the
contributions of both consciousness and the unconscious to the structures of
the ego" (p. 113). However, in another article from the sam e period,
“Existential and Phenomenological Foundations" (1976b), she leans away
from Freudian ego-psychology toward Husserl’s transcendental ego for her
conception of self with its attendant preconceptual memories.
Grumet’s collaborator at the time, William F. Pinar, seem ed to employ
a more Jungian conception of the self, though it was never specifically
identified a s such. Currere was conceived by Pinar (1974) a s the verbal
experience of the running-of-the-course, as opposed to the nominative, pre
designed curriculum, or course-to-be-run. As the primary and still most fully
developed method of autobiography in curriculum, currere employs
psychoanalytic terms alongside those of existentialism and phenomenology
and some post-structuralist tropes.
Pinar, coming from the literary arts, approached the ego in a Freudian
sense, but a s artist and existentialist, understood this ego to be basically a
delusion constructed by the repressive forces of social power structures:
“The method of currere is one way to work to liberate oneself from the web of
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political, cultural, and economic influences that are perhaps buried from
conscious view but nonetheless comprise the living web that is a person’s
biographic situation” (1981, p. 437). Liberate to what? Liberation, Pinar
indicates, is an ongoing process, both personally and socially, but he does
seem to obliquely point as well toward a transcendental ego which sounds
very much like the Self which is the culmination of Jung’s centering notion of
individuation away from the uncentered ego:
Just as one cannot peer directly into the sun but can more easily
examine the earth it lights, so one cannot easily peer directly into the
self.. . . One’s effort is always to return to “the things themselves,” to
experience that which is “preconceptual.” The aspiration is to unearth
material hitherto submerged in unconsciousness. (1981, p. 442)
The question of remembering “the things in themselves" is of
paramount importance in any investigation of memory. Can we recall pure
experience, perceptions, or images without peering through a linguistic
subjectivity? The question is moot, but such conceptions as transcendence
or the Jungian Self cannot help but be tinged with such academically
outdated terms as spirit or soul, terms that seemed acceptable to Pinar in
1976 when he compared currere to Zen Buddhist meditation.
Interestingly, the satori or awakening in Zen is considered to be
linguistically impossible to describe—often dismissed in a self-effacing
manner as “nothing special”—but is explained by Suzuki (1954/64) as a
memory without an object: “The awakening is really the rediscovery or the
excavation of a long lost treasure” (p. 179); that is to say, koan-istically, the
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remembering of the face one had before conception. Preconceptual
memory, image, soul, and Z en’s void will be invoked further throughout.
The question arises whether such an inner liberation leads to a private
satori or individuation—a sort of self-actualization without an effect on the

world—or whether the remembering beyond ego takes one directly into the
language and symbol of the world. This is the position of post
structuralists—who most often deny they have a “position” or are even poststructuralists. Politically inspired critical theorists, neo-Marxists, and the
feminists of curriculum also se e the self a s only an illusion, a
“subjectification" of the power elite, and the search for it only “betrays a
hunger for something outside, something beyond judgment according to
which we might be absolutely certain—according to which any one of us
might be the one presumed to know. This is, of course, the logic of
domination” (Pagano, 1991, p. 201).
Individual memory in this view has no purpose whatsoever. Diagnault
and Gauthier (1981) se e only the “paradigm of infinite regression” in seeking
to remember the Self, transcendental ego, or the soul. This is precisely the
point where the phenomenology of memory sh ad es into the hermeneutics of
memory which seek s no final essen ces but only the revelation of the
intersubjectivity of all experience, where the sen se of self is an afterthought
of communal interaction. When we look for original memories or “when we
look for pure perceptions we run the risk of an infinite regress” (Willis, 1991,
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p. 176). Every memory is a re-membering. This sense of memory is
obviously and inextricably linked to the world since it must interpreted in
symbols culturally understood, the chief symbol-system being language. I
understand the pivotal role of language and this intermingling of part and
whole to be two of the themes in the process of the hermeneutic circle, the
third being the inherent creativity of interpretation (Smith, 1991). With this in
mind, my research into memory must include the memory of the world—the
memory within language and semiotics—as well as the memory within the
presumably private self, or image of that self.
Dismissing the self as a fiction should not really have such an impact
on what sort of experience remembering is. Dismissing anything as a fiction
is just another way of falling into an infinite regress. It is like declaring that
metaphors are not clear writing—as if there were any writing that was not
metaphor (Olney, 1972). Language, itself, may dismissed as fiction—even
though it seem s to some like Lacan (1977), Derrida (1978), and Kristeva
(1989) to be the only “reality” we have. The self may be just a fiction within a
linguistic fiction within another fiction of “the world,” but we’re going to have
to live with it either way, as Philippe Lejeune (1989) expostulates: “Telling
the truth about the self, constituting the self as complete subject—it is a
fantasy. In spite of the fact that autobiography is impossible, this in no way
prevents it from existing” (p. 132). Olney (1980) suggests that for a self to
deny its own existence is either "bravura” or “anxiety” when he states that
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what they are still troubling about is the self and consciousness or
knowledge of it, even though in a kind of bravura way some of them
may be denying rather than affirming its reality or its possibility. And
this is the crux of the matter, the heart of the explanation for the special
appeal of autobiography to students of literature in recent times: it is a
fascination with the self and its profound, its endless mysteries and,
accompanying that fascination, an anxiety about the self, an anxiety
about the dimness and vulnerability of that entity that no one has ever
seen or touched or tasted, (p. 23)
This sensorily unavailable “entity” throws open the question of the
possibility of there being a phenomenology of the self. Willis (1991) notes
that Pinar and Grumet have largely departed from the fields of
phenomenology, Grumet into using autobiography to develop feminist theory
and as the foundation for teacher education, and Pinar for more abstract
philosophical theorizing, neither seeking any longer to “peer into the sun" of
an essential self:
The intuitive scanning of one’s own primary experience, which Pinar
and Grumet suggest, is borrowed directly from the philosophical
phenomenological tradition, although in elaborating it in their own
ways appropriate to curriculum studies they have not pursued the
traditional philosophic search for universal essences within
experience, (p. 180)
Individual memory, then, can hardly be trustworthy as to its facticity. In
this interpretation there is no unique soul which remembers.
Hermeneutically, to remember is to interpret and to interpret is to involve us
in the semiotic world which created a space for our sense of self in the first
place. We must always remember through the lens of who we think we are,
and there may be all sorts of blind spots and wish fulfillments involved in
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such remembering. I have experienced it with friends or acquaintances
when we have reminisced over occasions in which we had shared. Unless
our stories had been shared together over the years to produce mutual
memories, I have found the extent to which our memories have varied
nothing short of astonishing. Both in detail and overall effect it has seemed
we could not possibly have been at the sam e place at the sam e time. And
my memory was so clear!
Truth in autobiography with regard to times, dates, and the unfolding
of events has been questioned in autobiographical theory for a long while. In
the quest for truth, even autobiographers have had biographies written of
them, Henry Miller being one example (Jay, 1978; Dearborn, 1991).
Mary McCarthy, in Memories of a Catholic Girlhood (1957), first told
her narratives with all her “natural” judgmentalism and superiority, then
checked the facts in italicized sections at the end of each chapter from
records and relatives and wondered about the discrepancies and
generalizations her own character had produced. Further backing the “law”
of infinite regression, however, was that, opposed to her own opinions and
memories in many cases, were simply other opinions and memories. She
claims the writing and research were important experiences in themselves,
however.
Going even further in the quest for truth is Ronald Fraser in his
fascinating multi-layered recollection In Search of a Past: The Manor House,

Amnersfield 1933-1945 (1984). Fraser, himself a historical researcher, was

this time his own historian. Recalling his basic impressions, he also gathers
the memories of the servants who worked at the Manor House and their often
opposing viewpoints on the events surrounding his childhood. As a third
approach, he relinquishes the role of questioner to be questioned himself in
psychoanalysis. The revelations come fast and furious but in the end nothing
is resolved, as indicated by his analyst’s response to his (Fraser’s) pleas for
a summative opinion. The analyst replies: “ ... ” The hint, it seems, is that it is
in the writing, in the quest itself, that a sense of meaning—even meaning as
an endless project—is discovered.
In Childhood (1983), Nathalie Sarraute tries a different approach.
Writing as an octogenarian, she allows two separate voices (at least) to
recreate her past, one of which seem s to be more frivolous and youthful and
the other more stern and less forgiving. She attempts to be true to the facts of
the past, yet succeeds in an evocation of personal experience which refuses
to be hooked into a single self.
Though history, itself, has been seen as a fictitious concatenation by
those who interpret its impossibly disparate events (Veyne, 1988; Young,
1990), the above examples are unashamedly literary and not at all like the
memoirs of the rich and famous. There is no pretence of historical fact,
despite the unusual efforts to discover it. The truest past, the past as creative
of self, it seems, is discovered in its portrayal and the experience of such
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portrayal. The addition of other voices may take a summative unity of
experience beyond reach, but the additional dimensions express a truth to
which a mere chronology can never attain. The paradox of symbology may
not reveal a self but it opens out in the twilight realm of that from which selves
are created, according to these artists. The literal succumbs to the literary in
autobiography, which does not imply purposeful deception, as Pinar has
noted, but an expansion of the Lebenswelt and the memorying which
subtends It: “we aim, in autobiography, at truthfulness, not truth, at
expanding and complicating the lived space in which we dwell, through
which we experience the world—as that space expands, so does the world to
which we have access” (quoted in Edgerton, 1992, p. 192).
This “truthfulness" seems to be a reference to honesty when delving
into one’s personal store of memories, misguided as they may be, but it also
implies the bold truthfulness necessary to doubt their eternal veracity. Such
deconstructing and reconstructing is what Pinar (1992b) implies in his notion
of “an architecture of self," what Edgerton (1992) interprets as “a construction
that takes seriously the boundaries one has erected as well as dissolved" (p.
188), or as Pinar (1992b) states simply: “What is planned and constructed
can be deconstructed” (p. 395). Memory, then, must be considered fallible,
subject to one’s present blueprints. But from where have the blueprints
emerged? Surely, they can only have changed from memory’s creation
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through spontaneous inspiration—presumably in solitude—or through
dialogic insight, a merging of one’s house blueprint into a community plan.
Spontaneous inspiration has no part in the doubting of both personal
memory and the social memory which forms it, according to the sociological
wing of the group of curricular theorists once called reconceptualists (Pinar,
1975, 1988b). This “wing” largely derives from the neo-Marxism of the
Frankfurt School and have more recently been characterized a s critical
theorists. Writers like Giroux and McLaren (1989) and Apple (1979)
understand the past to be purposeful deceptions of capitalistic power and
they work prolifically to reveal the “hidden” curriculum which supports the
ideological elite. They succeed in revealing the industrial support system
that schools are urged to become and the artifice of both public and private
memory, but there still seem s to be the suggestion that they are somehow
tuned in to a higher justice and deeper truth:
The interest of the critical tradition is not just persuasion but a
predetermination to shape the social order in fixed directions; it
requires material evidence of ideas translated into practice. The
curricular agenda of the critical has the character of a blueprint
operating in the name of justice. Pedagogy is concerned with
mobilizing the social conscience of students into acts of naming and
eradicating the evils of the times. (Smith, 1991, p. 196)
Apparently there is no point in personal remembering, a s such activity
merely supports the ideological illusion of individuality. Remembering must
be done in like-minded groups basically to recall the social injustices to
which we have been heir. Pinar (1981) feels they have lost contact with their
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own inspirations and what they “are telling us when they insist upon the
primacy of economic and political determinants of human life is that they
themselves are so conditioned.. .. Structurally they are no different from their
counterparts on the Right. Both confess their vulnerability to the social by
their preoccupation with if (p. 435). He could have added that
hermeneutically or deconstructively speaking their interpretations can only
be narratives open to the infinite regress of further interpretation. This is still
a contentious point in the field, but it does seem that most thinkers who see
memory as purely an ideological construct usually can only offer a
truer—even if intricately subtle—ideological construct to replace it.
Madeleine Grumet (1991) now sees ideology embedded in our
memories and our interpretations of them. Our imagined truths are more
often merely the discourse of our place absorbed by the site of our bodies.
To diminish the concretization of such ideological identities and to open it to
new perspectives, she asks for more self-criticism: “After years of working
with autobiography I have learned to ask for multiple accounts in order to
diminish coherence and the ideologies that accompany stories that attempt
to bind together the varied moments of our lives into a logic of development,
purpose, or necessity" (p. 108). This implies that such logic obscures a truth
more than creates one. She does not have another ideology, however, with
which to transform past memories. She instead seem s to move her students
to understand that they are themselves narrative constructs:
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Narrative is a form for inquiry that can contain both the world and
relations within which it becomes the focus for our attention, a locus of
concern, a system of meanings, in short, our world. The narrative
encodes time and space. Like our bodies, it literally takes place. Its
story line takes up time, as do we, from beginning to end” (p. 107).
Though narrative products, self and truth seem, in her regard, to be always
being storied, in process, and never grasped.
The only autobiographical theorist in curriculum today who may
believe in more truthful memories than those we first conjure up seem s to be
Richard Butt and his colleague Danielle Raymond. Early on, Butt (1985)
employed such Freudian ideas as projection and defence-mechanisms to
explain the misconceptions in our narratives of memory. Such Freudian
terms imply a self which uses delusion to maintain its identity schema. This
was later tempered with more existentialist and phenomenological terms as
revealed in the title of his 1990 essay, “Autobiographic Praxis and Self
Education: From Alienation to Authenticity.” By the authentic memory or the
authentic self, Butt may be only implying the “truthfulness” as suggested by
Pinar a s an approach and not the confessional outpouring of St. Augustine
or Rousseau or Freud’s patients, but this is uncertain.
The use of the term “authenticity” does suggest that there are truer
narratives than others, however, and Graham (1991) states this means Butt
and Raymond have not accepted language as being merely a system of
differences without actual referential signifieds:
It would appear that Butt and Raymond are committed from the outset
to a view of language as a transparent medium and consequently

30

consider that the value of a narrative account lies primarily in the
extent to which it can be checked out for its correspondences to some
previous event. In other words, Butt and Raymond seem to want an
autobiographical narrative to resemble a window that provides access
to some preexisting reality uncontaminated by the writing process and
the intentions of the writer, (p. 114)
According to Graham, this is a motivating factor behind the
development of “collaborative autobiography” for Butt and Raymond (1987,
1989) and Butt, Raymond, and Yamagishi (1988). Graham notes the
emphasis on trust in the collaboration but also that “on the other hand, the
researchers’ desire to sit in on the teachers’ classrooms in order to check out
whether the teachers were telling the truth about themselves and their
practices provides a broad hint that they may be ambivalent about the status
of their own narratives of the teachers’ classrooms as fictional constructions
themselves" (p. 115).

In my view, Graham overstates his case. The teachers with whom Butt
and Raymond, and now Butt and Townsend (1990), work all wish to see
themselves more honestly and take responsibility for their own behavioral
blind spots. They have entered into collaborative autobiography less as a
search for final truth, than in an effort to overcome the defensive
programming of their own ego-schemata. If identity is intersubjective, as is
demanded by those who wonder at their own words, then collaborative
autobiography may well prove to be a way to ease the grip of narcissism
(Lasch, 1984) and to objectify the self, discovering the social interactions
which are always in the process of creating us.
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Butt does seem to accept an inescapable “isness” in personhood, as
well as a “condemned to be free" attitude, a s anyone who has been
influenced by Sartrean existentialism would be expected to accept, and Butt
(1990) tells us he has. He refers (1991), however, to the unique research
tool of his and Raymond’s as worthwhile not because of its true revelations of
self but because it is “energizing and empowering for teachers”:
Raymond and I evolved collaborative autobiography as a m eans for
understanding teachers’ knowledge and development. The process
provides a powerful m eans through which the teacher can express
who she is and who she wishes to become. In our experience, it is
very energizing and empowering for teachers. It enables significant
renewal and professional development. This approach highlights
storytelling a s a dynamic and culturally appropriate form of pedagogy,
(p. 273)
Finally, it seem s to me, the factualness of memory is not what is
important to Butt or his collaborators. Fundamentally, he is most concerned
with the meaning and experience of actual teachers engaged in teaching
and, most often, on their terms: “In interpreting and reconstructing our past,
present, and futures, we move beyond what we thought before through
action. In exploring these notions through acting them out we are able to
rehearse the possibility of transformation” (Butt, 1991, p. 276).
It is interesting to note that a s Pinar in recent years has largely
forsaken the interactions of autobiographical work in graduate classes—
certainly not attempting to take currere personally into the public schools—
and has withdrawn into the Castelian abstractions of ever more esoteric
autobiographic theory (Kincheloe & Pinar, 1991; Pinar & Reynolds, 1992),
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Butt has moved directly into the schools to work with teachers in the field
(Butt, Raymond, Yamagishi, 1988; Butt, Townsend, Raymond, 1991).
There are two varying approaches to memory here, both of them
necessary to our existence a s humans but perhaps opposed even in origin
(Neumann, 1954; Kolakowski, 1972/89). One sees memory a s techne: a
practical assistant to action; the other sees memory as memor: mindfulness,
a recoil of the soul upon itself whose only product seem s to be actions,
representations, and artifacts which serve the needs of the animal body not
at all. Heidegger saw the difference this way: “Only now, within the widely
and deeply grasped essence of memory, the contrast emerges between that
firm hold on things, which the Romans called memoria tenere, and
evanescence" (In Krell, 1990, p. 297).
Seeking a “firm hold,” even collaboratively with the full agreement of
the collaborators, is not the architecture of self Pinar (1992b) envisions: “One
danger of autobiography is further reification of these processes, and the
construction of an unchanging edifice, a skyscraper proudly proclaiming its
owner and occupants" (p. 406). Pinar’s blueprints of self are not mazes
within which we can at last find our way because—collaboratively—the
neighbours phone to tell us where we are; such deconstructing blueprints
more resemble the runes of an anarchitecture whose self-constructions
evanesce even as they are glimpsed. I will discuss this further a s I discuss
the self as aesthetic creation.
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Connelly and Clandinin (1991), narrative researchers in other
teachers’ stories, have given up the expectation of finding a true self behind
the stories they encounter. Somewhat uncomfortably, it seem s, they admit:
There are more Ts" than person and researcher within each research
participant. . . . In narrative inquiry we see that the practices drawn out
in the research situation are lodged in our personal knowledge of the
world. One of our tasks in writing narrative accounts is to convey a
sense of the complexity of all the T s ” all of the ways each of us have of
knowing, (p. 140)
They accept no authentic, singular self but a plurality of selves, each,
presumably with its own memorial interpretations. How, then, it may be
wondered, do they manage to decide which accounts are “more authentic”
and which “less authentic"? They have developed their own system for
approximating the truth, it seem s:
In our studies we use the notions of “adequacy” and “plausibility.” A
“plausible” account is one that tends to “ring true.” It is an account of
which one might say “I can see that happening.” Thus, while fantasy
may be an invitational element in fictional narrative, plausibility exerts
firmer tugs in empirical narratives, (p. 136)
In their notion of empirical narratives, they may find an ally in Grumet
(1991), who feels autobiography should be subject to both a sympathetic
hearing and an expert review. This does not explain how some of the finest
works of “pure” fiction so seduce us with their “adequacy” and “plausibility.” If
the self is a figment of social discourse, it must be wondered where spaces
are opened for pure fictions in the first place, or if a space within a mythic sort
of fiction opens out into the facticity of individual memory. Whence comes
imagination or intuition into this culturally-determined intersubjectivity?
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Curricular autobiography has been somewhat appropriated a s a
mode of liberation for feminists (e.g., Benstock, 1988; Grumet, 1988; Pagano,
1990; Witherell & Noddings, 1991), or self-realization for marginal groups in
general. For such groups, the question of the ultimate reality of the self may
seem unimportant. According to Edgerton (1992), the question is which self
to becom e—that offered by the larger society or the self seeking existence
within its own cultural memories:
Often, in “writing the self into existence” such authors are also actively
engaged in writing an entire people along with them. This alters the
context for theorizing about autobiography from the apparent context
for much written autobiographical theory. This context, with its larger
pedagogical and emancipatory project, can render argum ents about
“fictions of the self" pedantic, but, at the sam e time it renders the
isolated, unified, “self-identical” self obsolete—a distortion, (p. 186)
Dewey and G. H. Mead, according to Graham (1991), understood long
ago that the self is social, and it is for this reason feminists have taken issue
with the individualism—either a s self-referential or self-creative—of much
autobiographical writing and theory. Identity, it is claimed, is exclusively
relational, so claims to individualism only reflect the mutual projections of a
privileged—read employed white heterosexual m ale—minority. Friedman
(1988) claims both Georges Gusdorf and Jam es Olney in Olney’s 1980
collection of autobiographical essay s ignore “the differences in socialization
in the construction of male and female gender identity” (pp. 34-35) and
perpetrate the myth of individuality presumably to the detriment of those, like
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women, who are either not so privileged or so inclined toward individuality.
We recall ourselves differently through different socializations.
The argument may be “academic.” Individuality conceived as an
impregnable castle, or a towering skyscraper, imagines itself as self-created
and established behind its thick walls of self-defenses. Of course, such
rugged individualism has no doubt about the correctness of its memories and
values and so, like Dirty Harry, can discern the good “us” from the evil “them"
and proceed, apparently, to blow the evil others away without remorse.
Socially constructed subjectivity, on the other hand, sometimes leans
so far into the communal register that positions become rules and variance
ceases to be tolerated. Mythically, this is the change from inspired prophets
to priestly “orders.” Autobiography in support of feminist positions which
remembers socialized injustice has been called empowering by many (e.g.,
Miller, 1987; Roman, Christian-Smith, Ellsworth, 1988) but there is a danger
here of a presumption of knowing what true justice, or true selves are: an
essentialism which ignores, again, the hermeneutic paradigm of infinite
regression, as well a s forgetting that even "essential” selves must have
developed a s places in some community.
William Pinar (1992b), politically feminist, reminds us that communal
relations may be modified from “commodity” relations, but also that there is a
time when even the most socially-oriented autobiographers must withdraw
into a situation, if not of individualism, then certainly of isolation:
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Autobiography as alternately sublimated and desublimated modalities
of self-self, self-other, and self-object relations, is itself an exclusion,
an absence, in schools and in the public sphere generally. To engage
oneself and others autobiographically reconnects the minimalized,
psychological self of the public, political sphere as it de-commodifies
interpersonal relations. Such engagement risks debasement if
performed exclusively or primarily through speech, that presence of
immediacy which recapitulates the momentariness of m ass culture.
Only through the “secondariness” of writing, solitarily, in a
Kierkegaardian “soliloquy with oneself,” can the architect construct
(and deconstruct) his presence to himself and to others in the world.
(p. 408)
Despite the different cultural and political projects of feminists in
general, it is possible that most women, for whatever reason, remember in
different ways than most men. Benstock (1988) has indicated in her
introductory chapter that
women's writings often proceed from anxiety rather than desire and
are written under the sign of melancholia rather than mourning. These
differences—which mark in a general sense a difference between
male and female writing—give rise to a specially marked form of
writing, one that situates the loss that is the spur to creation not in the
past (as Freud and Lacan theorized) but rather in the future, reading
its possibilities as the aging process itself, (p. 8)
Be that as it may, it seem s that most can agree that self is a social
construct. This opens up problems when it is considered upon what site
such a self is constructed. To ignore the body, both in its unique placement
and its genetically specific drives and attributes, is to fall into behaviorism in
which there is no free-will allowed the person at all (except for the free-will of
the experts who decide what behaviors are most appropriate). Felicity
Nussbaum (1988) indicates that socially created subjectivity, of the kind
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described by Lacan or Foucault, does not imply that such a subject is unable
to participate in its own ongoing, shifting process, but can “adopt a position”
within the language-world:
This reformulated "self," then, is a product of specific discourse and
social process. Individuals construct them selves as subjects through
language, but individual subjects—rather than being the source of
their own self-generated and self-expressive meaning—adopt
positions available within language at a given moment. This
disruption of the traditional self redefines the individual as a position, a
locus where discourses intersect, and subjectivity a s a social construct
that is constantly being reorganized. The intersections between social
relations and individual subject perpetually shift and change to
produce an inconsistent and contradictory subject, (pp. 149, 150)
In my quest for memory, is there any use to looking toward the
individual, or som e sort of inner essence, at all—even the body—, or should I
focus only on the larger memories of the language-world which has told us
who we are? Nussbaum indicates we are an intersection of discourses.
W as there any “being” in us before we were introduced to the world of others:
of language, but also the semiotics of faces, of touches, and of aural tones.
Martha Heyneman, in an article called “The Mother Tongue" (1992), is
ambivalent on this point. By looking at the stories of those who were
deprived of normal human contact of the sort described above in their
earliest years, she notes how fearful or “bestial” these beings were. (“Bestial”
may be an unfortunate choice of words, however, because many of the
“lower” animals are alone from the moment of hatching and seem to survive
on genetically-programmed knowledge.)
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She mentions the famous experiment of Frederick II (1194-1250) of
Germany who had som e children reared without sound or touch or facial
interplay to se e if they would speak Greek or Hebrew or whatever. They all
died. Casper Hauser who spent his first years in a dungeon had great
difficulty in distinguishing things and learning depth perception as opposed
to a chaos of colours on a flat service. The Wild Boy of Aveyron never
learned anything to speak of. For hum ans—who can be sure of dolphins or
chimps?—early contact with the “mother tongue" seem s to be necessary for
identity and for life, itself. As the poet Rilke (1939) wrote, elegaically:
Mother, ... you arched over those new eyes
the friendly world, averting the one that was strange.
Where, oh where, are the years when you simply displaced
for him, with your slender figure, the surging abyss?

Heyneman feels “There is a sense that one is calling another, and a
recognition that one has been called by others, out of darkness and
uncontrollable chaos” (p. 10). Her paramount example is Helen Keller who,
she notes, had nineteen months as an infant to experience those aspects of
the mother tongue to awaken her soul before being plunged into her
particular darkness and silence for the next six years. Helen became
articulate enough to attempt to explain the oblivion of her previous life:
Before my teacher came to me, I did not know that I am. I lived in a
world that was a no-world. I cannot hope to describe adequately that
unconscious, yet conscious time of nothingness. I did not know that I
knew aught, or that I lived or acted or desired. I had neither will nor
intellect. I was carried along to objects and acts by a certain blind
natural impetus. I had a mind which caused me to feel anger,
satisfaction, desire. These two facts led those about me to suppose
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that I willed and thought. I can remember all this, not because I knew it
was so, but because I have tactile memory. It enables me to
remember that I never contracted my forehead in the act of thinking___
I also recall factually the fact that never in a start of the body or a
heartbeat did I feel that I loved or cared for anything. My inner life,
then, was a blank without a past, present, or future. (Keller, 1910. The
World I Live in. p. 113. In Heyneman, 1992, p. 11)
Personal memory, then, in these theories, cannot exceed itself; it
cannot go back to personal memories before the life-force was summoned
into the world by the mother tongue because there was no person there. In
the life-world, personal memories seem to be created in the shifting loci
“where discourses intersecf (Nussbaum), rather then gathering around a
central core of self. If one is to pursue memory, then, the quest must be into
the formative discourses which have intersected at the position of subjectivity
and continue to do so. Because of our intersubjectivity, our sen se of self is
constantly changing, though primary memory and body memory provide us
with a sense of continuity (Casey, 1987b, next section). It is no wonder
memories are seldom, if ever, exact when our very identities are so
intermingled with those of others. In this situation, it must be admitted that
imagination is always active in our remembering.
But this too fails to escape the paradigm of infinite regression. If our
imagination is given a vague sort of primacy and we can now announce our
autobiographies to be artistic fictions, it brings us no closer to the mystery of
how memory extends into the language-world. History, as noted, is most
often merely the “official version” of the past, a narrow sequencing of events
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according to present interpretation. Pinar (1992b) indicates that our
narratives of memory always reach back into the larger stories of our culture
and must do so. Not just the official history of a people but what we today
would call their literature and other arts provide the mythic context from which
our imagining takes the form for remembered life-stories:
Cultural myths are, of course, intertwined with personal myths. In one
se n se an architect of self works with the material of myths, especially
its literary subgenre, stories. We tell stories about our families, our
school history, etc., and in so doing interpret experience, creating
fictions. Our personal stories occur in cultural stories, sometimes
coinciding with the latter, sometim es told in opposition or denial of
them. The point is that in a Nietzschean sen se the self is fictive; it is an
aesthetic creation, and the m eans by which the self is planned and
“built” are story-telling and myth-making, (p. 394)
But if the self is an “aesthetic creation," a “mythmaking” project, it still
leaves the question moot as to the sources of such imaginative myths. Do
we remember and somehow reassem ble the potential tales or inspired
visions within the language-world? Infinite regression again: We
understand inspiration to come from the “unconscious,” but is such an
unconscious within us as soul or biological potential, or “around” us in the
repressed unsaid of the linguistic? Why are som e driven to “reassem ble”
and others to remain assem bled?
This approaches the peculiarly W estern dichotomy referred to a s that
of the subject/object. In the mediaeval West, the study of alchemy first
seem ed to locate the unconscious within, a s in the depths of soul:
Mercurius ... is an absolutely primitive concept, a projection
symbolizing the unconscious itself where nothing can be
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differentiated. He is in effect a symbol of the subjective factor, the
unconscious as a dynamic energetic substance correlated with other
aspects of energy composing the cosmos. Its essence is
symbol-production. . . . Mercurius is the inchoate source of the
conscious complex, the ego, which is the son of darkness and through
which the “world” comes into existence. (Grinnell, 1973, p. 17)
In other cultures, especially those where a "within” simply has no
place, the source of all mystery was the world itself. For the Australian
Aborigine, the world was derived from the Dreamtime, and his existence
always a part of the Dreaming: “An Aborigine can never escape the sacred
history of his people. He is constantly in contact with a metaphysical
perspective which conditions his way of thinking and acting” (Cowan, 1992,
p. 64).
Each case indicates a supra-personal remembering or a potential for
such, either in the encounter with the unconscious or with the gods who are
always present. Imagining gives shape to the vague intuitions of memory so
that self and world again intermingle like a dream that can’t be grasped.
Such intuitions in our era have led to the idea that we have paid a price for
projecting the gods (or God) far beyond Earth and introjecting our unique
egos, our subjectivities, within. A. Vernon Woodworth (1989) has bluntly
stated in his article, “Architecture and the Anima Mundi: Transformations in
Sacred Space," that “the displacement of deities to a heavenly region
resulted in a lessening in the experience of sacred immanence, that is, of the
Anima Mundi” (p. 135). It may be said that what we now somewhat
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disparagingly call imagination w as taken from the world and introjected with
our subjectivities, where, for those receptive, it still continues to work.
This imagination, I hope to show throughout this paper, is more a
particular kind of reception to images conserved in memory than the reverse.
Yeats in “The Second Coming" (1921) expressed his tendency to be subject
to such spells or visions:
Hardly are those words out
When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi
Troubles my sight, (lines 11-13)
The editors then proceed to quote Yeats to expand on his notion of
"Spritus Mundi”:

Or Anima Mundi, the Great Memory. “Before the mind’s eye, whether
in sleep or waking, came images that one was to discover presently in
som e book one had never read, and after looking in vain for
explanation to the current theory of forgotten personal memory, I came
to believe in a great memory passing on from generation to
generation. . . . Our daily thought was certainly but the line of foam at
the shallow edge of a vast luminous s e a ” (Per Arnica Siientia Lunae,
“Anima Mundi,” § ii. In Allison, et al., 1983, p. 883).
Such a “Great Memory,” composed a s it is of images, speaks of a
preconceptual memory, the existence of which remains a controversial
question in these language-immersed times, and one which can never be
finally resolved (from our present emplacement). We certainly cannot think
our way to a preconceptual state, and direct experience of such a state can
have no memoried content, depending as it does on re-presentation. Aoki
(1991), however, still believes in the “mindfulness” of direct experience, and
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Zen masters did not seem to mind that their aw areness was not explainable.
It was, after all, “nothing special" (Suzuki, 1954/64).
Autobiographical truth and the self of autobiography are going to have
to wait for someone else to locate their referents. I have unearthed
indications that, though memory cannot be “counted on” for self-certainty or
for truth, its very evanescence may lead it to images of a preconceptual state,
a "dreamtime” which may be a sort of fount of imagination, though this can
never be known, that is, known conceptually. It may certainly be imagined.
But this is not to eschew the ego or the power of its critical concepts.
Heyneman’s (1992) description of the “spiritual path” may apply a s well to
those who attempt to remember beyond words and it seem s a good place to
end this extended section:
It seem s ironic that later in life, if we pursue a spiritual path, we
struggle with the ego, to still the stream of incessant chatter that began
at our birth, and to realize our own nothingness, in order to make room
in ourselves for something greater than the ego. But it takes a strong
ego with a critical mind to distinguish what is genuinely greater from
what is ersatz, and to surrender voluntarily to ... what one has been
looking for all one’s life. If we had not been called out of nonbeing by
our mother and father, or those who undertook to fill their places, there
would be no pilgrim to set out on the search, (pp. 11, 12).

§ P h en o m en a of R em em bering an d B eyond.

Edward C asey's

Remembering: A Phenomenological Study (1987b), ten years in the writing

and a follow-up to his Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (1976), and
David Farrell Krell’s O f Memory, Reminiscence, and W riting: On the Verge
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(1990), which he claims has been in process since his research proposal for
his dissertation in 1969, have been highly suggestive in my often pathless
wanderings in the labyrinth of memory. Both are phenomenological studies,
though Casey transcends the phenomenological method when he takes
“memory beyond mind,” and Krell deconstructs his own writing in a
fascinating manner as he allows into his text the whisperings of the literature
that spoke to him in his investigations.
Casey’s book is a revelation, ultimately affirming for the Great Memory,
or anima mundi, thus somewhat humbling for our proud humanistic—man
the measure of all things—enterprise. Krell’s book is an astonishing tour de
force which he considers “a long and interesting death" (p. x/). He begins by

quoting himself when he was setting out that "Memory has a way of
transforming any content into a wondrous appearance, bathing even the
most traumatic event in a soothing light...” but concludes his preface with the
resignation: “I wanted that soothing light for my writing, but it turned out to be
a darkness. A darkness that irony and science could only disperse, never
penetrate” (p. xii).
Krell, primarily known as a Heidegger scholar, has understood the
erasure that Derridean post-structuralism requires. The very structure of

language, its linear sentencing and its skyscraper constructions built by
argument from the ground up, is the source of what we call sense and from
which we derive meaning. It is the victory of logos over ...something, but this
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something has not been inscribed in language and cannot be inscribed into
it without becoming another linear plank in the unending skyscraper. Krell
has presented a magnetic text which succeeds more than anything outside of
literature in evoking what a post-structure might be, what forgotten 6lan vital
might lie in what the structure has dismissed as madness: “But this crisis in
which reason is madder than m adness—for reason is non-meaning and
oblivion—and in which madness is more rational than reason, for it is closer
to the wellspring of sense, however silent or murmuring—this crisis has
always begun and is interminable” (Derrida, 1978, p. 62).
In this brief section, however, I shall delineate Casey’s work in order to
make some foundational sense for the chapters to follow. Casey’s (1987b)
position is that “plural modes of access to the remembered past are far more
plentiful than philosophers and psychologists have managed to ascertain" (p.
xi), though he does make exception for the cognitive-behavioral work of

Marcia K. Johnson (1985). Because of these multifarious modes of
remembering and its always “on the verge" aspect, Casey says that, unlike
imagining, in “remembering, there is an unresolvable ‘restance’1—resistance
as well as remainder—which calls for a different approach" (p. xi).
Casey claims we are drawn away from the earthy burden of
remembering toward Milan Kundera’s “unbearable lightness of being" (1985)

1Derrida (1981)
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and Nietzsche’s “active forgetfulness" (1983). It is for this reason we turn to
the fascination of the computer:
The half-life induced by forgetting, its oblivious half-life, tempts us to
attribute the full reality of remembering to machines. As if by a rigid
law of compensation, the logic seem s to be: the less responsibility I
have for my own remembering, the more I can forget—ultimately, the
more I can forget my own forgetting. And the more I can forget, the
more responsibility I can ascribe to other entities: most conveniently to
computers, or to my own brain or mind regarded as computerlike, (p. 3)
Casey makes several dichotomies, between which some structure can
be discerned. Being who we are, some structure is necessary for us to feel a
sense of place, and without a sense of place, according to Casey, there can
be no remembering. Casey traces philosophies on memory basically from
the works of Plato and those of Aristotle somewhat as follows: Those who
have followed the former he calls the “activist” tradition, and those of the
latter, the “passivist" tradition. Plato, of course, saw knowledge as
anamnesis, a recovery of the forgotten truths from the realm of pure form or

pure ideas: active. Aristotle, on the contrary, understood memory as a waxen
tablet on which were inscribed the detritus of perceptual and intellectual
events: passive—there are correct memories and incorrect memories.
The passivist paradigm has prevailed as science has proved its
effectiveness and factual information has been documented in writing to
make it available to others. Facts are facts, are they not?
Only in the undercurrents of the occult and alchemy did the activist
paradigm continue, until Nietzsche dramatically arrived on the scene to
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announce the death of God and the end of history. Nietzsche pointed out
that, like Luria’s “S.” (1968) who could recall nearly all the details with which
he was confronted, too much memoried data would dissolve identity and
make us insane. “S.” had to actively forget in order to carry on with his life,
yet he did not possess a strong sense of self. Nietzsche advocated forgetting
to avoid the horror—the “heaviness”—of realizing that all is an eternal return.
Heidegger deplored our recalling of the details of egoistic selfhood to
cover over our forgetfulness of being. It was Heidegger who blamed Plato for
taking memory from myth, from the gods, and internalizing it as though it
were some sort of transcendent region for the esoteric elect. Heidegger
(1977), like Casey, recommends “commemorative thought” a s a way to
experience the body in place, to experience time in place, and to awaken to
being. It was Merleau-Ponty (1978 ) who recognized the body a s primary
place of memory. In my Coda and conclusion, I shall expand somewhat on
commemoration and body memory.
Freud and his heirs in psychoanalysis developed an active memory
theory in which either the recovery of repressed memorial contents or the
discovery of the need for forgetfulness would give the ego more scope to
deal with the overwhelming moods or neurotic actions it found the body
undergoing. Jung, of course, implied that memory and dream not only
alleviate repression but provide dangerous but passable doorways to the
bottomless contents of the collective unconscious.
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On the other hand, the passive tradition, according to C asey (1987b),
“is still very much with us, whether it takes the form of a naive empiricism or of
a sophisticated model of information processing.” This is opposed to the
activism “according to which memory involves the creative transformation of
experience rather than its internalized reduplication in images or traces
construed a s copies" (p. 15).
Activism is involved in all remembering to som e extent in that a search
is often required to retrieve even “passive” contents. The objective
experimentalists, usually calling them selves psychologists, are opposed by
the activist originators of schem a theory: “But it is not until recent times that
full-fledged activist models of memory have been developed: e.g., in J a n e t’s
idea of the retroactive transformation of memories by m eans of their
narration^ ... in Bartlett’s theory of the evolving character of memories a s
these are reconstructed by various memorial schem ata; and in Piaget’s
similar theory that memories directly reflect changing schem es of
accommodation to and assimilation of experience" (Casey, 1987b, p. 15).
Activism seem s to be liable to both negative and positive
interpretations. Schem a theory indicates that memories are processed, filed,
censored, or altered to accommodate a schem atic self-representation which
is usually unconsciously derived (Ross, 1992), or in-gathered from social,
especially parental, suggestions. A schem a is mirror-image, an objectively

i Certainly worth noting for autobiographical theorists in curriculum.
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apprehended self. The more unconsciously such schem ata are kept and
held there, the less self-aware we are and the more prone to self-delusions—
though often others around us, to their amusement or disgust, do not partake
of those sam e delusions. Piaget (1973), however, has indicated that self
development can lead to near absolute freedom in choosing what type of
schema, what type of self, we wish to have, so we may choose a self more
likely to be authentic and in tune with the world.
Such ideal free-choice, like choosing a self in a wine-cellar, is
tempered by psychoanalysis, especially the idea that ego and body-image
are learned through identification: “Psychoanalysis proposes a model of
mind that challenges the Cartesian-Lockean prototype. It challenges it not
just by recognizing an unconscious dimension of fantasy and memory, but
also by specifying that mind is ineluctably intersubjective in origin and import.
Such is the implication of the idea of identification itself” (Casey, p. 243).
Psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on active remembering, also tempers
passivism.
Piaget’s optimism, and C asey’s own movement toward freedom in
modes of interpreting the past is tempered in turn by C asey’s own insistence
on memory’s “thick autonomy” (pp. 262-287), in which the very density of
memory resists the attempts of consciousness to plumb its compelling
depths. The mnemonist “S.” in Luria (1968) had to actively forget his
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inundation of memories to have even a semblance of identity, which points to
other difficulties with this model.
Krell (1989) wonders whether the activism of memory is in
consciousness, the schematic self, or is in another “nonspace": “What if that
activist paradigm held the secret of the vaunted ‘autonomy’ and ‘freedom’ of
remembering, a freedom exercised in the nonspace of the soul—a soul, to be
sure, infected by the body and its hollows?” (p. 253) He doubts that the act of
remembering can be separated from its narration, as Casey sometimes
implies. Memory as impressions on a wax tablet (Aristotle) is the very writing
from which our thinking on memory continues to derive, as Krell contends:
Memory is engrammatology, the gleaning of incised marks or engrams
as though they were letters, vpanpaxa. - It will not do to flee the
passivism of wax for a phenomenological activism. For the activist
gleaning remains wholly embroiled in the passivist typography.
“Freedom” is engrammatological; “truth” iconographic; and both are
typographic, (p. 254)
Narrative proceeds by defining and dichotomizing. The
dichotomization inherent in consciousness may be what leads us to fantasies
of separation from the world or from each other, including the subject-object
polarity. Consciousness must divide to grow. Aware of this, Casey’s review
of his next dichotomies, primary and secondary memory (derived from
William James), also imply some difficulties with Piaget’s optimism.
Secondary memory deals with those memories which in Whitehead’s
(1978) words have “perished” subjectively and become “objective occasions"
which can affect us only through “efficient causation.” In other words they

have no direct influence on our immediate state of awareness. They must be
“recalled" before they can be heard from. Primary memory, on the contrary,
sounds suspiciously like self-schema or like Whitehead's "presentational
immediacy”: It is the zone of collected habits—physical, cognitive,
perceptual—from which we act and experience. It works mainly on an
unconscious level but need not do so. To become conscious of primary
memory is to become conscious of the "storied nature of the self” (Schank,
1990), or of our phenomenological “lived reality," but it must be born in mind
that primary “memory” also contains body and place imperatives which may
become, at best, subliminally conscious —but which are always aware.
Primary memory is referred to by Kerby (1991) a s “character” or
“habitus”: “This character is thus constituted by a more or less unified and
unifying substrate of habitualities or dispositions, of act types exhibiting a
lawfulness determined by prior sedimented ego properties [ego: a pole of
identity rather than a substantial entity]—what in medieval thought was
termed a habitus” (p. 20).
For the alchemists, however, the dark side of character was the
habitus. The unconscious motivations within this habitus were considered to

be the primary source of all the self-deceptions, cruelties, and evil in
individuals who imagined themselves a s pure and good—negative
motivations ultimately derived from the shadow-side of parents. Grinnell

52

(1973), a modern alchemist, refers to these aspects as “rabid dog" which
fears the loving redemption metaphorized as flowing water:
For, as Jung says, there is [sic] evil and darkness in the parents which
can only come to light in their offspring. And so collectively, childish,
brutally short-sighted goals of pride and concupiscence which have
hardened into a habitus reveal themselves as a sort of hydrophobic
dog. . . . It condenses into itself solar and lunar agencies at a bestial
level in which evil has hardened into a habitus and the diseased eros
passed on by the parents acts like the foaming rage of a rabid dog.
(pp. 104, 105)
Memory functioning within the habitus of the present is already
whispering its stories of love, warning, purpose, and identity. It surrounds our
thinking and feeling like a cloud of possibility and limitation. Our actions
spring from the character we have become in our life-world drama. To
realize our part and the rationalizations or loyalties which condition it, we
must make conscious the narratives within which we are presently living, the
“part" of the story we are presently acting out. Others have suggested we can
make such things conscious through reflection, especially as reflected in a
form of lifewriting. To write the self, however, is not to discover it. Like fractal
geometry, the hermeneutic of memory promises only infinite regress.
Or does it? This habitus, this Lebenswelt, may consist of primary
stories or first principles which stay with us always, but often it is a shifting
pattern of narratives in which ideas and occasionally even values shift over
time. Seeking the boundary of lived reality may indeed be to discover only
whirling compasses and disorienting clouds. As Einstein predicted, a
straight line out at some point arrives at its starting point. As Nietzsche
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declared, there is only the eternal return. A quest to discover the borders of
the habitus we are may have us travelling in circles—not an endless
regression but a labyrinthine journey which transforms the traveller.
Still, there are problems with Casey’s dichotomizing. Krell (1989)
asks: “Why does Casey accept the division into primary and secondary
remembering when, as he concedes, primary remembering does not even
pertain to memory?” (p. 262). Casey, himself, casts doubt on both his
active/passive and primary/secondary distinctions in his impressive final
chapters on body memory, place memory, and commemoration, all
considered in his section, “Pursuing Memory beyond Mind.”
“Body memory alludes to memory that is intrinsic to the body, to its
own ways of remembering: how we remember in and by and through the
body” (Casey, p. 147). One mundane example he gives is that of hearing the
whine of a steel drill at a building site and immediately feeling pain in a tooth
which had been crowned weeks earlier. Casey asserts: “let me state baldly
that there is no memory without body memory’ (p. 172).
Marcel Proust, too, in all his concentrated efforts at memory, found that
the body of his narrator—not daytime recollections—brought about
significant connections with past things, places, and years:
My body, still too heavy with sleep to move, would endeavour to
construe from the pattern of its tiredness the position of its various
limbs, in order to deduce therefrom the direction of the wall, the
location of the furniture, to piece together and give a name to the
house in which it lay. Its memory, the composite memory of its ribs, its
knees, its shoulder-blades, offered it a whole series of rooms in which
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it had at one time or another slept, while the unseen series of rooms in
which it had at one time or another slept, while the unseen walls,
shifting and adapting themselves to the shape of each successive
room that it remembered, whirled round it in the dark. And even
before my brain, lingering in cogitation over when things had
happened and what they had looked like, had reassembled the
circumstances sufficiently to identify the room, it, my body, would recall
from each room in succession the style of the bed, the position of the
doors, the angle at which the sunlight came in at the windows,
whether there was a passage outside, what I had had in mind when I
went to sleep and found there when I awoke. (1981,1, p. 6)
Body memory adds the dimension of depth to remembering, though its
actions are not subject in themselves to recollection. Body memory is
contained in primary memory. Casey suggests that we can use Whitehead’s
notion of causal efficacy “as providing the most promising basis for
understanding the deep ingrediency of body memory in memory generally”
(p. 173). Causal efficacy, a sort of past prehension, precedes external
perception and has an aspect Whitehead specifically calls bodily efficacy. I
address a more thorough discussion of Whitehead, time, and memory in
chapter 3.
Body memory is seen by Casey as “crucially interstitial in status. The
basic borderline it occupies is traced between mind and place: it is their
middle term, their tertium qu id“ (p. 180). In discussing place memory, Casey
makes his strongest case for a deeper, non-narrative memory. He cites the
Pythagorean Archytas as declaring that place is “the first of all beings, since
everything that exists is in a place and cannot exist without a place” (p. 184).
He distinguishes place from mere site, a geometric space like any other:
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It is the nature of place, in contradistinction from site, to encourage and
support such distinctiveness, thereby enhancing memorability.
Requisite to any full understanding of memory of place is thus a
recognition of the way in which place itself aids in remembering. It
does so precisely as being well suited to contain memories—to hold
and preserve them. (p. 186)
Place haunts Proust’s narrator as being evocative of memories. Each
place has its own resonance: “Combray," “Balbec," “Paris,” “Doncieres," etc.
Joyce had to leave the place of his birth to remember it without being
overwhelmed by it. Henry Miller and D. H. Lawrence found different places
to inspire very different writing. Lawrence Durrell (1969) has written that
“human beings are expressions of their landscapes” (p. 157). Place makes
us inhabitants of the world. It contains us and orients us, as Casey twice
quotes John Russell observing:
“Where am I?” is, after all, one of the most poignant of human
formulations. It speaks for an anxiety that is intense, recurrent, and all
but unbearable. Not to know where we are is torment, and not to have
a sense of place is a most sinister deprivation. (“How Art Makes Us
Feel at Home in the World,” New York Times, April 12,1981. In
Casey, p. 195)
It is interesting to note that upon awakening from unconsciousness no
one asks, “When am I?” We need only think of places from our personal
pasts to have all sorts memories evoked: sensory glimmers, emotions,
persons, pets, joy, trauma, or, perhaps, nervous lacunae.
The very fact of spending our early, formative years in a house may
have led us to envision our minds as having secret closets, forbidden
bedrooms, hidden nooks and crannies, cluttered attics, and foreboding but
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compelling cellars. Other cultures have different psychic environments: think
only of the difference in the space or emplacement of memory between the
Amazonian's life-drunk enclosure in the thick jungle and the arid, open
sandscapes of the Arab nomads.
C asey feels time as we commonly understand it—a succession of
instants or points—only disperses memory:
By its very immobility—through the stolid concreteness of things set
within pathways and horizons—place acts to contain time itself. This
is not to trivialize time but to make it into a dimension of space through
the active influence of place. On the other hand, time is trivialized
when it is reduced to calendrical-historical dates, (p. 214)
It may be said we pass through places, but, in a sense, their memory
continues to contain us. Time, on the other hand, just passes, like the wind,
and only “bending boughs" and the mirror speak of its passing. We do not
need memory’s narratives,—unless place is considered a prenarrative—
place will suffice to become lost in what C asey calls “ruminescences”i (p. 49,
p. 112). But narrative, especially autobiographical writing about or within
particular places, may well be a via regia, a royal road, to bringing to
consciousness or interpreting the affective meaning of such places. Place
memory, which includes bodily memory, might well be the natural “place” to
begin “an architecture of self,” a s suggested by William Pinar (1992b). An

1“C asey coins the word ruminescence, which combines ‘reminiscence’
and ‘rumination,’ in order to capture the mood or emotional state that often
accom panies remembering. (Perhaps ‘lum inescence’ and the ‘numinous’
resound there a s well.)” (Krell, 1989, p. 259)
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architect of self needs a place to construct, even if that place must
occasionally be deconstructed to a site for the next constructive endeavour.
“ ‘Commemoration’ means an intensified remembering" (Casey, p.
217). Though Casey uses it in its public sense as an occasion for paying
homage to events and people one has never experienced or met, he also
notes that here, in this remembering, language is essential. As Krell (1989)
has noted of his chapters on body and place memory: “Everything depends
on Casey’s being able to separate off the narrative from the memory” (p.
255). In the less obvious—compared to official ceremonies—
commemorabilia of language, itself, Casey here gives in to narrative and
points to the supra-personal remembering found intersubjectively:
Could it be that in its communal-discursive aspect commemorating
forms a part of all remembering? If so, this would imply that there is no
remembering of any kind that is not in some sense verbal or verballybased: if not occurring expressly in language, then arising through its
agency. Just as commemoration is a calling to remembrance through
language—through ritual-cum-text, ritual as text—so memory is

indeed a matter of "re-call.” Might it even be that recollection,
seemingly dependent upon images alone, occurs as re-collection
through language? Can there be such a thing as a purely renascent
image that counts as a memory—or a purely bodily action that counts
as a commemoration—without the intervention of words at some
significant stage? (p. 233)
I will be returning to the memory within language at several stages in
the pages to come, as well as to the implications for consciousness. Suffice
to say at this stage that Casey points directly to commemoration as
participation of the sort written about by L6vy-Bruhl (1926/85). Since our
particular type of subjectively-centered consciousness expands through
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division—creation of new dichotomies and definitions—C asey understands
that at som e point separate identity is overcome, as in Yeats’ “Great Memory"
or Anima Mundi: “In short, whenever we become engaged in
commemorative activity—whether this occurs in a dyadic or a polyadic
context —representation cedes place to participation” (p. 251).

§Preview. Commemoration may take place unconsciously and it is not to

be identified with history. The “Linguistics” section of chapter 4 extends this
point. C asey’s last section on “The Thick Autonomy of Memory”will be
discussed in my final chapter, as it seem s to culminate in a sen se of memory,
in line with Krell’s, which reveals memory a s a worldly force, as, in fact, fate.
In my awaiting chapters, I pursue memory along the rhizoid network of
its roots in memor, or mindfulness, a s opposed to memory as tekne, a sort
practical assistant to constructive action. To use another dichotomy, I rarely
follow the mode of cognitive functioning defined by Bruner (1987) as the
scientific methods which establish formal, empirical proof, but instead pursue
his other mode, narrative, which establishes not truth but "verisimilitude”
—parallel, I think, to Pinar’s “truthfulness" (p. 25). In other words, I pursue,
plead, and evoke memory through the labyrinthine pathways of story and
theory no matter where they lead, rather than examining memory to be used
specifically a s a tool in autobiographical or other classrooms.
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My inquiry, then, is neither a cognitive psychological one nor an
analytical one. I consider it to be phenomenological in that I seek to perceive
below the layers of interpretation in the direction of memory’s “centre,”
always recognizing that any centre re-cognized is already a secondary
cognition. Perception must be a perception of this memory (or a memory of
the memory) and it is already subject to interpretation. In this way, this study
is also hermeneutical:
There is a similar risk in treating phenomenology and hermeneutics
separately. First, since we are humans, there may not be at the center
of our life-worlds any pure perceptions or feelings untainted by the
meanings we impose upon them. . . . Second, when we look for pure
perceptions we run the risk of an infinite regress. (Willis, 1991, p.
176)
Because of this hermeneutical element, I felt it incumbent upon me to
include me, the researcher, as subject of inquiry. All writing is in some sense
autobiographical and narrational, but since this will be made explicit I felt it
necessary to encom pass this whole inquiry with strong narrational elements.
I approach the phenomenon of memory within what Smith (1991) has called
the hermeneutic imagination. The hermeneutic imagination, Smith says,
shows how meaning is arrived at “referentialty and relationally” and avoids
conceptual or categorial authority:
The conversational quality of hermeneutic truth points to the
requirement that any study carried on in the name of hermeneutics
should provide a report of the researcher’s own transformations
undergone in the process of the inquiry; a showing of the dialogical
journey, we might call it" ( pp. 197-198).
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Narrative theory, as well as the hermeneutic imagination, demands an
explicit involvement of the researcher in his/her research. In some way, the
researcher is the research. Language may come to the subject from the
world, but the subject (or the self) becomes the language-conveyer of the
world into the future. The narrativist, Kerby (1991), also asks for investigation
of the subject of language:
But what now of the subject who is, in some sense, the source of
language? If on one hand language cannot be separated from the
world as we know it, then on the other hand we surely cannot extricate
ourselves from language. It is this other dimension, that of the human
subject or language user, that particularly needs to be investigated
today..., for why should we exempt ourselves from the very critique that
we so readily apply to the world around us? (p. 3)
The narratives of my past—the narratives of the subject—seem to work
within larger narratives which are usually less easily “heard." These are
myths which can be understood as cultural ideologies (Barthes, 1957/72) or
as Lyotard (1984) calls them, meta-narratives. But there is a more
imaginative, less-closured sense of myth within and beyond the narratives of
our remembering: “Myths do not ground, they open" (Hillman, 1979, p. 89).
The memory in language becomes mythic when deconstructed far enough.
These ancient and modern myths are the fabric of the stories of our lives, I
believe. As I will suggest in chapter 4.
Myth would not allow itself to be ignored in this study, intervening like
a fatal attraction whenever my ruminescence wandered into primordial terra
incognita. Theory is, after all, also derived from theoria, a reference to an
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Ancient Greek delegation from a polis “going to se e” a god (theos) in its
temple, or going to consult an oracle (Morris, 1982). So, in this curriculum
theorizing, my second chapter is a sort of intellectual autobiography charting
my course betwixt and between mythology and pedagogy.
Chapter 3 explores the hints of chapter 2 with speculative philosophy
drawn mainly from the work of Bergson and Whitehead. It freely speculates
on the possibilities opened out in the space of so-called postmodern science
(Griffin, 1988) and visionary physics (Toben & Wolf, 1982) about the force of
memory in the world, including the uncertain world of particle physics.
I go directly into myth in chapter 4, reviewing the mythic idea of
memory as eternal return (Eliade, 1954, 1963) or profane separation from the
world (Eliade, 1959). Then I approach myth as a primordial form of language
(Kristeva, 1989) and as the “solid" images which Jung and Hillman consider
to have preceded internalized conception. Images, appearing from the
(sudden?) expansion of aw areness through mindfulness, are approached as
the archetypal source of imagining. Archetypal psychology a s a unique
approach to curriculum theorizing has been seldom invoked, except in the
work of Ronald E. Padgham (1985, 1989) and David Jardine (1992).
Chapter 5 changes its main source of research materials to those
drawn from the mythopoeic memory previously invoked. The poetic and the
paradoxes of post-structuralism, as well as some inspirations drawn from the
vast literature of Eastern sacred writing, are used to support a more personal

autobiographical chapter than chapter 2 —recalling fantasies and underlying
emotional patterns—somewhat along the lines of Jung’s Memories, Dreams,
Reflections (1963), though hardly of such quality or depth. Here, I

experiment with creative style in an attempt to summon the realm of
archetypal presences and indicate potentials for metamorphosis.
My last chapter’s title, "C oda" indicates that it is not a conclusion to
careful, cautious, and logical arguments which have built one upon another
from chapter 1 through 5 to a relentless and irresistible conclusion. Instead, I
attempt to summarize the major points concerning memory and
autobiography I have portrayed. I further take some of the residue of my
theorizing on memory and suggest an approach for narrativizing or
deconstructing the habitus of students, and evoking the imaginal springs of
memory to desired “architectures.”

C hapter 2: A byssal M asks

Transparency. To let the light not on but in or through.
To look not at the text but through it; to see between the lines;
to see language as lace, black on white; or white on black,
as sky a t night, or in the space on which our dreams are traced.

(N.O. Brown, Love's Body, p. 259)

§Mythic Conflict: Hill G ods, Town G ods. Mythology and pedagogy
have been Interrelated from the moment of my first encounter with teaching.
My first time in front of a class entwined the two forever (ike the serpents
around the caduceus of Hermes. In the strongest sense of myth a s being a
sort of psychic substrata, of course, not only pedagogy but studenting and
even my wild childhood play in the sandhills outside of town were based on
vague storylines which could be traced (had there been anyone to do so) to
the ancient cultural narratives collectively called myths. Every crumbling
tunnel I explored was a labyrinthine quest, each "King of the Castle" battle
royale on a steep but soft sandhill was a fight to the finish for temporary glory;
like the single year of kingship for the consort of the eternal queen, like the
Achillean life—glory over longevity! Battles and explorations, tests of
courage and endurance: were they initiations of the soul for the heroic life to
come?
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The slower initiation through the school system—which took piace in
the de-natured town—only seemed repressive and confining. I did not know
that its cellular grouping, its cloistering, its ability hierarchy, its graded
progression, and its teachers who kept order and knew the knowledge for
which we were expected to strive were all part of another mythic
complex—going back through mediaeval Europe and the Roman
dispensation, to Plato (and Apollo), and to Christianity and the ultimate
absent father of monotheism.
It seemed the two mythic cycles I lived were usually in conflict. One
was physically aware, outside the school, outside the home, outside the
town, and it led to powerful impressions of both some imminence and an
immanence. Something was present, was “far more deeply interfused”
(Wordsworth, 1798) and always there was the rich sense of Nature waiting,
of something ...about to happen. The power of direct enculturation—parents,
teachers, everyone—was such, however, that a life without school never was
really seen as an option. I was pushed by my parents, got my marks, and
attempted to preserve the feral Pan, or the hero-in-waiting, in my soul. The
journeys seemed parallel but, in an open universe, forever separate.
Years later, my first pedagogical experience was foisted upon me and
the mythic seeker met the mythic priest. The experience was both unsought
and, in some way, sought. It occurred with the kind of meaningful
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randomness C. G. Jung (1971) called synchronicity. It may be too early in
this paper to make any pagan references to fate.
I had recently returned from Europe where I had spent almost all my
time in Greece. The trip had begun as one of those post-baccalaureate
jaunts to the continent with a few friends. I was morose, however, and found
the company of my two friends unbearable, as they found mine. We parted
company in three separate directions at Dusseldorf, Jake going to East
Berlin, Bryan to France and Spain, and me to Greece. There I would find
some release from the word-clamps around my head and find authors to
guide me back into the world from my Icarian madness to transcend it. After
nine months, I found my way through North Africa to France and flew off in
sunny spring. I arrived at Dorval Airport in Montreal with $2 in a blizzard.
Back in Lethbridge, I found the small city from where I had graduated quietly
snowed in, somnolent under 7-foot drifts. I was twenty-two.
Setsuko called me. She was a strange-beautiful Japanese-Canadian
girl who had been my friend, my clandestine lover, and who, more
importantly, had taken the English department's upper level course called
"Mythology" with me.

She had been the young professor's favourite, and it

was she and her artist friend who had read the most personal, most symbolic
papers, seeing aspects of their lives in specific Hellenic deities. I, on the
other hand, had been striving to squeeze my mythic universe into this one,
rather than the other way, and I had read a paper on the historicity of the
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Mycenean Empire and the fall of Troy, and the likely reality of the lives of
Agamemnon, Clytaemnestra, Orestes, and Elektra. I was out of tune in my
approach and had stuttered through my paper. I considered the course a
humiliation and humbly had accepted my ‘B’. Now, after returning from the
land of myth, Setsuko brought it all back to me again.
A student teacher was attempting to inculcate a language arts unit on
mythology into a grade nine class at Hamilton Junior High. It seem s the
students found no relevance in the subject. The student teacher had heard
of the young professor of mythology and had asked him to do a presentation.
The professor was either indisposed or ill-disposed so he had called
Setsuko to speak instead. She had many excuses, but mainly this
poet/dancer/insurance agent was anxious about speaking to a roomful of
hostile grade nines.

S he had heard I was back and offered me a lemon

meringue pie if I would speak in her place.
Unable to resist such forces (and others, no doubt), I found myself
being introduced to a large class silently staring at me with a mixture of
determination and blatant curiosity. It was like that: My earlier whirl of
doubts, wishes, other timetables, and rough planmaking simply evaporated
and, suddenly transported it seemed, I found myself there being sized up.
I probably w as something unusual at that time in that place. The
student teacher, my age, had affected a neatly-trimmed beard, tweed jacket
and a tie, and I noted the curved pipe he carried in his pocket. I still had
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longish hair and my North African tan had not yet faded. I was wearing a
shirt which looked Slavic or 19th century: flowered chest panel, the rest
white, no collar, and insewn arm garters. No one had to know the label said
"Funky, Groovy Fashions." I was introduced as just having returned from a
year in Greece.
At this time, I had read my share of mythic tales, literature, and my old
major, philosophy. I had not, however, read many of the interpreters of myth
who have become so popular today. I had dug up a little Freud and a little
Jung, and in anthropology a little more of the French structuralist, Claude
L§vi-Strauss (1966), the animist, Tylor (1891/1958), and the functionalists,
Durkheim (1915/68) and Malinowski (1926).

In literature courses, I had

encountered Robert Graves (1948/72, 1960/80),with his notion of myth being
patriarchal propaganda to cover up and validate the overthrow of the "White
Goddess" by Indo-European hordes, and the enigmatic Northrop Frye
(1951/84), who like Jung and L6vi-Strauss in their way, perceived universal
patterns in myth and literature. These views seemed too scientific or too
abstract to satisfy my understanding at the time, yet myth felt strangely
meaningful and there was a need in me to know why.
The only writers who had understood myth in a way that stirred me
deeply by then were the psychiatrist, Rollo May (1969, 1970), who named the
daimonic as any force capable of possessing the daily mind, and that

avenger of the id, Norman O. Brown, who in his Life Against Death (1959)
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proclaimed that the repression imposed by the superego in its abhorrence of
desire was driving us to yearn for the apocalyptic grande finale.
When I heard from Setsuko, I had been immersed in the netherworld
of Henderson and Oakes' Wisdom of the Serpent (1963), and that was what
led me into my ravings at Hamilton Jr. High about each of us having a
personal quest to transform or transcend our "chronic" selves, but which our
word-walled consciousness so reasonably resisted.
The students listened, I felt, with some intensity and Setsuko watched
with shining eyes. I found myself warming to my subject as though I had
never talked about anything so important in my life before. I forgot to stutter. I
even said that school systems and too rigid long-term plans can get in the
way of the quest for discovery and integration of the soul. They loved the hint
of anarchy and many who likely never listened due to some sort of passive
resistance listened now. I was telling them they weren't just prisoners of an
imposed educational system, the monastery myth of fallen life.
At the mention of the school system, the questions started. The
late-sixties’ bugaboo of "relevance" rose up alive and well in the seventies. “I
mean, how is this mythology going to help get us jobs?” Ah, the new
relevance of the ‘Me’ generation, I thought, and I went to town asking them if
that's all they thought education was about. I sat down on the teacher's desk
and a wide-ranging dialogue ensued on the purposes of education and the
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school system. Most, it was revealed, simply had assum ed that school was
what eventually led to gainful employment: security.
I knew employment was important (though I was without it at that time),
but felt the need for them to hear other voices. I asked them if they thought
their lives were only about getting jobs and then hanging on; I asked if,
perhaps, som e courses were not trying also trying to raise their
consciousnesses. When they wanted to know more I found myself saying
things I had never thought through: I brought up the things they cared about,
like relationships, like adventures. I said mythology provides models for
each of our silent seeking. It activates the winged horse of imagination to
invigorate our lives and provides them with a sen se of journey, of
significance. Through myth, we realize we deal on a daily basis with such
things as fate, dragons, sirens, and lotus-eaters—the trials and temptations
along the path of the journey through life. I had trouble describing the goal; it
always seem ed to be a princess or golden ring, or golden fleece, or holy
grail, but sometimes it was out and out apotheosis (as it was for Herakles and
Psyche and Siddhartha).
This brought out the obligatory questions about Christianity, which has
its own ideas about eternal life. The discussion got quite lively when I
pointed out that the serpent in Middle Eastern myths is more often than not
the guide who leads to wisdom (Henderson & Oakes). The Gilgamesh story
indicates that the serpent is eternal (Richardson, 1989). The sacred tree
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associated with it is often interpreted as the image of the Goddess, herself
(Henderson & Oakes; Brown, 1966; Godwin, 1981).
Now came the Garden of Eden questions. Here I tried a little Robert
Graves on the old patriarchal paradise. I noted that God did not want
humanity to gain knowledge. As in other myths, it was the serpent who led
them to understanding. God wanted humanity to remain a witless animal to
keep his garden. When he realized his garden-keepers had “eaten of the
tree of knowledge,’’—that is, become conscious, thinking beings—he cast
them out into the world where all the hardships of life would become our
experience. Naturally, there was the usual cry that Adam and Eve were
being punished for disobedience in listening to Satan (and there was implied
blame on Eve, too). I reminded them that there was another tree in the
garden that God felt he had to protect at all costs: “Behold, the man is
become as one of us, to know good and evil: and now, lest he put forth his
hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever” (Genesis
3:23). This was the tree of eternal life, and, to avoid the possibility that
humanity become as gods. Yahweh cast them out for he is “a jealous God”
(Exodus 20:5), presumably aware of the tree of life’s association with the
Magna Mater.
I closed, leaving them in some consternation by saying that many of
the pagan myths implied the potential for using the serpent of wisdom to
actually transcend our physical limitations here on Earth and "become as
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gods." Yahweh, himself, may be understood as the archetypal dragon
protector of the ultimate boon (Campbell, 1949) who wished to keep us
unconscious and who yet wishes to keep us mortal. Some may have thought
me a Satanist. I was not, but I did not know at that time that I had
rediscovered Gnosticism (Godwin, 1981).
It was a day, no doubt, that changed me forever. The young people
walked me to Setsuko's car, jabbering at me and asking questions about
Greece all the way.

I talked to the student-teacher a couple of weeks later

and he told me they were still talking about the presentation. I found this
pleasant for the ego, of course, but also humbling.

I had gone right from my

nice planned talk on mythic heroes as good examples and had indicated
instead a “pagan path of perfidy." I found myself as much surprised by the
words cascading from me as were the students. I decided my "third eye" had
worked so well because (a) I truly was excited about—had given myself to—
my subject-matter, and (b) I took the plunge when their questions led me to
unexpected waters. Of course, I had neither contract nor paycheque.
Of course, such a one-shot encounter filled me with inflated ideas of
my pedagogic potential. I still did not intend to become a teacher, but a
sense of destiny hovered about me. I would be on the watch for dangerous
ideas which could limit or forbid my freely chosen quest.
After moving north to Edmonton and roughing out a novel, I soon
found the need for bare essentials overcame any artistic impulse. I worked

72

here and there, ice-cream maker to construction labourer, but, after a day on
such jobs, i was simply too tired or bored to write.
Writing had become my Pegasus. I had travelled but had found
mainly thieves, self-deceivers, and crowds. It is only now, looking back
through the seven veils of memory, that I realize that such on the road strife is
the very stuff of adventure. Then, however, I had determined to pursue my
quest on paper. Failure to become successful did not deter me. It was like
standing up to the gangs in high school, 1told myself. You might not win the
first round, but if you just keep getting back up, you have shown some nobility
of soul. If I became a poor unknown writer, at least I would be a man whose
inner quest continued its night-sea journeying (Campbell, 1949).
I had left Canada for Greece in near pathological condition. During
my B.A. days, my readings had ail grown from experiences which were
aimed at mystical awareness, at transcendence. Aldous Huxley (1956) and
Tim Leary (1965) had urged me up and out. I had read the Tibetan Book of
the Dead (1931/60), perhaps containing a m essage I should have heeded

about the “place” of ultimate transcendence: nowhere at all. I had
experienced a rapturous self-transcendent unity with Nature, it seemed, but
had also afterward been sucked back within subjectivity, unable to explain.
I had gone to philosophy because I so desperately needed answers. I
discovered only more questions and that what anyone says is somehow
wrong or incomplete. Thinking became an obsession which I hated, not
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even sure the thoughts I heard were any longer my own. My own memories
seem ed to sink toward an unnameable dread. In my yearning to realize
myself beyond my body and mind, I had ironically become a prisoner within
the mind's echo chambers, and the body had not been transcended but was
instead dragged around like a useless appendage. I lost interest in sports,
socializing, and even in sex. There was so much noise! I slunk through
graduation, and it was then I went to Europe.
Aside from merely being in Greece, it w as two novelists who reminded
me of the life given by Nature to be lived, even if we can't discern why. I read
my first Henry Miller book at the mega-ancient sacred temple ruins of
Dodona (Dodoni, today), where I had arrived on my motorbike. It is said to
have once had a great oak (shades of the Goddess) which whispered clues
to the seeker's destiny. I listened, but heard only the buzzing of great black
bees. Doggedly, I sat down and opened Miller's Tropic of Cancer (1959) to
the first page: “I have no money, no resources, no hopes. I am the happiest
man alive.”
What could this m ean? Was something getting through? Later in
Athens, I read the vitriol of Tropic of Capricorn (1961) and Black Spring
(1963a), but I also encountered Miller's light-filled but definitely earthy paean
to Greece, The Colossus of Maroussi (1963b), and I was in Greece.
The other text which inspired me to affirmation, to freeing myself from
the living death of having to know the why of being here—untranscended at
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that—was Zorba the Greek, by Greece's own Nikos Kazantzakis (1953).
Zorba never knew why either, but he lived fully from the heart in spite of it.
Faced with a mishap? Why, dance! In his last moments, he sprang from his
deathbed, threw open the window and crowed like a dawn rooster, and died:
The release from having or knowing: existentialist gusto!
This literary legacy was with me in Edmonton. I met other fledgling
authors and artists and we formed a raucous bohemian circle. I had
rediscovered my body and Dionysos waged a continual war with Apollo for
my time. I felt very much alive, unencumbered with morals or philosophy,
and slapping out pages daily on my 1936 German typewriter.

I joined my

sister's academic crowd who gathered around the fireplace and took turns
reading modern poetry. In the quiet stillness by the fire, concentrated
suggestion flowed out so unforced and so strangely clear that I can quote it
by memory still, or, perhaps, I am the one recalled by it.
It was at this time, that Setsuko sent me Joseph Campbell's Hero of a
Thousand Faces (1949) and I obtained Henri Frankfort's Before Philosophy

1946/61). Hero, like Wisdom of the Serpent, seemingly looked at myths
worldwide and concluded they were all variations of one archetypal
"monomyth": the hero’s quest. This monomyth Campbell structures into such
parts as "the call to adventure," "the refusal of the call," "crossing the
threshold of adventure," "attainment of magic talisman or divine assistance,"
"the trials," and, at the apex of adventure, "the attainment of the boon and the
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sacred marriage." This is followed by the just-as-perilous "return" and "the
re-crossing of the threshold of adventure with the boon."
This academic fantasy reunited me with the child in the sandhills and
the riverside groves. Of course there is a quest, and each of us must deal
with it (if only to burn all our energy ignoring its call!). Campbell uses his
Jungian background to explain the monomyth as a symbol of our necessary
journey into the unconscious to reunite with its lost contents, its "pearls of
wisdom," in a hieros gamos, or sacred marriage.

He considers it a sacred

social duty, honouring life, to return after the conquest to teach others of the
wonders of the hidden eternal realm, like a bodhisattva, like himself it is to be
supposed (Segal, 1990). From this return, society is revitalized. It finds new
energy to evolve or transform. The thought of teaching as a kind of sacred
quest did trickle through—but had I thus far received the boon?.
"Myth and Reality” (1946/61), the introductory essay by the husband
and wife team of H. and H. A. Frankfort in Before Philosophy, was the first to
reveal to me the absolute otherness of mythic consciousness—that people
who lived in a mythic world were not merely trying to explain things but failing
to do so truly because of the lack of an exact science. They, in fact,
experienced an entirely different world. For the mythic mind, “the distinction
between subjective and objective knowledge is m eaningless.. . .
Meaningless, also, is our contrast between reality and appearance.
Whatever is capable of affecting mind, feeling, or will has thereby established

76

its undoubted reality” (p. 20). It sounds like phenomenological philosophy,
but the Frankforts describe the mythic mind a s experiencing a very limited
sen se of personal self, a self which w as buffeted about by emotions,
memories, visions, and apprehensions that cam e to it from the surrounding
world in which it partook. This sen se of self could even be paradoxically
maintained while wholly identifying with something else "outside" in the
world: an animal, an object, another person, or even an ancestor or demon.
After certain earlier experiences I had sought for years to validate
through explanation, I was pleased to find (outside of the Eastern mystical
tradition) that such ego-transcending identification with natural forces w as
considered the usual state before the days of rational imperialism. My
brother-in-law recommended Levy-Bruhl—whom we had somehow missed
in my anthropology courses—for corroboration. In his writings I was intrigued
to discover his concept of participation mystique, with its hints of
extra-sensory powers and perceptions:
In the collective representations of primitive mentality, objects, beings,
phenom ena can be, though in a way incomprehensible to us, both
them selves and something other than themselves. In a fashion which
is no less incomprehensible, they give forth and they receive mystic
powers, virtues, qualities, influences, which make themselves felt
outside, without ceasing to remain what they are. . . . [Primitives]
depend upon a participation which is represented in very varied forms:
contact, transference, sympathy, telekinesis, etc. (1926/85, pp. 76, 77)
Obviously, such an aw areness will never develop skeptical science,
construct a compulsory school system, or build a civilization. Yet I found
these ideas irresistibly attractive—in themselves and in my pursuit. I
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imagined myself writing best in a kind of trance or possession, perhaps, by
some daimonic muse or third eye. It is no wonder, I thought then, that artists
tend to be eccentrics: we were sham ans in contact with hidden planes of
reality who despised our own personae, and often those of others.
There was a great deal of trepidation when I found myself signing up
for the one year Professional Diploma/After Degree program in Education at
the University of Alberta in Edmonton. I could not believe I was going to be a
student again: I was an ancient 23! I was on a quest! But I was also
determined. If my experiences had found their way into any kind of
knowledge which had truth-value for me, then it could be and must be
defended, even if in my intensity my knowledge-certainty w as somewhat rigid
and intolerant of the knowledge-certainty of others.
It was academic war: I wrote an 80-page paper in my Secondary
English Curriculum class (while student teaching) summing up from various
perspectives my emerging worldview. It was humbly titled, “Prolegomena to
Any Future Educational Thought That There Ever Be Whatsoever.” Despite
more than fulfilling all research, length, and reason requirements, my
cajoling and condescension so infuriated Professor Martin that he mocked
me in comments like “the great Nixon speaks!" and "ugh!” and gave me a ‘B’.
In Educational Psychology I fought the Skinnerians who might
condition me from my quest and leave me content. In Educational
Philosophy, I struggled to find a place for "free will" against the professor's

"hard determinism" (and found it in "creative breakthroughs"). In a very
different Educational Psychology course—this one "third force" encounter
and touchy/Feely sensitivity groups—I rebelled against the pressure upon me
at a workshop to plead for acceptance and declared I didn’t “give a shit’ what
anyone in the circle thought about me. After being verbally and very nearly
physically abused, I realized the imperative to "love" can be as totalitarian as
any other. Setsuko (now my pregnant wife), who had come along, reminded
me there were credits involved here so I later managed to bite the bullet and
work the circle into a hugging frenzy.
Having preserved the sanctity of my intuition from the wolves of
academia, it was a major change—again from the Apollonian/Athenian
paradigm down to the Hermetic/Dionysian—to find myself involved in a
six-week intensive summer drama workshop. I'd had only one job interview
after finishing the PD/AD program with 1st Class Honours in May, but it had
been in Jasper (a Rocky Mountain resort town similar to Banff but less
commercialized). They offered me the job of 2/5 time nonacademic English
teaching and 3/5 time Drama instruction before I left town after the interview
and mini-teaching day. As a result I had to allow in the god of masks,
Dionysos, and learn something of developmental drama before I could begin
in the Fall. I became immersed and emotionally entangled in the 6-week
3-hour per day sessions, at the same time as Setsuko and Namiko Athena,
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our new daughter, seem ed to be forming a circle of two. Perhaps the seeds
of a marital fleur du mal were planted then.

§Threshold: Pedagogy as Quest. And we were there, in C anada's

Rocky Mountains, in the railroad town of Jasper, and I w as a real teacher. My
mother had been a teacher and it had seem ed too undynamic as a life so I
had decided earlier never to be one: There were strange readings to do and
mythical novels to write. I had to live, however, and teaching could provide
the bread and leave the time for my own pursuits (I thought). Moreover, I was
now a man with a wife and a child and that new duty seem ed very important
indeed. I should have realized that the hermetic transmutations of authors,
the baggage of a day's teaching, and the stability dem anded by fatherhood
were an unnatural menage a trois.
I began to teach and all my dreams, experiences, and readings arose
in my heart. I had hated school because it had tried to tell me who I w as and,
worse, who I must be. It had attempted to obliterate the memories of my own,
true life and had superimposed a generic past. Its dogma had seem ed like
some plot to subvert my natural destiny. Yet I had survived, and now I was
tense with purpose, even if this purpose was a teleology hidden in the centre
of my mazelike quest. My students, too, would be aroused from their
am nesiac apathy. I knew a second purpose: I w as a man with a mission!
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Campbell's lessons rested in my soul more strongly than those of
Frankfort or Levy-Bruhl. I translated his call to the mythic quest in my own
style: With each class, each day, I set out to save the world.
To save the world, each of us has to save him or herself first. To do so,
one must cross the threshold of adventure, deal with her/his demons and
magical guides, and attain the crystal centre of the authentic Self. One must
not allow "The Plot" to pacify him or to absorb her identity, because this
establishment conspiracy's only purpose is to perpetuate itself indefinitely.
This leads to personal stagnation and eventually to the despair which
manifests in cultural suicide. An ego identified with The Plot has the same
purpose: security and perpetuation. But since personal security is never
absolutely attainable (the future being uncertain and the end always being
near) a social ego also has the same pathology: neurotic anxiety, commonly
called insecurity (which may occasionally collapse into paranoid despair).
The border guardians of this Plot are Fear and Desire. The Plot
conditions us to believe security is our most important goal: It is to be desired
above all else, just as destitution, its alternate, is to be feared. These twins,
Fear and Desire, are the children of Insecurity, so it should be no surprise
that their purpose is to drive us into needing Security, who is their offspring.
But since the desire for Security has such origins, it can be seen that its
shadow, fear of not attaining that desire, is always with it, as well. Expanding
concurrently with the drive to security is the fall to despair. The shadow of the
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desire to succeed is the desire to fail (or, to put it another way, the fear of
succeeding).
The border being guarded by these twins (like the ferocious temple
guardians in many locations of the Far East) is, of course, none other than
“the threshold of adventure.” To accept the call to adventure, the quest for
the pre-ego Self (Jung, 1971; Eliot, 1944), one must p ass between the
socially created guardians. This does not necessarily have anything to do
with becoming socially anarchistic. It seem ed to me at the time that the most
quiescent-appearing citizen could in fact be a secret hero on the quest for the
"pearl beyond price" with which s/h e could return and renew the world
through transforming the relations of the world's creatures. Similarly, one is
supposed to have emerged from an Eastern temple transformed, having
been in the transcendent presence of a deity.
The nature of the ultimate boon, the pre-ego Self, remained unclear to
me. Still young and vigoroso, I could not help imagining the goal of the quest
to be a conquest, and the return bringing back som e sort of sacred loot. The
heroic ego w as strong in me, influenced by Campbell's monomyth and
implicit monotheism. I would have done well to have studied the
animistic/polytheistic implications of Frankfort and Levy-Bruhl more deeply.
Dan Lindley (1991) has named three stages teachers go through. The
first stage is adjusting to being in a classroom full of kids. Most teachers
respond by emphasizing their separation. They display their status as

teachers and as adults. They act out of the senex archetype: serious, old,
and ordered—and often find the children or adolescents respond by being
irrepressible puer types: childlike, playful, and anarchic (Hillman, 1983b).
The second stage occurs when the teacher identifies with her/his role as
teacher and becomes comfortable there. This is senex in the guise of the
intellectual traditionalist, the wise man or wise woman. Stage 2 teachers are
stars of such things as STAR testing . 1 Most teachers stay there, perpetuating
a system. Stage 3 is the transformation of the teacher into "absolute
individuality" (Lindley). Here the everpresent puer is recovered, and the
teacher has learned it is okay to be his or her authentic self when with a
class.
It should be noted that this "authentic self" is not the sam e self the
teacher had repressed at the beginning of her/his career. This puer has
been reality-tempered through mediation with the senex. Too pure a puer on
the part of a teacher, and the class feel it incumbent on them to be serious,
ordered, and "old." This authentic self may or may not be the sam e as the
(capitalized) Self which is discovered at the end of Jung's individuation
process. Jung's Self has no mask or persona in and of itself, but is an
archetype which uses a persona and its personality to unite with the world.
It should be clear by now that I began my teaching career a s a
missionary anarchist, a stage not recognized by Lindley. I preached

i Louisiana state’s teacher evaluations under Gov. Buddy Roemer
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intensely about remembering who you are, speaking up when oppressed,
and listening to the voices within (whose source I conceived as deities). I
told them that whether they were "rejects" or valedictorians, they were all
slaves of a system. But to be rebel to your own destruction, I told them, is
only to glorify the victor. To be a rebel who always sweats the small stuff is to
be just a rebel in short pants. Freedom exists in going through the given—by
choice—but also keeping a private self in reserve. It means the burden of
making each decision on your own, even if that decision agrees with the one
made by the powers-that-be. In short, freedom is possible—but freedom is
the greatest responsibility of all. I had no Mount but I walked on desks.
This worked great for the first while; the kids were hugely entertained.
The class-most-warned-about was my English 013 group, newly
de-streamed from their academic mainstream cohorts. They were, for the
most part, transfixed by my near-Swaggertian performances. I taught the
more subtle poems of Wordsworth, Shelley, Keats, Tennyson, and Dylan
Thomas. I taught very few short stories, but had them write them instead.
Often I read aloud to them. If their attention lagged and whispering broke out,
I would get louder, until I was real loud. When that wore out, I would read
while walking up and down the rows of the student desks. Yes, they enjoyed
me, the entertainer. Maybe they were pleased by my faith, I don’t know.
I taught Drama the same way, with energy, and some subtlety. I was
not concerned, at first, with play-production (as the realist, retiring
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Englishman former Drama teacher had insisted). I used my notes from my
summer course and various guide books, especially Brian Way's
Development Through Drama (1967) which roused in me the fervour for

deepening consciousness, exploring psychic complexes, and opening
personalities to hidden wells of emotion and deeper springs of inspiration.
Here, it seemed, was a finer, more ancient way to get others to cross the
threshold of adventure: No need to harangue them into taking the bold step
away from ego-identification and into the Sacred Way of the Mysteries. 1
Now they could experiment with imaginative adventures and
imaginative identities, either mimicked from the world or "called-up" from
among the repressed personality complexes below.

Their quests could now

begin where all quests, all myths, and all knowledge began: in memorial
images and stories, like Jung’s archetypes (1971).
I learned how to teach from my Drama classes faster than my English
ones. In English, it took little time for me to realize that many of my students
had lost the faith in themselves to even venture a guess of their own as to a
poem's meaning, much less to write a narrative that someone else might
read (that Mr. Nixon might even read aloud!). Moreover, though they rode
happily along when I carried them with my missionary energy, when I
showed up more subdued or wanted them to work in group or on their own,
they simply fell back into habits revealing a complete disinterest in scholastic
i Leading from Athens, the “Sacred Way” was the brick-walled road to
Eleusis where the famed mystery rites were performed (Godwin, 1981).
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activities.

No wonder, of course: the system had told them that nothing was

expected of them academically. My only response was another “Don't let
them tell you who you are or what you can do!” type of speech. It worked, but
only when I led. W as I creating followers?
In Drama, my classes were composed of mixed grade levels, though
they did separate high school (10, 11, 12) from junior high. No one had told
the administrators that the gap between grades 7 and 9 was much vaster
than two grade levels. They all did fine in drama games, in physical
movement, in passive imaginative exercises, and in small group work. But
when actual improvisational work involved the grade levels mixing, the
resistance w as Spartan. The difference in size made the grade nines
dominative, but the emotional gap w as often insurmountable.
My initial response had been, a s usual, to fire up my rocket boosters,
move rapidly from group to group, make sure everyone w as involved, and
often shoot off ideas and/or roles if they were lacking. I wanted them to
discover, but if they did not seem to do so or not do so rapidly enough for me,
I would put the director's ring in their collective nose and pull.
I soon built a reputation in Jasper Jr./Sr. High School for being an
effective rookie who simultaneously w as plagued with class control
problems. My first sem ester w as an initiation through fire: I had no
preparation time, taught Drama all morning and English all afternoon. I
inspired my students, yes, but my inspiration was sometimes misunderstood
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as a direction to break rules. I was so teacher-centered that I may have
seemed a Pied Piper, and when, at last, my adrenaline levels evened out
and I ceased to play, many of my students simply found themselves lost in
the woods and they responded with appropriate frustration.
In Drama class, however, I soon learned to let the groups work out
their own projects. I discovered my patience could have an insistence of its
own and that sudden inspiration on their part was often the result. I let them
work out their thematic improvs as they felt, and finally I began to learn with
them. Though I received many complaints about noise levels, our little reality
creations would sometimes lead to insight, or to laughter, or to tears. The
junior highs proved to be die most spontaneous and open to experimental
experience, though they could also be volatile.
My fixation with the mythological guides behind the cloistered
classroom representation of advancing levels continued to assert itself. That
spring, I wrote a play called The Three Fates set mainly in some
cloud-bedecked Kingdom of the Gods: The gods play happily, pleased to
exist because mankind worships and obeys them. The creators on Earth,
however, have no need of gods for they create or discover as a way of life.
When creativity becomes universal, the dominance of the gods will end. In
anger, the King God wishes to destroy these creators but his Old Seer
reminds him he would then have to destroy all the human race since
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everyone is a potential creator in his or her own way. (That would be the
gods' fall, too, since gods need worship for their existence.)
Frustrated, the King God sends the Old Seer into the timeless centre of
the Abyss to meet the Three Fates. Not from obedience, but foreknowledge,
they agree to pretend they are the King God's prisoners and thus withhold
the spark of creativity from the cosmos. The earthly creators cease alright,
but the gods and their courtiers become apathetic, as well, and no longer
even have the inspiration for play, no matter how decadent. The beautiful
human dancer the King of the gods had amorously pursued is now willing to
submit, because without a destiny “nothing matters anyway” (Nixon,
unpublished). He realizes that he no longer cares about obtaining his prize
and in understanding and (existential?) sadness, he has the Seer set the
Fates free. Creation and destiny are activated. The play ends with the
creators on Earth in intense activity, and the gods and their minions playing
heartily, despite the knowledge of their eventual fate: amor fati.
This play was done by my exuberant junior highs. It had shows in
many places and was clearly superior as a production to any junior high
festival winners at that time. I felt it was worth mentioning in some detail
here, because the "philosophy" is both existential and romantic, as I presume
my philosophy is even to this day. As I imagine it, the power of imagination is
the first principle of creation; it is found in “commemoration" (Casey, 1987b)
or the lowermost molten strata of the deep unconscious and it is in the air of
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the sunlit woods of the world. But when imagination submits to order and
control, it ceases its main activity, and the source of culture is lost.
The first manifestations of imagination are the galactic vortices or
gravital complexes to which Jung (1953 ff.) applied the term, archetypes or
“primordial images,” but Jam es Hillman (1975b, 1983a) considers these so
inchoate in themselves as to be meaningless. As imagination imaginates
these whorls of potential into images, we find ourselves facing the “Gods”
(Hillman, 1980. Hillman’s capitalization). Any god-image may partake of
essences of one or more ineffable archetypes, so god-image and archetype
are related but not necessarily identical. Like storm centres, they are always
in motion and exist only a s part of a continuum by their differentiation from
other storm centres. When the god-image has constellated enough
essences to be representable, to be a face for us to face, experience
imagined for the god becomes inevitable, as well as a gravital complex of
memory-associations.
The experiences of the gods with each other and with us are created
and repeated as the foundational narratives of a culture, the field of stories
and images we term mythology. We are each cultural products, afloat in
culture' and these primal narratives chart the flow of emotion, the dart of
thought, the stuff of dreams, and, perhaps, a culture's destiny (Hillman,
1986). When we tell our own stories, whether personal vignette or doctoral
dissertation, they strut and fret within the preinscribed courses of the primal
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mythic riverbeds (Frye, 1951/B4). Mythologies, themselves, need not be
linguistic representations; they may be found a s well in the form of ritual or
iconography. All are representations of the paradox of the imaginal; both
here and not here, both private and communal, both cultural and natural.
Jung’s archetypal explanation of myth is sometimes understood to be
reductionist (Keller, 1989), to leave us as predetermined as behaviorists or
neurobiologists would expect. If the archetypes are merely generic instincts,
then this may well be so. In that case, the drive runs its course, the individual
leaves the stage and is heard no more, culture stagnates into meaningless
repetition—eternal return?—and eventually dies of boredom or is replaced.
My play had drawn strange links between free expression and
fatalism, and I continued to attempt mediation. It is here where I saw the
necessity of the journey of the mythic hero. I had by now completed Joseph
Campbell's 4-part Masks of God series, and the lesson had been deeply
ingrained in me that, unlike The Hero o f a Thousand Faces who seem ed
bent on conquest, the cultural paragon of Masks was understood as a
shaman, an artist, or a seer. S/he w as a transformer of culture who broke
new ground or changed the airwaves—so unlike the priests of tradition or the
enforcers thereof. Campbell claimed a direct link between the early neolithic
religious visionaries and cave painters of his Prim itive M ythology (1969) and
the writers, dreamers, and artists of the twentieth century West of his Creative
M ythology (1968).

Still, I had carved my psychic image out of Homer, and the hero
archetype smoldered beneath the surface. My favourite poem was "I Am A
Cowboy in The Boat of Ra," by Ishmael Reed (1969). I continued to feel
oppressed by systemization, and this was not helped in Jasper by a painfully
plodding principal who had received his master's degree with a thesis on
flytying methods for fishing.
I had most success with those needing identity or recognition. The
core of the original English 013 rowdies managed to graduate and bought
T-shirts proudly proclaiming themselves "Yahoos,” as i had once named
them. A group of the nonacademic lads had done a play with me on some
down-and-out bums in New York. They rehearsed more than I asked and
when the performance came it was the first time as director I could sit in the
audience and confidently watch a flawless performance.

§Mythic A m nesia: P edagogy a s C onquest.

My romantic hero of the

oppressed, however, was, perhaps, arrogant in being so.

Many began to

consider me a troublemaker (my social climbing spouse among them).
When things began to bog down in gossip and quarrels, I simply
romanticized myself into an existential hero. My actions accorded with my
memories of them; others’ memories were too self-centered to recall fairly.
Less the choice of abyss or treasure than the Sisyphean struggle, itself:
Onward, without hope, without glory, without love.
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When I quit, I loaded my backpack and hiked the 120 miles around the
north boundary of Jasp er Park alone. On the 11-day journey, I toted along
Kazantzakis's epic poem, The Odyssey: A Modern Sequel (1958). In that
tome, O dysseus becomes the paragon of the determination to live for its own
sake: “Life is an uphill struggle, against impossible odds, totally devoid of
hope” (p. 297). When I wandered my despairing way into a little room near
English Bay in Vancouver, I kept that phrase above my bed. I knew that if I
could rouse myself to work on my ancient typewriter after facing that
m essage each day I could deal with anything.
I completed my novel and rejected it. I dabbled in Tibetan meditation
(the poster had proclaimed: 'T he Battle of Ego"). Relationships were short. I
went broke and found myself all at se a as a deckhand on a fishing boat. It
was when I was seasick on the rocking deck in the pelting rain and gutting
my 100th salmon that the thought of teaching again trickled in.
I wrote to various jobs and while I waited for a response I waited tables
and lived in East Vancouver on Gravely Street.

Plagued with remorse and

self-doubts, I began to fear. I feared becoming a social outcast, a lost soul. I
feared disintegration. It occurred to me that if living is the only reason to live
then survival is its own purpose. Maybe I had been wrong to buck the system
(or to have done so openly). Setsuko had once said, “Icarus should have
flown at night.”
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Setsuko, Namiko: Maybe I had been wrong not to follow Setsuko’s

daily lectures on guidelines for upward social mobility, for societal conquest.
Where was I now—Gravely Street? For the first time, I was ready to work as
a teacher, rather than live as one. Could it be that fear is the strongest
impetus to conformity?
Another perspective on the hero myth found its way in timely fashion
into my hands through Erich Neumann's Origins and History of
Consciousness (1954). Applying an array of ancient texts and mythic tales,

Neumann illustrates Jung's basic notion of the first half of life requiring
"heroic" ego development and separation from the collective unconscious
and the second half an integration of the ego with its source. Neumann goes
beyond the noncommittal imagery of Jung’s labels, however, and identifies
the primal source as the Great Mother or, simply, the Goddess. And he
identifies the psychic danger of ego-inflation (or hubris): “The stronger the
masculine ego consciousness becomes, the more it is aware of the
emasculating, bewitching, deadly, and stupefying nature of the Great
Goddess" (p. 63).
This awareness may manifest a s terror, and thus repression, of all
things female, as so many misogynist myths testify; or it may act out the
repression a s a desire for the absolute escape of death (as in the phallic
power contests of "missile envy"). More controversially, the ego may also,
according to Neumann, abnegate this repression and seek identity with the
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memory of the passive “Great Goddess Unconsciousness,” resulting in the
feminization of the masculine ego. He understands all self-directed
consciousness to be a masculine, heroic endeavour—whether undertaken
by man or woman—and unconscious quiescence to be the yin principle.
Whatever the truth may be, I knew I was fast approaching 30 and
needed to change. Perhaps the time of battles, ego and otherwise, had
ended and I could now work, a s they say, within the system. Foolishly, I
imagined the system to be somehow similar to the collective unconscious, to
Neumann’s Great Goddess as bride. When I got the temporary appointment
in Crawford Bay, British Columbia, I unknowingly was entering into Lindley’s
second stage of teaching (though 1 had completely inverted stage one).
There have been many critics who have accused the institution of
schooling in North America as having a secret agenda to ensure the
continuance of privilege (see chapter 1), or, at least, as mimicking a social
structure which oppresses (Anyon, 1988). Paulo Freire (1984) talks of the
dream of many oppressed being to become an oppressor. I was now
determined to do the right thing, keep a low profile, and to pass the students
through the system in an orderly procession. I do not know if I wished to be
an oppressor, but I was certainly ready to be a repressor of all my notions of
retaining the early vision which had to do with authenticity of experience in
Nature, and the private quest to realize in consciousness the patient
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presence I had felt guiding me there. Of course, this was denial. Of course, it
did not work.
When I was a kid, I had never been happy playing the gam es the other
kids seemed to be content with. Cowboys soon got tiring, but when I did play
I became neither Roy Rogers, Kid Colt, nor Rex Allen. I made up a tough
character who seemed to me to have the essence of the lone frontier hero. I
called him "Kid Trouble." He seemed to follow me into later life. It was a
shock of recognition to leam the name, Odysseus, also seem s to translate as
"trouble" (Finley, 1977).
My pedagogical odyssey continued in this way in Crawford Bay and
later in my two and a half years in the consolidated high school in Crowsnest
Pass, Alberta. I did unit plans. I shouted in class. I attempted to keep order,
even in my junior high Drama classes. Some kids liked me, some did not.
Trouble came in this incarnation in Crawford Bay when the seniors
complained I was too separate, too judgmental, that I gave their opinions no
place.
It seemed to me I was willing to discuss, to exchange ideas, but these
students in an isolated valley on Kootenay Lake in central British Columbia
were all too ready to make sweeping statements based on nothing, or
hearsay, at best: “My cousin saw a million Paki immigrants getting off planes
in Calgary!” This was fearful in an area where the mines and most of the
lumbering had closed. I demanded facts. An opinion without a rational
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backup meant nothing. I was confronting naked irrationality (like that found
in Nature) and I was siding with the order and control of the god of culture,
Apollo, and the god of authority, Zeus.
When a large grade twelve girl from one of the few prosperous
families in the valley attempted to get too rambunctious in class, I sternly had
her sit down. Still, she stayed after class and began to openly flirt, and I
rather rudely (and nervously) sent her home. Like a bad TV-movie, she
complained to the principal that I had kept her after school and come on to
her. I was fully exonerated by w itnesses who had heard me rebuking her
foolishness but the whole valley had cabin fever after a long winter and
gossiped hungrily. I was glad to leave.
After a year of doing theatre in Calgary (with only modest success but
with the triumphal return of Dionysos), I took the job in Crowsnest Pass, away
from the temptations of Calgary. Again, I was determined to do it right; again,
I was going to labour at this job and defeat it. I did it their way. My students
were rebellious—more than I had ever experienced anywhere—and I was
miserable. I read only science fiction and, miserably, determined to stick it
out. I do not think I was an ideal teacher. When they began to push
compensatory classes for slow learners at me and the small town was too
concerned about whom I was dating (and when, and where), I retired again.
I was the sam e age at which Alexander the Great and Je su s of Nazareth had
died—after fulfilling their destinies.

By that time, it seem ed clear to me that my destiny had long ago gone
on without me. Years before, I had been sent to Concordia, a St. John's
Lutheran boarding school in Edmonton, Alberta, at the beginning of grade
ten (our family of four each leaving Saskatchewan for a new locale). I read
nothing, it seemed, but myth and Ancient Greek literature and history. I had
the opportunity at Concordia to study Latin, which would lead me into a major
in Classics—Ancient Greek and Roman Language and Civilization—upon
beginning university. For various reasons, loneliness being one, I
transferred to Lethbridge where my mother had moved and where only
French was taught a s a foreign language. Of course, the mythic significance
of returning to mother was more than losing Latin as a key to the future.
Campbell’s “denial of the call”? Neumann’s “uroboric return’’?
When I finished high school in Lethbridge, I w as again determined to
major in Classics, but the University of British Columbia, which has a fine
program, w as very expensive. I was talked into spending the preliminary
year doing non-major subjects at the U. of Lethbridge.

Of course, I retained

most of my friends from high school and took full advantage of the nonenforcement of attendance. I was so blithe a s to skip the final essay for an
anthropology course called "The North American Indian." That summer, I
was working a s a deckhand on a Department of Transport shipping lane
barge in the Northwest Territories when I received notices in quick
succession: 1) that I had flunked “The North American Indian," and 2) that
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UBC could not accept me. On my boat on the Great Slave Lake, I learned I
had again "missed the boat" and that the lake w as well-named.
It was the confusion of the following months on Vancouver Island and
the violent scatterings of the illusion of self that coerced me into studying
philosophy when I returned to classes. In philosophy, however, I found what
seem ed to be kindred spirits in Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and—perhaps the
beginning of the strange pairing of romantic idealism and existentialism—
Bergson and Merleau-Ponty. I wanted only a clear explanation which would
make the world acceptable to me, and, perhaps, me to the world. Fate (or
teleology) were no longer factors.
So I still thought after leaving Crowsnest P ass and returning to nearby
Lethbridge to sub and write—exactly 10 years after I had left it the first time to
go to Edmonton and write (as strange a timespan as the 9 gestation months I
had spent across the Atlantic). If that did not seem to have the chilly touch of
metric karma, my next position certainly did.

§Penance. The University had been reconstructed across the Oldman

River in the time I had been gone. The Lethbridge Community College was
now situated where the University had been. It was this college which now
hired me to drive to the Peigan Indian Reservation each day and teach Adult
Upgrading.

Thirteen years after flunking my course on the North American
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Indian, I was going to do time among the North American Indians,
themselves.
The tribal reserve of the North Peigans, an offshoot of the Blackfoot
nation, is a remarkable place, if mainly for all the wrong reasons. Here I had
gone full circle, returning with nothing, and was now to do penance (it
seemed) on one of the smallest, poorest reservations in Canada. I had lost
so much and experienced so much, it somehow seem ed right I should work
with a group whose habits were really unknown to me. It may have been
penance, but it was a chance to leave the usual world behind:
The nature of the hero is a s manifold a s the agonizing situations of
real life. But always he is compelled to sacrifice normal living in
whatever form it may touch him, whether it be mother, father, child,
homeland, sweetheart, brother, or friend. (Neumann, p. 378)
I could still console myself with Neumann: Surely here at the bottom rung,
my labours would find their turning point.
The program was sponsored by Canada Manpower, the division of
government concerned with employment, so the idea, at first, was for us to
get our students through the GED. After passing that, they were to leave the
reserve and take some sort of employment training program and, eventually,
get a job. In practice, this seldom happened. The students were paid a small
amount to attend class and it soon became clear to me that this was the
reason most of them were there. Babies would be brought to class, and
homework was usually out of the question. The students had no intention of
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leaving their families on the reserve, but the Manpower stipend was more
than the government welfare on which most subsisted.
My part was to teach English and “something else.” I started the
something else with Psychology but soon moved into History. My partner did
the Math and Science programs. Over the years, I convinced the officials to
do away with GED accreditation since it was so rarely recognized, and to
institute actual college upgrading courses for college credit. Then I found
myself teaching such things as the provincial curriculum for Social Studies
010, which included early Canadian history. This history attempted to be
unbiased but usually limited to a page or so the pre-European era in
Canada. My students did not complain, but I sought wider materials on the
native cultures of our nation.
No administrators followed us to the reserve so I did have the
unpressured sense of freedom with my classes: freedom in what I taught and
in how I taught it. Canada Manpower was basically concerned that whoever
achieved grade twelve credit could read and write at that level and I made
sure that was so. It was the "how" of what I taught that eventually underwent
such a subtle metamorphosis.
I was nervous when I started. I did not know what to expect. These
were adults, and these were Indians. I feared resentment from them, but it
only seemed to appear when someone provided the leadership for it.

100

This was the unique culture I discovered on this little scattered
collection of rundown houses without trees, gardens, or streets, and often
without windows: The reserve spans a major highway and has towns on
either side. The buffalo are gone and the last people to have seen the
buffalo are gone. The inherent native culture had virtually disappeared. The
Indians walked about the prairie like ghosts in the wind, a people who did not
remember their gods.
But they did have a subculture: It was built on the solidarity of poverty,
isolation, and resentment for those who had made them this way. The
remnants of rituals which had been preserved had gone underground and
were usually done in secret, but nobody seem ed exactly sure of their
purpose any more. If there was no one around to resent, they resented each
other or themselves, and often there were suicides and drinking deaths.
This time I did not begin a s a missionary—they had had enough of
that. I tried being low-key. They seem ed content to silently labour their way
through the course workbooks which had been recommended to me by my
partner. They very seldom asked for help unless I explicitly circulated and
asked them. It was strange: I seldom taught a lesson because everyone was
at a different place in the coursework. Figuring to treat them as adults, I
seldom strove to motivate them. I took attendance but did not belabour the
point when it became random, after all, they were paid only for the days they
attended.
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It seem ed a comfortable distance—from their world and from my world.
I was a stage two teacher frozen in time, between two worlds. I had seen the
face of the G oddess in her guise a s Medusa and I w as petrified by the
“intolerable image" (Micklem, 1979). All I wanted to do was hold on, a
death-grip on duty. Still, their heavy passivity annoyed me and I wished to
se e them vent som e anger (which was surely there) at their present situation.
It w as Cornelius who began the change and awakened in me
memories of the mythic mind in a darker light than the "Nature's children"
image I had conjured up. I had found 3 large coffee-table type books replete
with paintings, photographs, and charts. They covered Canadian prehistory
and history from the Precambrian to the various treaties with which the
Canadian government annexed huge parcels of land and allocated reserve
settlement on the natives. The books referred to the Indians a s "Children of
Eden," and C anada’s Europeanization w as "Deception and Conquest," so,
with such a sympathetic portrait of the Indians and the mammoth opaque
projector, I had every reason to think we could enter into heated, but
reasoned, discussion about the injustice of their situation.
Wrong: Generally, I did the talking, though there w as a fair amount of
grave agreem ent to som e of my suggestions. After one day of outlining the
treaties, Cornelius, by far the brightest student in my class, suddenly spoke
up a s I w as ending the lesson: “It’s just whiteman bullshit."
“What?" I asked.
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“It’s just whiteman bullshit. Whatta you know about it? You weren’t
there. You came here and planted diseases and took our land. All you
Europeans—why doncha just go back to Europe and leave us alone?”
Everyone giggled, some nervously, som e with pleasure. I felt the heat
rise to my face. I was flustered but attempted to counter: “I can't go back,
Cornelius. I'm a European mongrel from about six different countries. I'd
have to go back in pieces.”
Cornelius leered evilly, “Then go back in pieces, dead, all of you white
trash. I just hate white.” There was more laughter.
“Then there's only one racist here, and it ain’t me. If you hate people
because of the colour of their skin, then you, my friend, have the problem."
Cornelius stormed out and the class ended. I made no issue of it but
the silence had increased in weight in future classes.
We played volleyball every Friday afternoon. Inevitably, Cornelius
and his table aligned themselves against me and whoever was on my team.
The first Friday I sprained my ankle to hoots of derisive laughter. I was so
angered I rose and played anyway. Every Friday became a release of
energy in no holds barred, very few rules, killer volleyball. The ferocity
eventually led to pride and some mutual respect.
“Good game, Nixon!" Cornelius would yell and grin like a wolf.
I began to think that it was my forbearance and continued friendliness
which kept the class stable. In other words, I knew what these poor
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misguided souls had wrong with them. If they'd listen to me, their lives would
surely improve. This hubris, the sheer do-gooder confidence, blinded me to
the fact of my defensive ethnocentrism. I was almost beginning to feel like a
leader again.
At 3:30 in the morning, my phone rang. It was Cornelius calling collect
from a phone booth next to the highway. I could clearly hear the cars hissing
by. He talked real slow with long silences between his words.

It seems his

household had begun drinking again. He had tried to avoid partaking but
had been drawn in. He felt awful. Not understanding, I suggested he go
sober up.
“You don't understand,” he said derisively.
I suggested he tell his family to leave him alone. And, again, I found
how distant I was from comprehending. The household had some family but
it also included anyone else who had decided to take up residence there. I
did not yet know that "drinking" did not mean a party: It meant a long,
ritualistic dissipation which went on for days and which ended either when
anything alcoholic (or anything in any way intoxicating) was finally consumed
or when unconsciousness or death intervened.
He began to sob: “You don't know; you just don't know. It's too much.
I'm just gonna walk out on the highway until it's done.”
Shooting, freezing, poisoning, the railway tracks, and the highway
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were the common means of leaving this soulless world. I woke up. I knew
he was serious. The cars hissed ominously.
I searched deep for the right words. I gave solace. I gave advice. I
encouraged: “Man, you'll be in college next year.”
“I'll never make it. You know that! They never let you forget you're an
Indian.” His voice cracked: “I wish I was white.”
This shocked me into silence.
Cornelius spoke low: “You'll never understand. You can't. I've gotta
end this...hell. There's nothing you can say, because you just don't know.”
The phone clattered, but I still heard him breathing on the other end.
I felt something give way in me. I was absolutely ignorant and I was
absolutely helpless. Almost astonished, I heard the weary resignation in my
voice: “You're right, Corn. You're right. I have no idea about your life. None
whatsoever. I've lived in a different world. I don’t understand at all.” He was
silent, but I felt he was listening now. “You're gonna do what you're gonna
do, and I have no idea about the reason why. There's nothing I can do 'bout
that. But if you can just find some shelter, go through your horrors, 1 then
maybe later you can come and explain it to me. You'll be considered absent
with excuse until I hear from you.”
It was the beginning of an interesting friendship and an aperture into
the hidden life of the Peigan Reserve for me. From then on, I taught less

1Alcoholic withdrawal
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defensively and I actually began to listen when people talked, trying to hear
the resonance, the intent, behind the short sentences and limited vocabulary.
After a few years there, I found I was being accepted by people from the
hopeless drunks (who had spat at me my first year) to the chief and tribal
council.
After class, I listened to distraught wives or confused young men. I
never gave much advice but it seemed to mean so much to them to be able
to speak of their troubles. I began to attend some of their functions—
traditional dance competitions, sporting events—on the Reserve on my days
off. With increased trust, older Peigans of either sex would sometimes take
me aside and hint to me of mystical secrets, or of the ancestral power of their
inherited sacred medicine bundles. Eventually, I was invited to take part in
the Sweat Lodge Ceremony.
The ceremony proved to be long, smelly, suffocating, and very very
claustrophobic. A large group of males stuffed into a hide tent around
red-hot stones among still-smoking embers was experience enough. But the
chanting, chanting, chanting began to convince me I would lose my mind (if I
didn’t sweat my heart out first). There were moments when I could no longer
tell who I was, or even that I was a separate individual. Distantly, I could hear
my own voice sounding alien and singing along with the rest. I believe I
even saw my hands raising little dust clouds by pounding on the ground to
the insistent drumbeat, though who could have seen the dust in the smoke?
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When we finally burst gasping from the dissilient pod, I found myself
among the younger men being splashed with cold water by a circle of
women and crazily laughing. The older men kept their dignity and walked
soberly away.
It was a kind of initiation. If nothing else, it finally buried the missionary
and the rabble-rouser, too. How can you preach when all you know is that
you know nothing? The result of such unknowledge, however, is not
self-doubt and insecurity. In a quiet way, I felt liberated, even invigorated—
like a young animal first exploring its environment. My awareness felt as
undirected as when I had roamed the riverside groves or the bleak sandhills
as a boy, and, similarly, I again felt a sense of something immense
happening, though I made no attempt to grapple with this. I soon let the
sense disperse in the eternal wind.
I suppose I was passive. I suppose I could have accepted my fate if it
had been to toil hopelessly on the Peigan Indian Reservation all the rest of
my days. Perhaps the Indians' windblown torpor was seeping into my soul.
Whatever it was, my stillness was not without fecundity.
It seem ed the world came to me: not as a result of the abandonment of
my pedagogical quest—this was no cause and effect progression—or even
to make demands toward action. The hints of the anima mundi implied open
doors (along with complete indifference about my choosing to enter one of
them). I can only describe it as one of those crossroads of time (perhaps an
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unintended "creative breakthrough") in which synchronicity made itself
uncomfortably evident.
Jung (1971) describes synchronicity a s "meaningful coincidence" (p.
505). Most people with any sort of peripheral aw areness have experienced
it: Incident after incident seem s to indicate the intrusion of another reality, the
deeper significance of a certain theme or a certain image. Jung, himself,
gives the example of a time he vaguely noted the parallels between the fish
imagery in alchemy and in Christology. For three days running he
encountered fish—in children's drawings, in every article he read, in
overheard conversations, in dreams, and, inexplicably, laid out on his garden
fence (pp. 506, 507). It was as though the unconscious were indicating,
somewhat humourously, the mysteries which lay below its wavy surface.
In my c a se —and it is still happening—I found the theme of
metamorphosis oozing into my life like a vapourous fog sliding under
windowsills and up from the basement. At first, its presence was merely
distracting but, when it came between me and my fridge or my TV or my
mirror, the sense of the uncanny was unavoidable.
Of course, I had read Norman O. Brown (1959) with some attention
previously, and his insistence on the need to metamorphose back into
unrepressed Nature, into "polymorphous perversity," or into the immediacy of
the Dionysian ego had been strongly impressed on me, as had the similar
ideas of Herbert Marcuse (1964) in first-year university.
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Now, however, I opened my door one day and met Vireo who thought
sh e was looking for som eone else.

After verbal exchange, this unique

woman cam e through my door. Later we went through the ritual of book
exchange. Her gift w as Brown's Love's Body (1966):
The id is instinct; that Dionysian “cauldron of seething excitement," a
se a of energy out of which the ego em erges like an island. The term
“id”—“i f —taken from Nietzsche (via Groddeck), is based on the
intuition that the conduct through life of what we call our ego is
essentially passive; it is not so much we who live a s that we are lived,
by unknown forces, (p. 44)
T hese thoughts left me adrift, so I turned to poetry to find solace. I
re-read "I Am a Cowboy on the Boat of Ra" then found Lawrence's 'T he Ship
of Death" opening in an anthology. Were these watery metaphors for
“unknown forces”? Where do these stream s lead, I wondered.

I did not think

too hard for I had accepted my basic stupidity; yet, soon after in the university
library, I happened upon a translation of a very ancient text which addressed
my unknowing: “I have entered in a s a man of no understanding, and I shall
come forth in the form of a strong spirit, and I shall look upon my form which
shall be that of men and women for ever and ever” (Budge, 1938, ch. 64).
It w as a s though the Egyptian Coffin Texts were addressing my
misreading of Reed's "...Ra" poem, which w as certainly m eant to be ironical
toward conquering heroes. The texts concern the transformation of the dead
soul into Osiris for its final journey.
I began to wonder if for many years I had not been on a Campbellian
quest for "the ultimate boon," but had instead been pushing a self-image
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before me like a scarab pushing its ball of dung. Osiris (and Jesus, for that
matter) was a paradigm of sacrifice, which a Jungian may read a s the
ego-sacrifice involved in the individuation process met with in the second
half of life. Having "heroically" built an ego separate from its unconscious
sources, the maturing individual must now allow it to become decentered (to
ritually die) to become centered again in the Self. The Self is the sam e
source as always but now it may use the ego, and other complexes, for
vehicles of consciousness and action. The soul is not remembered by the
ego but made active through it: the ego is more remembered by the soul.
In this sense, it is "we who are lived," I thought. Whether “if be id,
instinct, archetype, Self, soul, or gods, the sense of self (small "s") or ego is
something lived through.

Egoism had always seem ed to be something

easily identified, in me and in others, but this more primordial force (call it
what you will) seem ed to remain distinctly unrecognized (unconscious) by
many, many people, or at least by our limited social discourse.
The young fight hardest to deny it. Perhaps being too d o se to the
primal matrix, they fear being overwhelmed. Their great fear is "being
different," and that may be the origin of those well-walled group identities:
W hereas the average individual has no soul of his own, because the
group and its canon of values tell him what he may or may not be
psychically, the hero is one who can call his soul his own because he
has fought for it and won it. Hence there can be no heroic and
creative activity without winning the anima, and the individual life of
the hero is in the deepest sense bound up with the psychic reality of
the anima. (Neumann, 1954, p. 379)
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The anima, or soul, is understood a s something to "be won" by
Neumann. Perhaps this is in line with Lindley's concept of the stage three
teacher as one who has attained to "absolute individuality." The concept
parallels the Jungian stages which culminate in individuation (and Lindley is
a Jungian).
But, I wondered, who is to do the winning, who is to direct the action if
not the ego? In one of our talks, it w as Vireo who reminded me of my own
ideas: in the ego’s security complex—in its monotheistic monologue forever
taking place within its walls under the rule of repetition and determinism—
thoughts are forever buzzing back and forth in oppositional evaluations.
Such thoughts interminably support the habit of self above the stream, like "a
hydrophobic dog” (chapter 1, p. 51), but the habitus is incapable of—even
opposed to—direct creative action. Such action is a "breakthrough" of ego’s
walls, but if it is done often enough—a demanding task!—ego’s centrality will
find itself "undermined."
An insight from myth—again Egyptian—seem ed to clarify the
implications of Jung's theory of transformational individuation. As Neumann
interprets: “The identity of Osiris, the human soul, and the prime creative
force amounts to identity with the creativity of the godhead" (p. 238).
At this point, I was satisfied. It was what early play and later dramatic
activity had always shown me: Whenever we do anything, we are acting. To
know myself means only to know my role at the moment. Every action is an
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improvisation, but we know what to do by remembering, or pretending to
remember, our character’s continuity. Transformation now seem ed a s easy
a s changing masks. I had not yet heard of Casey’s (1987b) “body memory”
(chapter 1, pp. 52-54) or I would have realized how rooted action habits are.
“But,” Vireo whispered one evening, “if a mask has grown on you,
such a change can be a painful experience." I made light of it, but she
continued: “You treat masks too lightly. I fear for you. Without any masks,
there’s..."
“The authentic Self?’
"No, it's just empty: an abyss.”
I pondered this but I did not know what "abyss" meant. Perhaps it was
like the nirvanic void, a creative centre which was "buried treasure."
Compared to this, personae seem ed such artificial decorations, a face to
meet the faces that you meet, defensive and slightly foolish:
Personality is not innate, but acquired. Like a mask, it is a thing, a
fetish, a fetishistic object or commodity. "I consent that Isis shall
search into me, and that my name shall pass from my breast into hers."
The real name of the god, with which his power w as inextricably
bound up, was supposed to be lodged, in an almost physical sense,
somewhere in his breast, from which Isis extracted it by a sort of
surgical operation and transferred it with all its supernatural powers to
herself. In the famous potlatch cultures of the Indians of the northwest
coast, what is wagered, won, and lost, is personality, incorporated not
only in name but also in a variety of emblematic objects; in masks;
also blankets, and bits of copper. (Brown, 1966, p. 94)
At this time, I was completing my part-time M.Ed. and doing a course in
Educational Philosophy. Vireo was nervously advancing on her B.A. and
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one of her courses was Mythology and Literature, ironically under the sam e
English professor as my Mythology class nearly 20 years before. We both
agreed to thematically approach metamorphosis but each in our own course
in our own way.
My paper took a very pessimistic view of culture and human life on
Earth, in general. Any rational extrapolation revealed utter catastrophe
ahead, especially as the result of a cultural mindset identical to the ego, both
of which paranoically seek security through "progressive" aggression against
their insecurity. The insecurity is found in Earthly Nature (phylogenetically)
and in instinctual nature (ontogenetically). The only hope, mad as it may be,
is in a miracle (I said): the metamorphosis of consciousness and body into a
state about which absolutely nothing can be known from here.
Vireo had been studying the English Romantic poets whom we had
often read together. The seemingly limitless flights of their imaginations were
intoxicating. Shelley was the highest flier, but it was in the more sensual
Keats that Vireo found the myth she wanted, and the paradigm of
metamorphosis for her paper. "Lamia" (1820) is an erotic poem which tells
the story of a snakewoman who yearns for the body of real woman again so
she may experience its delights, however transitory. She is granted
metamorphosis by Hermes, but the process reveals itself as one of the
utmost agony:
Left to herself, the serpent now began
To change; her elfin blood in madness ran,
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Her mouth foam'd, and the grass, therewith besprent,
W ither'd a t dew so sweet and virulent;
H er eyes in torture fix ’d and anguish drear,
Hot, glaz'd, and wide, with lid-lashes all seer,
Flash’d phosphor and sharp sparks, without one cooling tear.
The colours all inflam 'd throughout her train,
She writh'd about, convuls’d with scarlet pain.

Lamia em erges a woman but is eventually destroyed, shrivelled like a
dream, by the rationalist eye of the well-named philosopher, Apollonius.
“I think it’s like that with us," she said.
“What?”
“You're going. Leaving me to be Lamia: 'convuls'd with scarlet pain*. I
just hope you’re not Apollonius.”
“What?”
“Oh, Greg, you’re so damned obsessed with your journey, your
metamorphosis. You're even going to Louisiana because it's so 'down
there’, so 'delta of rebirth' and all that! I think you're just looking at your soul
from the outside, from your ego. And you look at me the sam e way:
Sometimes you think I’m just a bird in your goddamned tree of life, or som e
brief episode in your story."

§T ranslucent M asks. If the obsession continues, I do not think it is mine;
it more likely p o ssesses me than I it. Here in the land of Huey Long, I have
found a mutuality of being with the people I have encountered (as I have
everywhere), but I have also found different guards on the periphery: different
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fears, different desires. My mythic fate to “see through” my required roles—
whether teacher, student, lover, hermit, or fool—is purely my own and not to
be imposed on others. To make my masks of self transparent in no way
extinguishes them or their vital necessity when dealing with a world of
masks. Here in Louisiana I have become less and less aware of myself:
There are too many other presences, too many compelling voices. This story
evaporates as I write it.
In the quietude inside, I sometimes feel I now understand Kazantzakis’
Odysseus when he affirmed truth without substance: “...the soul at last had
reached its ultimate task, the Act” (1958, p. 449). To take action in this sense,
it seem s to me, is to act through the self, not from it. It is to relieve the soul,
the shadow over the abyss, from the stressful anxiety of only undertaking
actions which conform to the precepts of habit and training which have
constructed the ego from the outside in. These actions are, of course, often
necessary, but the difference is in the invisible matter of identity: Does one
listen only to the interminable voices which use guilt, duty, and reward to

decide the march of one’s day? Or does one Act from the listening to do the
dance of one’s day?
I kindle fires in fog, I plant bell buoys on waves,
I cut roads through the air and build all things from chaos;
my five slave-weavers a t the loom of my swift mind
weave and unweave all life on a ir’s firm-fibered cloth
until I cover the whole abyss with a strong net. (p. 514)
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This entire vision of “acting" draws us into the theatre of Dionysos.
The commandments of Zeus are used to inspire order and obedience, but
conceal, as well, Zeus’s fraternal identification with Poseidon (god of the sea
and chaos and earthquake) and with Hades. Dionysos, too, emerges from

the abyss to inspire unpremeditated action (Otto, 1933/65). It is Dionysos
who teaches us not only how to act, but that we are acting (performing) every
moment of every day. This implies, yes, that “all the world is a stage” but from
the Dionysian perspective, this stage is gloriously unconfined. The roles of
life should all be revelled in, so Ginette Paris (1990) imagines Dionysos:
The actor does not feel he is cheating about his identity because he
knows, as we do, that he is playing a role, wearing a mask. If he is not
cynical... he puts all of himself into his role and tries to be for the
audience the character he pretends to be. Meanwhile the actor is not
bothered about whether he is being true to his “real self.” He is truly an
actor. As we all are.
Dionysos is not the God behind the mask. He is the mask.
In our psychological culture, the quest for the real and true Self
conceals an anti-Dionysian fantasy and a typically monotheistic one. We
do not easily recognize Dionysos, patron of actors, who invites us to play
every role, tragic as well as comic, grotesque a s well as solemn, with
intensity, with spirit and brio.. . . As God of the carnival, of the
masquerade, he is concerned with the constant metamorphosis of
identity and opposed to any fixed identification with a role. (p. 49)
Paris’s statement reveals another sort of trinity in action: Our ideas of
culture, self, and divinity are archetypally interwoven. The belief in a
monotheistic centre of power has similarly led to a belief in a central (and
authentic) “Self.”i Culture (“our” culture) is understood to be a singular entity
i Though for Jung (1971), the Self, though indeed authentic, had no
attributes in and of itself. It more resembles the abyss of creative chaos.
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with its own internal growth patterns and digestive practices. This
“psychological culture” (Hillman, 1983b) may be understood a s deriving from
the subject/object split wrought by science and by the self-centered humanism
of the Enlightenment. C. G. Jung w as foremost a scientist.
Paris and Hillman imply that Jung, the son of a domineering Protestant
minister, had not himself escaped the fantasy of monotheism with his doctrine of
individuation seemingly leading to a deeper, truer Self. Hillman (1983b) has
said this “S elf can be nothing other than an ego projection. How else, he asks,
can that which is bottomless be said to have attributes at all?
This implicates Campbell and, perhaps, Neumann in their tendency to
imply an end of the quest: the “attainment of the boon," or the “mandalan” Self.
It may implicate me in my haranguing years. Behind the mask there is nothing
but fantasy. Was Vireo correct—am I obsessed only with the abyss?
Jung (1971) has stated that more "primitive” minds—animists, pantheists,
polytheists—experienced their traumas through the demons and deities of the
world. Now, psychological, monotheistic humanity looks only inward within an
enormously inflated self to seek the source of its malaise.

Since we a s a

civilization seem to seek only order (an order which must extend into the future),
our chronic malaise is disorder. Hillman (1986) understands this a s the voice of
the exiled “Gods” within:
If the Gods have become diseases, then these forms of chronic
disorder are the Gods in disguise; they are occulted in these
misshapen, inhuman forms, and our seeing through to them there—in
all forms of chronic disorder in ourselves and our city—is a grounding
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act of culture. The education of sensitivity begins right here in trying to
see through the manifestations of time into the eternal patterns within
time. We may regard the discontents of civilization as if they are the
fundamentals of culture, (p. 20)
The “seeing through” implies a seeing through our daily masks, our
identification with the collective, and with the linear flow of time to those
individuals and those groups who are less than content with our present
order of civilization. It is to seek the god behind the malcontents.
Marginalized groups would be unable to identify themselves as a group were
there not an image, a deity, as the constellating gravity of this identity. As an
example, Paris identifies a Dionysos for women:
Jung has made of Dionysos the archetype who frees us from the
tyranny of the ego, and archetypal psychology further describes
Dionysos as a path of freedom for inner oppressed woman. Her
liberation cannot be the result of an intentional, calculated, heroic
process; it comes when the inner Maenad finally is let out, free to feel
whatever she feels, including vulnerability as well as strength, distress
as well as potency. The special gift of Dionysos is that bursting energy
that breaks through the internalization of Pentheus’s rules and
Platonic devaluation of the feminine, (p. 33)
Is release possible? Can we release Dionysos like pent-up steam (as
Nietzsche cried in increasing evaporation) or can we construct Brown’s
Dionysian ego in the midst of the id? If we can, do we want to? How would
you teach such a thing?
I may once have imagined you could, but only when I assum ed there
was a more real, utterly authentic self within our carefully composed faces.
This present doubt makes me doubt a s well Lindley’s third stage of teaching
as being “absolute individuality.” Surely this must be only another illusion.
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Yet realizing the play of masks and our infinite self-deception is only one
aspect of a style of teaching which encourages seeing through, i f ! was
teaching hoping to metamorphose Dionysian egos from Apollonian (or
Jehovan!) egos, then i would be creating m adness to counter madness.
Paris (1990) puts it this way:
If any given culture receives only Apollonian sunshine, it dries up and
dies; conversely, if it receives too much Dionysian moisture, it rots and
becomes crazy. A hyper-technologized, hyper-rationalized society is
as crazy, in a way, as is an anti-intellectual rock ‘n roll subculture. We
need both Dionysos and Apollo, (p. 33)
I have asked myself many times: Then why work for transformation?
Why believe in experientialism? Why teach in a more Dionysian mode? As I
have indicated in this extended statement: Because I must. The hero-fantasy
may have been eclipsed, but to deny the exhilarating sense of presence and
creation which becomes repressed in school systems, institutions, and
civilization in general, would be to undergo a kind of death. It would be to
“dry up," like poor Lamia, like a hydrophobic dog.
I see the masks, and I usually try to wear an appropriate one, too. I
hear the deceptions of speech which reveal poorly hidden motivations of
another nature. The world we live in often seem s unreal, a vast
phantasmagoria of desire, anxiety, and cruelty: so many phobias, such
desperate hungers. We are set against one another, defined and divided by
language in the service of dissectionism and repression. The emotions we
live with, however, are a s real a s we experience them to be.
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Beneath the masks are the imaginal complexes, according to Hillman
(1983a). They are fantasies, a s I mentioned above, but fantasies as the only
possible manifestations of the abyss, which can have no characteristics of
itself (even the word “abyss”! has delusive connotations). They may be
imagined as amorphous constellations always being reshaped by interaction
with each other. But, being persons, we respond best (face to face) to other
persons so the faces of these complexes reveal themselves as the gods, and
there are animal-persons, too (Hillman, 1980). We are always in one such
complex or another, according to Hillman (1979c), and we perceive out of it;
but from the outside (as it were) such a complex may itself be perceived a s a
god:
All consciousness depends upon fantasy images. All we know about
the world, about the mind, the body, about anything whatsoever,
including the spirit and the nature of the divine, comes through images
and is organized by fantasies into one pattern or another. . . . Because
these patterns are archetypal, we are always in one or another
archetypal configuration, one or another fantasy, (p. 114)
This perspective achieves a type of depth perception for me when
dealing with students (and others). I would feel like a polytheistic priest to
suggest that students should be taught mythology so they can “find out who
they are.” There’s no doubt, however, that old cultural tales and images have
a purpose in directing individual energies to rediscovering their source,
rather than being rootless vegetables part of “the march of civilization."
Learning mythology, Hillman (1986) suggests, helps provide those roots:
iGreek abussos: a-, not + bussos, bottom. (Morris, 1982)
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Civilization looks ahead, culture looks back. Civilization is historical
record; culture a mythic enterprise.. . . Culture, a s I have been
speaking of it, looks backwards and reaches back as a nostalgia for
invisibilities, to make them present and to found human life upon them.
The cultural enterprise attem pts to peel, flail, excite individual
sensitivity so that it can again—notice the "again"—be in touch with
these invisibles and orient life by their compass. The key syllable in
culture is the prefix "re." (pp. 19, 20)
I teach autobiography; I use imaginative writing, journal writing, and
face to face dialogue to have people experience themselves in action, to ube
in touch with these invisibles” and remember their placement in time without
succumbing to literalism (the literal repetition-complex I once felt to be “The
Plot"). Other people use such “methods” (and more) and do so with greater
sensitivity than I. Yet the motivation for such facing each other, facing the
gods, is perhaps not only for the dem ands of my particular daimon, but for the
metamorphosis of culture, and, a s some would have it, of the world.
In my classes, I have certainly experienced the pleasant recognition of
one person by another who had thought they were strangers. Paris (1990)
suggests Dionysian aw areness of masks accomplishes the sam e purpose:
Dionysos shatters the positivist perspective, for which there is only one
interpretation, one truth, one definite place for everything and
everyone.. . . Dionysos [is] the God who introduces us to the world of
Otherness. To be able to play many roles we must have this built-in
sen se of the other, (p. 33)
Such a recognition is deeper and more important than political
polemics. The recognition of the Other (whether human or daimonic) is not
mere academic sloganeering. Its ultimate result may be the recognition of
our own “self” or mask, shapeshifted a s it may be.
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As many groups have intuited, the sen se of community, of
communality, is very important to a strengthened se n se of personal identity.
The other side of this, however, is the almost inexorable manner in which a
community hardens from a position of enthusiasm for uniqueness into a
dogmatic organization whose objective doctrines demand ritual
subjectification, and the problem of rigidification repeats itself (McLaren,

1986).
It is alone, within the whirlpools of emotion, within the gods and
animals—the angels and the dem ons—of one’s own nature that a person,
“convuls’d with scarlet pain,” may awaken to the tyranny of ego and to the
agony of existence. Hillman (1986) comments:
Confronted with the unbearable in my own nature, I show more
trepidation—which is after all the first piece of compassion. In regard
to others, my manners alter, my language more attuned and precise, I
become more sophisticated and artful. . . . I need something further
than community and civilization for they may be too human, too visible.
I need imaginal help from tales and images, idols and altars, and the
creatures of nature, to help me carry what is so hard to carry
personally and alone. Education of sensitivity begins in the back
ward, culture in chronic disorder, (p. 21)
Such confrontation, it need hardly be said, is no mere matter of
introspection or idle fantasy. Imagination must be active, in creative work or
in play, for it to memorialize “the invisibles.”
For some, the need to overthrow the tyranny of ego, the monotheism of
monotony, involves more pervasive matters than that of opening oneself to
the gods. With civilization rapidly moving into hyper-technologization, the
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possibility of success in at last eradicating its "chronic discontents”—its
marginalized voices and its frustrated pantheons—seem s possible. N. O.
Brown long ago saw this a s the vital issue of our times when saying in the
introduction to Life Against Death (1959), that
it begins to be apparent that mankind, in all its restless striving and
progress, has no idea of what it really wants. Freud was right: our real
desires are unconscious. It also begins to be apparent that mankind,
unconscious of its real desires and therefore unable to obtain
satisfaction, is hostile to life and ready to destroy itself. Freud was
right in positing a death instinct, and the development of weapons of
destruction makes our present dilemma plain: we either come to terms
with our unconscious instincts and drives—with life and with death—or
else we surely die. (p. x)
Brown understands our fear of the punishing social father a s being the
great dead hand which weighs us gravely down into a death-in-life.

It is not

old-fashioned religion, according to the early Gnostics and to psychoanalyst
Greg Mogenson, to see the spectre of the one God as the ultimate punishing
father. Many are those who, fearing that heavy hand, have identified with its
power to produce much of the incomprehensible terror and angst of our
present predicament. Mogenson (1989) proclaims that it is only through
destructuring the words around our minds that we can save ourselves from
the dead weight of time:
This century has enacted a derridean deconstruction of our
civilization’s logo-centric, Judeo-Christian defense—the JudeoChristian covenant. In the text of history we can read the subtext of
God, the horror of the Great Code. God is the oven. God is the atom
bomb. God is a trauma, (p. 50)
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These apocalyptic positions which blame the patriarchal allfather for
socially subjected consciousness are very uncomfortable to some. If the
attack is personalized, it feels like it is focused on a personal father and many
of us have or had fine, loving fathers. For m e—a s a teacher, a s a person—to
say I feel limited or oppressed because of the great Father God smacks of the
Oedipal crisis, but that is simply to continue mythmaking in another arena:
the application of Freud’s monomyth.
It is the dogma of pedagogy which stifles, the pretense that there is a
literal body of knowledge to be passed piecemeal to students. It is as though
each teacher is expected to dissect his or her portion of this body and pass it
on to the students. Whose body is this? What is the face of
institutionalization? Is it Zeus? Is it Yahweh or “God”?
There are voices which think so and which call for the replacement of
the patriarchal hierarchy with a matriarchal hierarchy (there can be little
doubt it would still be a hierarchy). Paris (1986) points out that any hierarchy
derives from a single point of revelation at its peak—a monotheism:
If we can let go of the devotion to an original, single matriarchy of the
Great Mother (that ideal which supports monotheistic feminism), then
we can regard the plurality of the Goddesses, not as her fragmentation
or a s her developmental differentiation, but rather as each Goddess
comprising an archetypal form of feminism. There are a s many
feminisms a s there are Goddesses, at least, (p. 199)
As I have attempted to indicate, the idea of “teaching” and “teachers”
implies there must be “a teaching”: a body of knowledge kept slightly out of
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reach from which we can feed on only parts at a time. The entire body is out
of reach for any one of us; it is just ahead, in the future, eternally deferred.
It seem s to me Norman O. Brown (1959,1966,1970) is near the mark
even at his most bizarre. Brown claims what is just before us is Thanatos:
Our will to seek control and security is a denial of growth, creativity, and the
dangerous erotic play of life.

Unknowingly, we labour for death.

The substance of Thanatos is there before us every day, either
drowning us in ads or implied behind the raison d ’etre for seeking an
education. Daily, hourly, it is either at the back of our minds or at the front. I
speak of the Great God Money. Brown (1959) explains that “money reflects
and promotes a style of thinking which is abstract, impersonal, objective, and
quantitative, that is to say, the style of thinking of modern science—and what
can be more rational than that?’ (p. 234) Money is perfectly rational, the
epitome of quantification. We look askance at anyone who plays with it. But
what is money: shining gold? the sacred? “The ultimate category of
economics is power; but power is not an economic category... to pursue the
tracks of power, we will have to enter the domain of the sacred, and map it:
all power is essentially sacred power" (p. 251).
But Brown goes on to claim that what we have made sacred is “filthy
lucre.” The wish to both retain money and use it for purposes of power leads
Brown to psychoanalyze that wish as “anal-sadistic” (p. 270). What we hold
before us and eat from is the same dung the scarab rolls into a ball and
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pushes patiently along, according to Brown. The totality of knowledge, its
body, even the ideal society (without discontents) appears in this image a s a
coffin, or, at least, as an outhouse.
Our civilization, which so many have claimed is overly “heroic” in its
myths, is in this view in desperate need of new archetypal adventurers. The
archetypal hero is not always male and is certainly not a policeman or a
soldier—those action figures that thrive on television. The hero to break from
the monomania of money, the monopoly of consciousness, must be a culturehero indeed. As Hillman indicated earlier, culture looks back and down
through memory and its sources, w hereas civilization denies the past to
pursue its anal-sadistic progress. It is in this sense of culture that teaching
may introduce the gods. Teaching becom es mythic whenever it works with
memory, imagination, or with “persons.”
I have my doubts that the system is in imminent danger of collapse or
that schooling in its entirety promotes only objective rationalists who seek
money (and all that it implies) and se e all other persons as stepping stones
to that goal. But I do feel strongly that teachers who work for m etis —intuitive
knowing—are often the heroes who renew culture by guiding students to
renew contact with their original pantheism (Hillman, 1981).
But perhaps the image of the hero has become too tainted with
notions of glory and conquest. The teacher I speak of is more like a
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hierophant of sacred mysteries, an alchemist of transmutation, or a magus of
metamorphosis.
It may be Dionysos who reveals the m asks we wear and to which we
have become attached, but it is Eros who overleaps Thanatos to bring life
(libido) back to our bodies and enliven the world. Here I understand
Aphrodite to be the forbidden goddess who has been fearfully excluded from
curriculum. She has been pushed to the margins, or left in the chthonic
depths of memory. She too often must become pathologized to get the
attention she needs. Aphrodite a s the principle of love in human relations
should be welcomed into any initiate’s education (Paris, 1986).
More acceptable, perhaps, at this stage of our evolution is the elusive
god, Hermes. Hermes is anything but heroic (Lopez-Pedraza, 1989). He is
the god of thieves, the deceiver who breaks all boundaries, and he is the god
of writing. When we find ourselves stuck, frozen in the consciousness of the
Thanatic money-security god, it is unboundaried Hermes who can free us.
In our paranoia we have transmogrified Aphrodite into Medusa who
turns us to stone in the terror of facing her. It is Hermes with his gifts of
magical flight, indirect attack—both attributes of the creative imagination—
and invisibility—aw areness without the delimiting rap of ego—who frees us
from this terror of the snake-haired Gorgon, and perhaps allows the Gorgon,
like Lamia, to em erge in a more attractive guise.
The Hermetic element in the intolerable image is considerable. . . .
Hermetic deviousness is given here in the form of flight that is in
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someway essential to the meeting with Medusa. It is more than an
escape. Likewise the invisibility is so much more than a hero’s
protective equipment. The psychological significance of this motif lies
in the way that Hermes directs us towards Hades through his gift of the
cap. This content is a reminder of the long tradition which realises that
the healthy state of psyche is invisible. (Micklem, 1979, p. 11)
Instead of imagining our physical image as our soul-self, a self-imago
like Narcissus, Hermes, as guide, disappears in the depths: “It was no
upward soaring to heroic ecstasies, but was essentially in the direction of
psyche and therefore a journey that, like, psyche, speaks and defines itself in
terms of depths” (Micklem, p. 11). Hermes is not the Pegasus of imaginative
inflation, nor is he the courageous hero inflated with dreams of glory.
Hermes smiles, shimmers, and disappears. He accepts the “ecstasis of
forgetting” (Heidegger, 1927, in Krell, 1990, p. 331, 5n) to stay undefined. As
Paris (1990) expostulates:
Too often the reaction against the domination of rationalism and
positivism has led to the defense of the simple-minded and ignorant,
those who are excluded from the Apollo-Zeus system. But this sells
short the Hermes intellect, for he is, along with Dionysos and
Aphrodite, an archetype to stand up to the champions of Logos.
These champions (the sharpest minds, the strongest wills, the
highbrow and the powerful) are more vulnerable to the cleverness and
astuteness of Hermes than to what they usually perceive as
threat—the uprising of the oppressed. Winning while appearing to
lose is a strategy that a hermetic person knows how to play to
advantage. The power of humor and ridicule in the face of harsh
authority, the role of the court jester, the uses of flight over fight and of
artful speech in negotiation—all these can be rediscovered in Hermes
. . . . Women, who are said to be wily, know these strategies, a s do
men who are endowed with that form of intelligence known to the
Greeks as metis, that is, an intuitive intelligence.. .. Hermes-Mercury
is many-faceted, shimmering, impossible to pin down. (p. 61, 62)
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Ju st a s imagination cannot be contained by an outsider—be it a
teacher or one’s own ego—Hermes can never become an identity. He is
never where he is expected to be and so, a s god of writing, he is the very
antithesis of a scribe. He is the messenger-god who brings m essages from
the archetypal depths below the masks. He is the shapeshifter who can drop
into the abyss and step as lightly from it. It is Hermes who suggests that in
the process of writing we may allow the world to speak, as is suggested by
the metaphor of Muses. By using writing in classes individuals may find
themselves on the path of what Jam es Hillman (1983a) calls “soul-making”:
By soul I mean, first of all, a perspective rather than a substance, a
viewpoint toward things rather than a thing itself. . . . by “soul” I
mean the imaginative possibility in our natures, the experiencing
through reflective speculation, dream, image, and fantasy—that
mode which recognizes all realities as primarily symbolic or
metaphorical, (p. 17)
Writing which is soul-making (providing a perspective outside of the
city of anal-sadistic compulsion) is precisely that which is undertaken in
autobiography, in dialogue, or in any true fiction. It m eans the loss of
certainty or its seeking.
When I beg?in encountering the Hermes-Mercurius archetype, I finally
abandoned the pretense that I knew. Transformation or metamorphosis can
only be explored a s a possibility when the end result is mysterious and
uncertain. Today I no longer accept the Jungian idea of the end result of
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individuation as being the discovery of an authentic Self. Hillman’s soul as a
shifting perspective behind the masks feels more strange, yet more
appropriate for a hermetic approach. Teaching a s a hermetic activity admits
to a future of infinite possibility, not one covered with the weight of the body of
knowledge, yet one supported by the weight of memory.
Teaching monotheistically leads, so it is said, to a strong sense of
identity. To know who you are, you have merely to listen to the sociallyinjected voices in your head. Teaching polytheistically gives all voices
validity but, guided by Hermes, the result need not be cacophony but poetry
(in the sen se of language speaking itself). Hermetic teaching allows the soul
to choose whatever identity (mask) it wishes and to play it into form in a
journal, an autobiography, creative dialogue, or some form of fictional
characterization or creative exploration. The imagination can never be
capped by a singular identity, as Derrida (1981) has noted of Thoth, the
Egyptian Hermes:
the figure of Thoth takes shape and takes its shape from the very thing
it resists and substitutes for. But it thereby opposes itself, p asses into
its other, and this messenger-god is truly a god of the absolute
passage between opposites. If he had any identity—but he is
precisely the god of nonidentity—he would be that coincidentia
oppositorum. . . . In distinguishing himself from the his opposite, Thoth
also imitates it, becomes its sign and representative, obeys it and
conforms to it, replaces it, by violence if need be. He is thus the
father’s other, the father, and the subversive movement of
replacement. The god of writing is thus at once his father, his son, and
himself. He cannot be assigned a fixed spot in the play of differences.
Sly, slippery, and masked, an intriguer and a card, like Hermes, he is
neither king nor jack, but rather a sort of joker, a floating signifier, a
wild card, one who puts play into play. (p. 99)
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I have found this “non-identity” to be the most important component of
the autobiography section of my own courses in the present. Jo Anne
Pagano (1991) has rightly pointed out that one of the major dangers in
classroom autobiography is precisely that hardening of self-pretense:
Autobiographical writing, particularly in the classroom context, can
inhibit that surprise because we are so concerned with the
representation of ourselves. When we tell stories with ourselves
prominently and self-consciously at the center, we tend to think of
others only in relation to ourselves; we tend to reify others. The
exclusive preoccupation with our own concerns and motivations
annexes the otherness of the other, (p. 202)
I try to teach in a way which avoids this unpleasant side-effect, yet I
must beware of providing too many guidelines and ordering the students to
investigate their past as they would a stranger’s. I, too, must take chances. I,
too, must undergo the “scarlet pain” of shapeshifting. I often make mistakes
and it often does not work, but I still feel I am working out my own mythic
journey and, at the very least, encouraging my students to enter on theirs. It
is not a path a student, or any person, may simply enter on to walk out of the
city, to cross the threshold of adventure. It involves transmutation, becoming
aware that the thing called T is just another mask (and one largely created
by others). This inner change is often not detectable or testable, but many
serious educators consider it the true task of education. As Donald Cowan,
President of the University of Dallas (1986), has written:
Learning must cause a metamorphosis of the person, not merely
elevate him—must make him into something different from what he
was before. The evidence for this comes in the moment of making.
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There must issue from the learner something new, something he has
not been taught, that has about it a recognizability of authenticity, (p.
27)
So this is where I find myself today: a stranger in a strange land. But
this land is also a mindscape and perhaps even a soul formation spiralling
above the abyss. And the stranger is I, the writer, estranged from other
soulmasks who may face me as gods or plague me as demons. I perceive
the images and hear the whispers which arise in reverie from hidden depths
within or hidden depths without. In this way, I participate with these
soulmaking forces, not as a heroic conquistador, but more as a transparent
mask whose features can adapt and give expression to the daimonic
presence behind it. I become as mutable as the gods within, my motions
and emotions transfigured and multiplied. Perhaps I continue to engage in
egoistic self-delusion, but fantasy is the stuff of the gods.
In a way, I feel I have become unreal, yet simultaneously been caught
in the maelstrom of more eternal presences which have swirled up from the
abyss and out from their hiding places in the natural world. I am involved in
the immanence I felt as a child in the sandhills and I again feel the
ominous/wondrous sense of something about to happen. I am deeply aware
of my transience and this gives life a certain piquancy, yet it does not lessen
the sense of other presences moving between the concepts, and back and
forth through the gates of the city of insecurity.
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This sen se of unrealized forces behind our existence was beautifully
expressed by the late naturalist, Loren Eiseley (1987), in a poem which
proved to be one of his final writings. Though it recognizes no gods, the
poet’s aching aw areness of the tenuousness of self leaves the reader with an
overwhelming sen se of silent worlds in eternal motion. This part of the poem
concerns Eiseley’s awakening after passing out cold at the top of his stairs:
“/ Am the Stranger Here"
I have often wondered since, knowing fu ll well I died,
how the dark and scattered cells in the sprawled body knew
how the rent in the brain m ight be closed,
how the churning blood m ight stop
the wind, the intolerable wind that swept
m e down to the dark, how, out o f nothingness,
could rise, could be rebuilt
the tower o f light in the mind, how steadily crawling cells
could recompose and knit
memory to memory, till up from death I came,
drawn forth by things unseen, som e entity, some toiling
congregation
below me in the dark, but not m yself nor m y will.
No, not myself. In a ll the years remaining
I know, and am grateful to them, those secret alchem ists
o f void and stardust who, when m y will had failed,
re lit the light. Why did they do it? No one has answered me, none.
The blood does not speak, nor the stricken neurons answer,
ye t they willed that light should be and it was done.
I am the stranger here, the construct. I am the lonely one.

(p. 244)

C hapter 3: Memory and Matter

“m em ory... is ju st the intersection of mind and matter."
(Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. xii)

§Mind and Matter. Now that I have remembered my teaching career and
sought the mythic themes which seem to have been so interwoven with my
life, I have to ask myself: Just what is it I have remembered here? Over the
basically twenty years from which I have rendered a narrative, there were
other incidents beyond count which must have had lasting effects. There
were vital relationships which were left unexplored and important places
which even now hold memories against time’s erosion. Most important, as
far a s the quest for memory goes, is why did I choose the particular lines of
summary I did? With all the endless bits of memorial data available, why did
I choose to compose the particular fugues I did?
It may be my narrative was emplotted unconsciously to be appropriate
for my particular self-schema (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973; Ross, 1992) or that
my habitus (Grinnell, 1973; Kirby, 1991) chose only those storylines which
would present me to myself in the best light. If either of these is the case,
then the self, however defined, chooses its memories and its role is more that
of a censor than a judge of truth. It seem s the self acts more a s a public
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relations officer than a chief executive, according to Jerem y Campbell
(1989), regarding truth and control a s being secondary to public image.
But then what does this say of memory, that it is a sort of grab-bag full
of sensory or emotional impressions, som e less than accurately recorded?
Then when the self puts these memories into a narrative all that must be left
is the “truthfulness” (Pinar, p. 25) of the narrator’s approach and that is
subject to the self-deceptions of the habitus or self-schema. The self is
assum ed to originate in intersubjective mimicry (Lasch, 1984) and
identification (Freud), especially of parental figures, until it, at last, becomes
an object to itself in Lacan’s (1977) mirror stage and begins to protect that
image through the manipulation of memory.
This, however, tells us little. It may be understood as being subject to
the paradigm of infinite regression. After all, where did the parents get their
identities from, and their parents before them ? How time and place oriented
is the habitus of self and how culturally designed are the schem ata of self?
At som e point, within what C asey (1987b) calls primary memory, memory
must be remembering itself. That is, if memory serves the function of a grabbag for self-image, it must also serve the function of remembering who the
self is. It must always already be active in every act of recollection.
Remembering into the self rather than “before” it—remembering subjectively
rather than objectively—takes one into the very structures of linguistics and
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culture which first created the space for subjectivity in the first place (Ricoeur,
1984).
This speaks of both the nebulous nature of that which we call memory
and of its abyssal depths. Did memory originate with language or with
technology or with mourning? The question of origins, itself, is probably
another instance of the paradigm of infinite regression (Daignault & Gauthier,
1981), but as Casey (1987b, 1991) indicated in chapter 1, body-memory
must underlie each of the above cases of mental memory: “Because it re
enacts the past, it need not represent it; its own kinesthesias link it from within
to the felt movements which it is reinstating; as a way of ‘dilating our being in
the world,’ body memory includes its own past by an internal osmotic
intertwining with if (1987b, p. 178). Such body memory must be present in
the rest of the organic kingdom, as well, which makes memory an attribute of
nature. Indeed, that is Casey’s project: returning memory to the world. But
what is this “world”? Does it include what we commonly refer to as “dead
matter”? Can it even be known outside of our cultural constructions?
That our cultural world has had an effect, an enormous effect, on
nature few would deny. Has nature had an effect on us? We were all taught
in school how cultural evolution has “replaced” natural evolution in our
species. We know today that we had ancestors who may have been
Hominidae, like us, but who had neither the brain capacity nor the larynx
necessary for speech, and “language is so intimately linked to man and
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society that they are inseparable” (Kristeva, 1989, p. 3). Did Homo
symbolicus (Jung, 1971) create culture in the “aether” of imaginative space

only then to turn on nature? Or did the symbol-making hominid merely act on
natural impulses to remember the past and adapt to the future? Or, perhaps,
the question is without meaning since our ideas of the inner lives of our
primate ancestors and of nature, herself, can only be cultural interpretations.
Memory, as memor (mindfulness), is described by Dunne (1988) in
chapter 5 as arising around mourning, an understanding shared with the
psychoanalyst Kristeva (1987) and perhaps with Lacan (1977). A more
widespread anthropological storyline is that as Homo erectus became Homo
habiiis —as the upright hominid used his freed hands and opposing thumb to

become the tool-making hominid—tools created mind (Portmann, 1954/64;
Leakey, 1982): Memory as techne (skill or art) evolved as the technical
assistant to the hands in their endeavour to produce and reproduce stronger
and finer tools.
In the latter case, language and memory can be understood as
developing within a rapidly enlarging brain and functioning constructively to
further the basic survival instincts of their animal hosts. Memory, in this case,
is a brain function like language which has expanded simultaneously with
humankind’s technological mastery. Technology, in this light, is not the result
of mental activity but is instead its manifest identity. Creativity is technical
creativity, present in nature and in matter.
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Kristeva (1989) states that the archeologists, Boklen and LeroiGourhan, share the opinion that language appeared with the graphic
symbols on statuettes and eventually in caves during the Mousterian period
and that “there is human language wherever there are graphic symbols” (p.
45). This would be an explicit case where “Anthropian” motor functions led
into a new world of symbolism, from which memory emerged and evolved,
gradually, the symbols into language.
The former c a s e —m em or— may have had a spontaneous
appearance more to do with shamanism, with rhythm and movement, than
with the referential symbolism of language (Eliade, 1964). Memor grew from
the nostalgia for pure action:" Except for the point, the still point, / There
would be no dance, and there is only the dance” (Eliot, 1944, 1, 66, 67). Only

with the evolution of mythic nam es and narratives, in this view, did memor
appropriate linguistic sounds and use them non-representationally as
invocation of the ancestors or gods and as sacred song to augment the
action of ritual (Harrison, 1903/91). L6vi-Strauss (1966) has noted how the
structure of language resembles that of music.
Here, instead of memory being a dependent “technical assistant,” it
becomes its own creative matrix. By recoiling upon itself, it com presses the
density of its own remembering “(which does not re-member)" (Taylor, p.
168). Dream and imagination produce images as memory turns upon itself.
“Poetic images condense infinite meanings in elliptic associations,” as
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Bachelard (1987, p. 28) says. Bachelard was fond of the image of the tree,
and he indicated the recoil of memory as being similar to the invasion of
dreams which awaken us to our roots: “A root is always a discovery. We
dream it more than we see it. It surprises us when we discover if (p. 84).
The way of the dreamer, the artist of the soul, is a reversal of the outgrowing
use of self toward environmental expansion:
The root is the mysterious tree, it is the subterranean, inverted tree.
For the root, the darkest earth—like the pond, but without the pond—is
also a mirror, a strange opaque mirror which doubles every aerial
reality with a subterranean image, (pp. 84,85)
It seem s that self as techne, with its practically-oriented memories, can
easily be explained away as residing in the space of the human brain or
hands or the constructions of those hands. However, where can we find the
space of those strange dreams and reveries which draw us back among the
roots of the “inverted tree”? The self which enters the labyrinth of itself,
through “possession" or bold endeavour, seem s to have other intentions than
increasing one’s “substance.” Can it be dismissed as instinctive brain activity
to “lose oneself” in ruminescences, or to actively draw or write to enter the
labyrinth of soul?
Bergson (1912) insisted that “memory ... is just the intersection of mind
and matter” (p. xii). He understood the body to be an instrument of action,
and “of action only. In no degree, in no sense, under no aspect, does it serve
to prepare, far less to explain, a representation" (p. 299). How he applied
these notions will be explained in the next section, but here it should be
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noted that memory, which consists of representations, is not understood as
merely an extension of perceptions which cam e into being gradually over
time, but a creative leap which he refers to as "spirit”: “When we pass from
pure perception to memory, we definitely abandon matter for spirit” (p. 301).
Bergson seem s to be indicating the hidden connection between
human memory and language. For him, the representation is the beginning
of language—a creative leap that could not have emerged gradually from the
signs and sounds of proto-human tool-users.
Linguistics a s a science refuses to even consider the question of
origins. Kristeva (1989) sum s this up by saying:
No matter how interesting ail this information is, it reveals only the
process by which an already constituted language is learned by
subjects in a given society, and can inform us only about the
psychosociological particularities of the subjects speaking or learning
a particular language. But it can shed no light on the historical
process of the formation of language, and even less on its “origin.” (p.
44)
Kristeva even questions the gradualist hypothesis:
Can one consider that language underwent a period of development,
of slow and laborious progression during the course of which it
becam e the complex system of signification and communication that it
is today, and that history finds as far back as it goes into the past? Or
should one ad m it... that from the “beginning” language w as “formally
complete” and that once there was man there was language a s a
complete system in charge of all the functions it has today, (p. 46)
Kristeva cites L6vi-Strauss in his renunciation of the search for a
sociological theory to explain symbolism, instead suggesting a search for the
symbolic origin of society. As language functions mainly through
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unconscious exchange, so social systems could have appeared as
representations of language. Kristeva quotes Levi-Strauss as writing that,
no matter what the moment and the circumstances of its appearance
in the animal scale were, language could only have been born in a
single stroke. Objects couldn’t just start to signify progressively. After
a transformation ..., a passage was effected from a stage where
nothing made sense to another where everything did. (p. 46)
In this perspective, the world suddenly revealed itself in symbols
which were felt as material presences (a perspective I will pursue in chapter
4, on mythical consciousness), but the appearance of this signification was
different from “the slow acquisition of the knowledge that ‘this signifies’” (p.
46). This latter function is the beginning of the division which led to
subjectivity: to identity, and to personal memory. It is only with some
semblance of personal identity that memory as memor can begin.
Perhaps here, again, the dichotomy is being too finely drawn. The
situation may be more both/and than either/or. Michel Foucault (1988)
considers the technology of the self to be the action of the soul which may
either increase substance or “care" for its invisible source:
The self is not clothing, tools, or possessions. It is to be found in the
principle which uses these tools, a principle not of the body but of the
soul. You have to worry about your soul—that is the principal activity
of caring for yourself. The care of the self is the care of the activity and
not the care of the soul-as-substance. (p. 25)
Yet, even if the principle of self and memory is the sam e in both
instances—that of natural, substantial concerns, and that of seemingly
insubstantial explorations—the difference is enough to give one pause. If the
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body seeks only to increase its substance, then why would the brain be
programmed to remember, imagine, or dream? Is it merely the response to
the growing awareness of “this signifies” or is it the regression back into the
world in which signifier and signified were once united? If such
remembering is the recoil of “care” upon the activity of the self, as Foucault
indicates, then such explorations may be regarded as contra-nature. If this is
conceivable, I submit that the inspiration for such mindfulness may not lie
within the solidity of the brain. Such inspiration may not lie within matter, as
we commonly understand it. But, lest it seem I am proposing a sort of
spiritualism or alternate reality, the problem may lie in the traditional
understanding of physical matter—and in its intimacy with time.
Before I use the minds of Bergson and Whitehead, and the startling
implications of “postmodern science,” to seek a source in time for the creative
recoil of memory upon itself, allow me to further explore the phenomenon of
memory as techne in time and matter.
If mind and matter are distinct phenomena, then memory exists only in
the former and there is no question to explore. If, however, mind and matter
are of the same substance—or at least mutually implicated—then the
question must be asked just where is the place of memory in matter, or,
better, what is the action of memory in matter?
This is not to delve into the specifics of the mind-body problem, a
subject thoroughly explored by neurologists, psychologists, and
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philosophers of various eras and schools who have yet to come to a decisive
conclusion. Body memory, especially a s elucidated by Merleau-Ponty
(1945/78) and Casey (1987b), was adumbrated in chapter 1 and it is likely
this is akin to the perceptually-oriented memory imputed to non-human
animals. Like animals, we, too, employ body memory to navigate through
familiar terrain and notice it most when something physically familiar has
changed in some way: “Body memory alludes to memory that is intrinsic to
the body, to its own ways of remembering: how we remember in and through
and by the body” (Casey, 1987b, p. 147).
It is difficult to see how even the most hermeneutical of
phenomenologists could deny a place within memory and self to the
vexations, “humours,” and genetic programming of each of the bodies we
are, though just what that place is remains open to cultural interpretation. As
our bodies are genetically similar to all those of our species, it is conceivable
that there could be species-specific memories which reflect traumatic
experiences or habituated responses common to us all. On a further level
entirely, since we have evolved from less complex forms of life and remain so
connected, atavistic body-memory buried deep in our genes could exceed
the lifespan of the changing cells of this body and derive from some
primordial cellular struggle for life. Even single-celled am oebae appear to
be capable of remembering and learning (Eiseley, 1960), so remembering
and learning (for specific ends) themselves may be inherited characteristics.
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Neurologists will insist that the mind is merely an “effect” of the body.
As neurons fire through synapse loops, the body experiences consciousness
with the attendant illusion of free-will. The body, it is concluded, is merely
responding instinctively to its environment and is pre-programmed to act in
certain ways to ensure its survival and reproduction. As D. E. Wooldridge
writes under his apt title, The Machinery of the Brain (1963):
No useful purpose has yet been established for the sense of
aw areness that illumines a small fraction of the mental activities of a
few species of higher animals. It is not clear that the behavior of any
individual or the course of world history would have been affected in
any way if awareness were nonexistent. (In Griffin, 1988, p. 42)
It is, of course, such mechanizing of our inner experience which led
from Pavlov to Watson, Skinner and the behavioral psychologists. Even if we
were someday forced to accept a purely physiological cause and effect
relationship between the brain and consciousness, however, it is still unlikely
that human personality could be reduced to generic behaviors. This was
known even in 1931, when Sir Arthur Keith, the British anatomist, wrote:
Within the brain, there are some eighteen thousand million of
microscopic living units or nerve cells. These units are grouped in
myriads of battalions, and the battalions are linked together by a
system of communication which in complexity has no parallel in any
telephone network devised by man. Of the millions of nerve units in
the brain not one is isolated. All are connected and take part in
handling the ceaseless streams of m essages which flow into the brain
from eyes, ears, fingers, feet, limbs, and body.
If nature cannot reproduce the sam e simple pattern in any two
fingers, how much more impossible is it for her to reproduce the sam e
pattern in any two brains, the organization of which is so inconceivably
complex! Every child is born with a certain balance of faculties,
aptitudes, inclinations, and instinctive leanings. In no two is the
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balance alike, and each different brain has to deal with a different tide
of experience. I marvel, then, not that one man should disagree with
another concerning the ultimate realities of life, but that so many, in
spite of the diversity of their inborn natures, should reach so large a
measure of agreement. (In Campbell, 1968, pp. 32, 33)
Though physiological uniqueness is affirmed, the necessity of
consciousness is not. Sir Arthur understands that reality flows “into the brain”
and the self—essentially passive—is apparently waiting there to receive it.
The perceived world is out there—solid, reliable, consistent—and the brain
must have generic sensory mechanisms after all which receive the impulses
of colour, sound, or what have you in identical ways. Mind, though unique, is
still implied as a by-product of the brain. The world is conceived as spatially
solid, undergoing only the slow transformations of time. Memory is a storage
unit of the brain where bygone sensory impulses reside in retirement, but
implacable matter, itself, contains none.
That the body takes part in remembering few would deny. As memory
is dependent on a healthy brain physiology, so is the constitution of identity,
as has been clearly made evident in reporting on brain damaged patients by
Luria (1968, 1972) and Sacks (1985, 1987). These physicians, however,
believe that the brain alone does constitute the human in human life. Sacks
has written that for Luria “even the most elemental functions of brain and
mind were not wholly biological in nature but conditioned by the
experiences, the interactions, the culture, of the individual—[Luria believed]
that human faculties could not be studied or understood in isolation, but
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always had to be understood in relation to living and formative influences”
(1987, p. viif). Sacks, at least, even goes so far as to accept
the lesson also taught by Socrates, Freud, Proust—that a life, a human
life, is not a life until it is examined; that it is not a life until it is truly
remembered and appropriated; and that such a remembrance is not
something passive, but active, the active and creative construction of
one’s life, the finding and telling of the true story of one’s life. (p. xviii)
Though it is not clear where Sacks considers the “active and creative”
storytelling source to lie, it does seem clear he means it to be somehow
beyond brain physiology. Despite his training in physiology, he seem s to
feel that remembering creatively undertaken becomes a self which is not
settled and final but in as much creative process as the remembering which
leads into its becoming. The self’s ongoing story is the self.
This, of course, is how memory is experienced: either freely
undertaken or its flashes freely pursued. The phenomenological study of
memory intends to be interested only in this subjective side: memory (and
self) as you and I intimately experience it with the assumption, apparently,
that neuronic impulses and chemical changes in the brain are merely
manifestations of our experience. Simultaneously, however, we continue to
experience perceptions as objectively real (even though some of us may be
somewhat colour-blind or have more finely tuned sen ses of smell, etc.). If
sense perceptions are “impressions” of the real, then memory is nothing
more than the passive retaining of those impressions.
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Aristotle (Sorabji, 1972) certainly saw it this way.i but he was
opposing the thought of his master, Plato, who maintained that sense
perceptions are but pale shadows of the realm of pure ideas or pure forms.
With right knowledge, according to Plato (1961), one can see through the
mere sensible world to this intelligible world. Knowledge, in essence, is
anamnesis: an undoing of amnesia, a remembering of these pure forms or

ideas as they eternally exist in a realm of light and bliss (Comford, 1948).
Long before Plato’s time, in the pre-Buddhistic East, this sort of denial
of the reality of the sensory world had emerged into the sacred
consciousnesses of at least Daoist China, Vedic India, and Bon Tibet. The
proud science of our West has long ignored the accumulated wisdom of such
areas because they have neither the technological progress nor the material
prosperity to “prove” their assertions. Experience cannot be measured.
Now, however, the revolution in the sciences has confirmed many of the
“idealistic” assumptions of these areas. Heisenberg (1971) could have
quoted from the secret doctrines of Tibetan yoga for his uncertainty principle:
“All things have no existence apart from the mind which holdeth them to be
existing” (Evans-Wentz, 1935/58, p. 141). Compare Plotinus (3rd century
A.C.E.): “In the same way [the soul] makes objects of sense which are, so to
speak, connected with it, shine out, one might say, by its own power, and

i Aristotle does affirm that matter must be conceived as a locus of
determinate potentialities that must become actualized only through the activity
of forms (Sorabji, 1972).
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brings them before its eyes, since its power of [sense perception] is ready for
them and, in a way, in travail towards them” (1984, IV:6, p. 329). (my italics)
W as Plato a yogin ? There is no evidence for such assertions but the
origin of such visions a s the “world of ideas” may help to discover the place
ascribed to mind, especially as it relates to matter. Plato’s idealism was not
as original as is often thought, deriving a s it does from Pythagoras'! by way of
Parmenides (Dodds, 1973). Parmenides and other pre-Socratic rationalists
developed their speculations within the “irrational” geography that myth and
ritual had already mapped out (Comford, 1952/71; Dodds, 1953/73). The
mythic mind’s experience of profane and sacred times may prefigure the
chronicity of becoming a s against timeless Being in Parmenides, and the
world of appearances and the world of ideas in Plato.
Plato, perhaps, was such a powerful influence due to his tenacity and
because he wrote in expressive dramatic dialogues rather dry treatises or
oracular pronouncements. Possibly read widely and enjoyed, people
embraced Plato’s transcendentalism. His idealism becam e the philosophical
foundation of the new Christian doctrine of the later Roman Empire, and the
senses and matter were relegated to fallen creation for at least the next 10CX)
years.

i Pythagoras may have travelled in Asia where he absorbed ideas from
the cultural locus mentioned above. Pythagoreans believed in the purification
and the transmigration of the soul (Dodds, 1953/73).
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In this view, matter is dead and of no interest or worth in itself. Mind,
on the other hand, through anamnesis in Platonism and through revelation
and obedience in Christianity, had the power to become aware of the one,
true reality. But with the Renaissance and the inexorable advance of science
into the mysteries of the material world, the stage was set for the opposition
of idealism and materialism, which is still echoed in the so-called mind-body
problem: Is memory in matter, or is it in some sort of ethereal space?

§The M ud Tempus. What is interesting about the space of memory is

how the question of time seem s to have been side-stepped, except among
the early mythmakers of the cosmic round. In profane time, individual
memories accumulate creating a sense of a “self-seeking self” and so is
accompanied by guilt, according to Eliade (1959):
Time had worn the human being, society, the cosmos—and this
destructive time was profane time, duration strictly speaking; it had to
be abolished in order to reintegrate the mythical moment in which the
world had come into existence, bathed in a “pure,” “strong," and
sacred tim e.. . . The meaning of this periodical retrogression of the
world into a chaotic modality was this: all the “sins” of the year,
everything that time had soiled and worn, was annihilated in the
physical sense of the word. By symbolically participating in the
annihilation and re-creation man too was created anew. . . .He had
reintegrated the fabulous time of Creation, hence a sacred and strong
time—sacred because transfigured by the presence of the gods,
strong because it was the time that belonged, and belonged only, to
the most gigantic creation ever accomplished, that of the universe.
(pp. 78, 79)
In this view, just as daily time is profane so are daily memories, the
comforting walls of the habitus. Any person “by participating ritually in the
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end of the world and in its re-creation ... became contemporary with the illud
tempus; hence he was born anew, he began life over again with his reserve

of vital forces intact, as it was at the moment of his birth” (p. 80). In Eliade’s
exposition of the annihilation of profane time for the earlier illud tempus, or
time of origins, it must be asked what the memories were of those who
walked among the gods. Could they not imagine a time before? Eliade
indicates that the memories renewed were those of the sacred stories which
signalled the beginning of all being and time:
The sacred time ... is a mythical time, that is, a primordial time, not to
be found in the historical past, an original time, in the sense that it
came into existence all at once, that it was not preceded by another
time, because no time could exist before the appearance of the reality
narrated in myth. (1959, p. 72)
Memory as techne—mind as technical accompaniment to the
hands—may well have employed language-forms, perhaps much as non
human animals have sound-codes and signals for information sharing,
called zoosemiotics by Kristeva (1989, pp. 318-323). Since the genetic
material of all (known) organisms is based on the nucleic acids DNA and
RNA, the genetic code may be considered universal so some observers,
according to Kristeva, have concluded “that biological as well as cultural
phenomena can be envisaged as aspects of the information process” (p.
322). Kristeva indicates that such universalizing reductionism implies a
transcendental meaning—an idealism—in material life:
Certain scholars remain convinced that the combined effort of
genetics, information theory, linguistics, and semiotics can contribute
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to an understanding of “semiosis,” which ... can be considered the
definition of life. Here we are faced with a phenomenological
postulate that is given as empirically demonstrated: the order of
language unites that of life and ideality. The element of signification,
the substance of expression that makes up speech reunites in a
parallelism (transcendental) meaning and life. (p. 323)
This imputation of a meaning-making function to the language of
information codes also implies an inherent meaning in the memory codes
constructed in the techne mode—perhaps akin to what Eliade has called
above profane time. It seem s to me, however, that we do not experience
meaning in the daily memory of unfolding time (no matter how genetically
universal we may be). To experience meaning, we must participate in an
infolding against profane time, against memory a s information, and

experience the beginning of time with “the appearance of the reality narrated
in myth," according to Eliade.

Memory as memor begins with myth. Narratives and ritual create
meaning—create reality—through a reenactment of "the beginning of time”
as known through archetypal memory: the creative recoil of memory upon
itself (chapters 4, 5). Archetypal memory may create meanings, but it does
not assum e them (Perlman, 1988). The mythic imagination has the sam e
limitations as does the empirical world of the senses, but it seeks to
remember beyond the information gathering of the private self. In the archaic

world, of course, there were specialists of the sacred (Eliade, 1964) who did
the remembering for the group and led them in reenactments and narratives
of the illud tempus. The result seem s to have been the same for all, however:
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Profane time and profane identity were abolished and everyone “began life
over again with his reserve of vital forces intact." The habitus was baptized.
Memory may well be flashback images, discrete sensations, and the
narrative interpretations I have been displaying through autobiography in
chapter 2 and will be evoking in chapter 5. Furthermore, such narrative
seem s to have no other possible derivation than the semiotic world—“the text
of everyday life” (Richardson, 1989). Even the images and sensations that
seem to leave us on the verge of a narrative-shaped memory would likely
receive scant attention were it not for the socially-constructed subjectivity
which takes note of such things. When memory and imagination m eet—and
they m ust—a mythic memory seem s to result.
The question remains whether or not such mythic memory—the
projection forward of repetition from the past—is part of “nature’s plan" as
genetic code or material evolution of some sort. I will indicate the dynamic
role of mythic narrative in creating (or re-creating) the future, but its place in
the unfolding of time has not been explored. To do so, I will look at two
modern philosophers of time, Bergson and Whitehead, who seem ed to
develop a vision of reality which gave an important place to memory and the
creative imagination.

§ldealism, Realism, Bergson.

After Plato and Plotinus, the Christian

philosophers held out for a kind of idealism which granted God the only
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reality. The crossover seem s to have come from Berkeley who led the way
back into a kind of modern Neo-Platonism in which the mind has some sort of
priority over physical reality. This position was supported from the differing
perspectives of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Hegel.
The realists, who believe in the material reality of what the senses
perceive, had supporters among the Greeks, but the modern anti-idealist
position was especially laid out by G. E. Moore who states that objects have
an existence independent of our knowing of them and exist basically as they
appear to us. Dewey is sometimes classed among the realists in that he
claimed only nature—that which is studied by the natural sciences—exists,
(summarized in De George, 1962) As a philosopher of “becoming," however,
Dewey is difficult to conceive in the realist camp.
Henri Bergson has found himself occasionally placed in the idealist
camp, or classified a s an “intuitionist” (Runes, 1961), yet he saw himself as
providing the link between the two positions, as science itself was beginning
to do. Instead of putting the “real" in the “ideal” or nature in the mind, in
Matter and Memory (1912), Bergson suggested the necessity of postulating

some sort of memory within both animate and inanimate nature—one of the
many suggestions A. N. Whitehead was to take up. Human memory, then, is
but the expansion of this natural impulse to lead to the separation of mind
from matter. Later, however, in Creative Evolution (1911/83), Bergson began
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to see more of a creative power at work in the world, which includes both
matter and memory, and may have its expression in language:
Bergsonian intuition is a concentrated attention, an increasingly
difficult attempt to penetrate deeper into the singularity of things. Of
course, to communicate, intuition must have recourse to language.. . .
This it does with infinite patience and circumspection, at the same time
accumulating images and comparisons in order to ‘embrace reality,’
thus suggesting in an increasingly precise way what cannot be
communicated by means of general terms and abstract ideas
(Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p. 91).
Attempting to deny both idealism and realism, Bergson reasoned that
matter is an “aggregate of ‘images.’ And by ‘image’ we mean a certain
existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation,
but less than that which the realist calls a thing” (1912, p. vii). Each
traditional position, then, depends upon the perspective taken. If memory
remains only perceptual memory, he writes in Matter and Memory (1912),
then we may be helped to make our next decision:
But this is not all. By allowing us to grasp in a single intuition multiple
moments of duration, it frees us from the movement of the flow of
things, that is to say, from the rhythm of necessity. The more of these
moments memory can contract into one, the firmer is the hold which it
gives to us on matter: so that the memory of a living being appears
indeed to measure, above all, its powers of action upon things, and to
be only the intellectual reverberation of this power, (p. 303)
This sounds very much like Bergson is suggesting that pure memory
has access to what he calls different planes of consciousness, or, sometimes,
pure spirit. Pure memory, he indicates is a pure potential for action to create
the next creative field of order science can then discover.
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The historical "quarrel” between the idealists and the realists has its
origin, according to Bergson (19.11/83), in the mind’s attempt to respond to
disorder. Bergson writes that “if the great problem is to know why and how
reality submits itself to an order, it is because the absence of every kind of
order appears possible or conceivable.” He continues:
It is this absence of order that realists and idealists alike believe they
are thinking of—the realist when he speaks of the regularity that
“objective” laws actually impose on a virtual disorder of nature, the
idealist when he supposes a “sensuous manifold” which is
coordinated (and consequently itself without order) under the
organizing influence of our understanding, (p. 220)
Bergson, on the contrary, wrote extensively about the synchronic
creativity between what had been called idealism and realism—or mind and
matter—both of which are the results of intelligence acting on instinct:
In order to follow the indications of instinct, there is no need to
perceive objects, it is enough to distinguish properties. Intelligence,
on the contrary, even in its humblest form, already aims at getting
matter to act on matter, (p. 189)
The world, that is to say, does not come to exist with its objects, i.e.,
objectively, until the “intelligence” perceives it as such. Simultaneously, the
intelligence gives itself mental form through the conceptualization of its
actions:
Thus the same movement by which the mind is brought to form itself
into intellect, that is to say, into distinct concepts, brings matter to break
itself up into objects excluding one another. The more consciousness
is inteilectualized, the more matter is spatialized. (p. 189)
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And, it should be added for my purposes here, the more time is
temporalized. The intellect, deriving from memory as techne, “instinctively
selects in a given situation whatever is like something already known” (p.
29). So, as matter is perceived as distinct objects and the mind as distinct
perceptions and conceptions, time is perceived as distinct present moments.
According to Bergson, this is the result of the way past perceptions—factual
memories—are “held” then further anticipated: “Of the future, only that is
foreseen which is like the past or can be made up again with elements like
those of the past" (p. 28). But the real is not in the fiction of present solidity, it
is instead being created as we move into it: “Time is invention or it is nothing
at all” (p. 341).
Bergson never develops a complete system or cosmology or states
imperatives, but he does indicate that if we wish to find the real, to participate
in the ongoing emergence of creation, we must cease projecting a future
from a “present” which seems to exist only because we are always in the
process of remembering it:
We should no longer be asking where a moving body will be, what
shape a system will take, through what state a change will pass at a
given moment: the moments of time, which are only arrests of our
attention, would no longer exist; it is the flow of time, it is the very flux
of the real that we should be trying to follow, (p. 342)
This leads into Bergson’s famous concept of “duration,” an idea
variously interpreted. It seems to be related to what German
phenomenologists call the Lebenswelt or the previously mentioned (chap. 1)
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habitus, and perhaps to the causal efficacy at work during Whitehead’s
actual events or occasions (1978). It refers to time as the becoming of a

reality which is never become, though the intellect perceives it so. The
rational intellect is an important survival mechanism which evolution has
made manifest, Bergson says, but it seem s only able to carry us along into a
future we have determined shall be as identical as possible with the past. If
there is no real present, an interesting implication is that we have created our
sense of the present with the immediate memories of the past, but the only
creative position is always the slightly extended futurity of becoming. The

“present” may be said to be created from the duration already moving into the
future—with the materials of the past. From which “present” we project the
“future,” and so o n ...
We cannot perceive beyond our senses which are limited by our
intellect’s “use” of memory to perceive. And we cannot creatively acf with
intellect alone, which works only within the flow of time:
For, as soon as we are confronted with true duration, we see that it
means creation, and that if that which is being unmade endures, it can
only be because it is inseparably bound to what is making itself. Thus
will appear the necessity of a continual growth of the universe, I
should say of a life of the real. And thus will be seen in a new light the
life which we find on the surface of our planet, a life directed the same
way as that of the universe, and inverse of materiality. To intellect, in
short, there will be added intuition, (p. 343)
It is intuition, according to Bergson, which guides us into "true
duration,” and a union with the power of creativity found there—the
immediacy of Gian vital. I would like to note how similar in structure this
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suggestion is to rituals previously described by Eliade as a return to the illud
tempus, the time of creation. Bergson’s position seems to be that an

intuitional memory can seek the symbols beyond the perceived circle of
self—the habitus—in what has been called the mythopoeic imagination.!
In what fashion can we imagine time unfolding or our infolding into
time? I look about me and I hear my air conditioner crank out pollutants, I
look beside my Mac Classic and see Sonya, my overweight grey cat, sleep
on Stephen Ray Gould’s Time’s arrow, Time’s Cycle, and I feel the weary
solidity of the self relentlessly tapping away at these keys. How can duration
be conceived as happening amidst these realistic events? Alfred North
Whitehead is often considered to have taken Bergson’s suggestions about
time and memory and to have completed them in a systematic fashion. I ask
myself: What is the place of memory in Whitehead’s work? Has he a place
for the mythopoeic imagination in his intricate cosmology?

§Becomfng a s P rocess: A. N. W hitehead. My initial response to the
latter question would be to simply reply in the affirmative. Since any human
construction of a cosmology cannot ultimately be verified experimentally and
since, by definition, any human is within its own ideas of a cosmos, a
cosmology is a work of speculative philosophy, which Whitehead has

i Like Foucault’s “care of the self being an advanced form of the
“technology of the self,” Bergson’s “intuition" is not a denial of intellect, but a
completion of it.
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extensively defined. Speculative philosophy in our rationalizing world is
related to the mythopoeic imagination. A cosmology is, itself, a work of
imagination which endeavours to divest itself of the cosmetics of imagery,
drama, and allusion to specific culture-heroes or divinities (Whitehead,
1978).
This is insufficient, however, so I will proceed to dissect the terms of
the question. Following this, I will attempt a brief outline of Whitehead’s
cosmology, as “ultimate” then a s “immediate," especially as portrayed in
Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (1978) realizing that this

statement and my limitations could not possibly do Whitehead’s “magnum
opus" its deserved justice. I shall then speculate whether or not Whitehead
intended the mythopoeic imagination to have a background or central place
in his cosmic scheme, or if such place can be found.

§C osm os and Im agination. The idea of cosmos will not detain me long.
It is such a big idea that it seem s to me unnecessary to attempt to grasp it
whole. To most of us, cosmos is a synonym for universe: an
incomprehensible totality consisting mainly of vast emptiness. Our
incomprehension must only increase when we learn through someone such
a s Carl Sagan in his TV miniseries “Cosmos” that this universe is replete with
mathematical anomalies and warps in space-time, such a s those
encountered when approaching the event horizons of black holes. The black
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holes, themselves, theoretically deny the totality of everything by being, as far
as we can understand, cosmic drainpipes to nothingness. Some even
propose that black-holes are inverse doorways to "other” universes or other
planes of being (Toben & Wolf, 1982). One need hardly throw in
speculations about universes beginning and ending or expanding then
contracting to give a sense of the utter chaos around our dreams of order.
The archetypal mythologist, Jam es Hillman, attempts to bring us back
to the original meaning of the word cosmos and to reveal that it refers
specifically to “dreams of order” within the image of a particular Greek deity:
“Everything had shelter and altar. Nothing was lost; everything belonged to a
cosmos because it belonged somewhere as image to the planetary persons
and their myths” (Hillman, 1989a, p. 226). Hillman’s admitted mythmaking
also reveals that cosmos refers to an aesthetic creation, a s does its logos,
cosmology:
This emphasis on descriptive qualities gives back to cosmology its
original aesthetic meaning. We have lost that first sense of the word.
Cosmos now m eans empty, vast, spacey—a video game for
astronomers. The Greek word meant orderly, becomingly, duly, an
aesthetic arrangement. Cosmos once referred to the anima mundi,
world-soul, an Aphroditic order. And our word “cosmetics,” referring to
the facial appearance of things, brings to light this original sense.
So, besides its astronomical and metaphysical meanings,
cosmology implies even more fundamentally an aesthetic world
whose essence is constituted in sensory images. Attempts to reduce
the account of the world to the fewest coherent principles, even to
mathematical formulae, have the intention of revealing by means of
scientific elegance this cosmic beauty, (p. 226)
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Despite the implication that cosmos is an aesthetic rendering of
universal reality, Hillman does not attempt to explain a cosmos as a
projection of the human faculty of imagination. Perhaps because he
understands imagination not to be a human faculty at alh but the process of
ordering within an archetypal image (or “planetary person”). Cosmos here is
not objective reality, but our ordering of it. Whitehead, a s will be shown,
seem s to understand it to be objective reality-in-process, with some
possibility for our ordering of it. It is precisely the denial of an ordering which
can be known in advance of the creative act of ordering (i.e., becoming)
which Bergson implied through duration. This comparison will be renewed
at the chapter’s end.
The Indo-European root of cosmos is usually considered to be /res-,
which means “to put in order,” thus the “order” of things. The scientific act of
ordering is usually the intellectual act of defining things in ever smaller and
more intricate categories: kes- also means “to cut," from whence we derive
castigate, castrate, and caste (Claiborne, 1989). Thus, cosmology here
implies a vast “de-fining” of all the objects and properties in the universe.

i “Grand—imagination not a faculty! The claim that it is a faculty has
been precisely what has deceived us most about imagination. We have
considered it one function among others; whereas it may be essentially different
from thinking, willing, believing, etc. Rather than an independent operation or
place, it is more likely an operation that works within the others as a place which
is found only through the others—(is it their ground?)." (Hillman, 1979b, p. 133)
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There is another possible etymology which gives precedence to the
human mythopoeic collaboration in reality. Kosmos may derive instead from
the suffixed o-grade form of the Indo-European prefix kens- = (kons-mo).
Kens- refers to “speaking solemnly” (Calvert, 1982), thus cosmos makes

order through solemn speech. It may worth noting that the root of the Greek
mythos may be muthos, or word (Levin, 1960). It is possible that cosmology

and mythology already have a familial relationship: a solemn speaking of the
sacred word —muthos as Logos? Muthos, in turn, may derive from mu-,
perhaps the first expressive sound (Harrison, 1903/91), which in turn could
well have evolved into murmur and memor.
Imagination in Western philosophy has oscillated in position from
being foundational to all thought to being derided as the distraction of
fantasy. Plato turned to myth for his deepest formulations; Kant distinguished
between reproductive and productive (or transcendental) imagination.
Reproductive imagination works only through association and is itself
possible, according to Kant, because it is founded in the transcendental
imagination, which is an active, spontaneous power (Avens, 1980). Like the
pre-Socratics, Kant seem ed to understand rational thought as an aspect of
imagination imagining itself. Kant, however, seem s to have sought shelter in
pure reason in later writings and finally understood imagination as did David
Hume in this terse dismissal: “Nothing is more dangerous to reason than the
flights of imagination” (Hume, I. IV. vii.).
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Of course, Coleridge, Wordsworth and the Romantics understood
reason to be the threat to flights of imagination. It was objective rationalism,
Wordsworth intimated, which made us feel that for “Nature,” and
for everything, we are out of tune;
It moves us not. —Great God! I'd rather be
A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn;
So m ig ht!, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea;
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn. (1807b)

The later Nietzschean overflow of mythopoeic emotionalism hardened the
reaction against such anti-rationality by logical positivists, among others, and
was still strong in the time when Whitehead was writing.
Whitehead knew that language was built on image and metaphor and
would never be as precise as the mathematics from which he had emerged
into speculative philosophy (Wallack, 1980). He recognized that, like
mythopoeic thought, imagination was the basis of all speculation. Here
(1978) he insists, however, that the difference in his metaphysics is in the
criticism of the concepts thus envisaged:
The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts
from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin
air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed
observation rendered acute by rational interpretation. The reason for
the success of this method of imaginative rationalization is that, when
the method of difference fails, factors which are constantly present
may yet be observed under the influence of imaginative thought.
Such thought supplies the differences which the direct observation
lacks. It can even play with inconsistency; and can thus throw light on
the consistent, and persistent, elements in experience by comparison
with what in imagination is inconsistent with them. (Whitehead, p. 5)
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Whitehead seem s weil aware that his rational metaphysics will be
hard to prove logically with inexact language, built as it is on relative
inference. He accepts that metaphysical explanation can only “approximate”
truth yet to be testable it must make meaning within a self-referential system:
No metaphysical system can hope entirely to satisfy these pragmatic
tests. At the best such a system will remain only an approximation to
the general truths which are sought. In particular, there are no
precisely stated axiomatic certainties from which to start. There is not
even the language in which to frame th em .. . . But no language can be
anything but elliptical, requiring a leap of the imagination to
understand its meaning in its relevance to immediate experience, (p.
13)
Imagination, then, by Whitehead’s own admission, surrounds even a
cosmology as seemingly profound as his own. But to what extent can it be
understood as "mythopoeic"?
First of all, some may question whether or not Whitehead starts without
any “axiomatic certainties” as he claims. “God" must be among the most
used terms in Process and Reality. God in his primordial nature is present at
the “beginning” and in his consequent nature is there at the “end.”
Whitehead’s “process" seems linear, ongoing, but in this sense is cyclical.
Whitehead calls this a presupposition (p. 44) and it is interesting to note
that—again through etymology—the very term “God” may have derived from
an infinitive verb form meaning “to invoke.”1 Like Homer or Hesiod in his
cosmogony (and cosmology) asking for inspiration—“Sing, O Muse...”,—

iGod, gheu(e)- = to call, invoke (Claiborne)
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Whitehead may himself be invoking cosmic inspiration for what is widely
recognized a s an inspired system.
W hitehead’s cosmology is not specifically a mythology, however,
especially a s it is not claimed a s a revelation or used a s code for ritual.i
Henri Frankfort, the great archeologist of the most ancient civilizations,
differentiated between mythopoeic and theoretical thought:
Myth, then, is to be taken seriously, because it reveals a significant, if
unverifiable, truth—we might say metaphysical truth. But myth has not
the universality and the lucidity of theoretical statement. It is concrete,
though it claims to be inassailable in its validity. It claims recognition
by the faithful; it does not pretend to justification before the critical.
(Frankfort, 1946/61, p. 16)
Though Whitehead elaborated his cosmology into finely tuned
conceptual abstractions, he also recognized that no system can be logically
complete and that future generations would probably pick his system apart
(Whitehead, chap. I, sec. II, II, IV.) Certainly his speculative concerns are very
similar to those of early man, who “entangled in the immediacy of his
perceptions, recognized the existence of certain problems which transcend
the phenomena. He recognized the problem of origin and the problem of
telos, of the aim and purpose of being” (Frankfort, p. 17).

i “Myth is a form of poetry which transcends poetry in that it proclaims a
truth; a form of reasoning which transcends reasoning in that it wants to bring
about the truth it proclaims; a form of action, of ritual behaviour, which does not
find its fulfillment in the act but must proclaim and elaborate a poetic form of
myth.” (Frankfort, 1946/61, p. 16)
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Poetry derives from “poesis,” a making or a creation (Morris). In this
understanding, especially underscored by Whitehead’s em phasis on primal
creativity, his cosmology, a logos of “solemn saying” is also mythopoesis, a
"making with words.” Many of those words refer specifically to the sacred,
and often to the eternal. It seem s to this writer that cosmologizing is
mythmaking, but it is possible that such a view depends on the etymological
dictionary employed.
More important, perhaps, to the question at hand, is whether or not
Whitehead reserved a place for such elem ents or “faculties” a s inspiration,
aesthetic memory, or the mythopoeic imagination within his system. Where
is the present moment—the inspired instant—in his process? To examine
this, an outline of his cosmological system must be attempted.

§W hitehead’s U ltim ates

Influenced by Einstein's theory of relativity,

Whitehead developed his theory based on space-time, rather than
understanding space and time a s separate dimensions of the sam e
unfolding reality. We perceive extension in space-time and understand
reality to be present and solid:
We must first consider the perceptive mode in which there is clear,
distinct consciousness of the 'extensive’ relations of the world. These
relations include the ‘extensiveness’ of space and the ‘extensiveness’
of time. Undoubtedly, this clarity, at least in regard to space, is
obtained only in ordinary perception through the senses. This mode
of perception is here termed 'presentational immediacy.’ In this
‘m ode’ the contemporary world is consciously prehended a s a
continuum of extensive relations. (Whitehead, p. 61)
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The senses, however, are later developments upon a deeper, less
conscious mode of awareness called prehension. This accepted,
experience need not be restricted to entities with sensory organs.
On this basis, it not absurd to attribute a vague kind of emotionalpurposive perceptivity to those lower organisms that are devoid of
sensory organs
To say that all individual events prehend the things
in their environments is to say that they take influences from them into
themselves and have some sort of emotional-appetitive response to
them” (Griffin, 1988, p. 153).
In this statement, David Ray Griffin, prominent modern Whitehead interpreter
and applier, does not pursue the matter the matter beyond “lower organisms"
to its smaller and more momentary limit: the actual entity, for the space
oriented, or the actual event, for the time oriented, or, simply, the occasion,
defined by Whitehead as “a momentary experiential event which occupies
(or constitutes) a region that is spatial as well as temporal” (In Griffin, p. 151).
So instead of semi-permanent “things” changing through a continuous
flow of time, we have experiencing occasions which appear, prehend their
environments, perhaps adapt to some “extent,” and disappear as
experiencing occasions to become completed objective occasions. These

occasions include events at the atomic level and those of macrocosmic
stature. The occasion is the act of becoming, like Bergson’s duration, the
process of which is going on “all the time.” These are the existential realities,
according to Whitehead—occasions becoming, achieving satisfaction, and
perishing. Their prehension guides them to satisfaction and alters them
through the environmental influence of other occasions. In their "perishing”
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they become fixed as objective occasions which will now influence the
becoming of subjects of new actual events. As Griffin (1988) explains:
an object is an event that had been, in itself, a subject. Accordingly, it
has the kind of stuff a subject can receive, i.e., feelings, whether
conscious or unconscious—feelings of derivation, feelings of desire,
feelings of attraction and repulsion. . . . By conceiving of each event as
having been a subject of feeling prior to being a felt object, we can
understand how an object can influence a subject, (p. 155)
This is the world according to Whitehead. We must look deeper into
Whitehead’s speculations to discover the alpha point of his cosmology.
In the beginning—metaphorically speaking since “non-temporal” does
not constitute linearity—was pure creativity and God in his primordial nature.
Unlike Bergson and others, Whitehead does not identify God pantheistically
with “The force that through the green fuse drives the flower (Thomas,
1936)—the primal force of creativity—but as a non-temporal actual entity on
his own. Creighton Peden (1981) concludes that Whitehead’s creativity “is
without character or individuality of its own. It is the active, creative force of
the universe, being conditioned by the objective immortality of the actual
world and by God” (p. 35). Bergson would likely accept condition one.
Studying Whitehead is often a matter of learning a new terminology,
but, as in all mythically-bounded language systems, each term has meaning
only in reference to other terms and the meta-meaning of the entire
language. Some terms never emerge, it seems, as actual entities—just as in
Whitehead’s system actual entities are really processes. Here at the illud
tempus of Whitehead’s cosmogony, it seem s important to understand the
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difference between the conceptions of “creativity” and “God,” since
specifically human creativity will be the subject of the next section.
Creativity as a first principle allows Whitehead to avoid the
mechanistic view of straightforward cause and effect determination and to
account for the “dendritic” nature of evolution. Further, his conjectures about
eternal objects, aims, and even God's primordial nature, which—combined
with the also primordial creativity—allow him to explain the unpredictable
outcome of each “concrescence” of occasions which results in “novelty” in
the universe:
‘Creativity’ is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter
of fact. It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the
universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the
universe conjunctively.
'Creativity' is the principle of novelty. An actual occasion is a
novel entity diverse from any entity in the ‘many’ which it unifies. Thus
‘creativity’ introduces novelty into the content of the many, which are
the universe disjunctively. The ‘creative advance’ is the application of
this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel situation which it
originates... .
The ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance from
disjunction to conjunction, creating a novel entity other than the entity
. . . . The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the ‘many’ which it
finds, and also it is one among the disjunctive ‘many’ which it leaves; it
is a novel entity, disjunctively among the many entities which it
synthesizes. The many become one and are increased by one.
(Whitehead, 1978, p. 26)
Creativity is both the ultimate reality and the active principle in the
concrescence of the many to produce a novel actual occasion, as in
Whitehead’s expressive phrase: “The many become one and are increased
by one.” The novel actual occasion then embodies its novel creativity as one
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of the many to be used in the concrescence of the next actual occasion, an
increase of one. In this way, creativity may be understood as inhering as self
creativity in each event. As Peden interprets:
Because of creativity, every actual entity, temporal or non-temporal, is
to some degree self-creative. Every actual entity, being to some
degree self-creative, is a novel being. On the basis of novelty ... an
actual entity is a new form in the universe. The doctrine of creativity
points to the fact that constantly new forms are being created and are
perishing in the universe, (p. 35)
If reality were understood as purely creative, however, then literally
anything could happen. Reality would be a chaos of novelty in which even
dendritic patterns could turn back upon themselves in disarray. To explain
the seeming form of the onflow of reality, Whitehead invokes an ultimate
actuality to guide his ultimate reality. Griffin (1989b) theologizes:
God, who is the source of all physical, aesthetic, and ethical principles,
is the ultimate actuality . . . . The ultimate reality and the ultimate
actuality are equally primordial. God does not create creativity, but
neither does creativity generate God. Each equally presupposes the
other. Creativity that is uninfluenced by God’s persuasion toward
ordered beauty therefore never occurs, (p. 31)
God is present “at the beginning” as a hidden persuader, so to speak.
This is what Whitehead calls God’s primordial nature. In this idea, God is
understood as an actual entity like all other actual entities (which are also
occasions), except that God “is non-temporal. This means that God does not
perish and become objectively immortal as temporal actual entities." (Peden,
p. 34)
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This suggests all sorts of difficulties in Whitehead’s previous definition
of actual entities as becoming from a previous many, but this is not the place
to consider them. Suffice to say that God, in his primordial nature, influences
the process of occasions by sustaining within him “eternal objects” which
contain the potential subjective aims for the becoming of temporal actual
entities. Eternal objects are conceptions which have no reference to any
definite entity in the temporal world, but
An eternal object is always a potentiality for actual entities; but in itself,
as conceptually felt, it is neutral as to the fact of its physical ingression
in any particular actual entity of the temporal world. ‘Potentiality’ is the
correlative of 'givenness. ’ The meaning of ‘givenness’ is that what is
‘given’ might not have been ‘given’; and what is not ‘given’ might have
b e e n 'given.’ (Whitehead, p. 44)
As indicated, it is the eternal objects which provide the subjective aim
in the concrescence of the many into an actual occasion of experience.
There will be more on this event later, but for now it should be noted that in
Whitehead’s view the eternal objects are present as potentials “in the
beginning” sustained by God’s primordial nature, and they are also present
“at the end” a s future possibilities toward which the creativity of each actual
event aims. These everpresent potentialities for experience, which approach
randomness in their sense of being “given” or “not given,” are the reason for
beginning and end being understood as metaphors (disguising circularity?).

God is also understood as having a “consequent nature.” This is the
physical prehension by God of the actual events/entities of the evolving
universe. Whitehead indicates this is how temporal entities achieve
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“objective immortality” after attaining satisfaction of their subjective aims and
perishing as an actual experience. These objective entities are no longer
capable of change or experience, but they never cease to exist, apparently,
in the mind of God. In this way, all objective entities have a potential
influence upon the present experience of an actual event. (Whitehead, 1978)
Finally, God has a “superjective nature.” It is in this manner that God
influences the creativity of each actual event toward noble or harmonious
ends, but does not determine those ends. An important question arising here
is the creation of dissonance or evil. In the self-creation of each actual entity,
is it possible to create destruction, that is, to coalesce into an experiencing
event without the superjective influence of God? Whitehead’s theologian
interpreter, Griffin, indicated above that such things do not occur. And, as I
have shown, Whitehead understands all possible aims—the eternal
objects—to be sustained by God in his primordial nature. Griffin (1989)
interprets Whitehead as implying that higher order self-creations—human
beings—are capable of evil aims:
From the point of view of a theology of universal creativity, the
existence of chaos and evil is no surprise. They are to be expected,
given a multiplicity of centers of creative power. The surprise is the
existence of order and goodness. They beg for explanation in terms of
an all-inclusive creative influence, (p. 43)
Chaotic or evil creations can only be explained by having aims not
within God. But what else was there “in the beginning”? Only a non
differentiated creativity, according to Whitehead. Anything non-differentiated

172

is usually conceived a s being in the primordial state known to many
mythologies a s chaos. Perhaps creativity, especially human creativity which
has such expanded memory capacity, partakes simultaneously of chaotic
and divine essences. Divinely “underinfluenced" creativity may not be
creative but destructive, according to Whitehead. Yet it must be understood
as creative if it is a novel concrescence of the many into a one to increase the
many by one. Every novel concrescence is the result of both “past”
occasions and an aim toward eternal objects, even those novel occasions
conjured by human minds. It is at least conceivable that Whitehead left room
for eternal objects not sustained by his harmonious, ordered, and morally
correct God. If so, such eternal objects need not be understood as
evil/chaotic/satanic. Where would one place the potential of an eternal
object which inspires a mischievous, but innocuous aim for an actual event?
God, even his three natures, should not be understood a s being
omnipotent. His superjective nature potentially affects the creativity of events
only through the multiplicity of eternal objects:
This doctrine applies also to the primordial nature of God, which is his
complete envisagement of eternal objects; he is not thereby directly
related to the given course of history. The given course of history
presupposes his primordial nature, but his primordial nature does not
presuppose it. (Whitehead, p. 44}
God and his natures are possibly unnecessary abstractions for
seeking archetypal memory or mythopoeic imagination. However,
Whitehead’s cosmology is built within such abstractions and it seem s
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necessary to touch upon them. Hartshorne (1981) has commented how
Whitehead’s three-natured God and the seemingly infinite potentials for
concrescence found in the eternal objects seem to be a multiplying of
abstractions which have no need of, or logical relationship to, each other.
For my purposes, it seem s worth observing that Whitehead’s
metaphysics implies a process of becoming within a divine order which
ultimately is without beginning or end. This may even apply to microcosmic
elaborations, since the three natures of God are closely mirrored in the
subjectivity of becoming and perishing during each actual occasion. One
major difference is that each occasion looks to past occasions for some of its
aims in concrescence, but God, at least in his primordial nature, has no past.
The question of Whitehead’s strict ethical dualism within the non
temporal God-influenced cosmic process cannot be resolved here. The
related question of the freedom and purpose of the human imagination within
such a cosmology must be addressed by examining the unfolding occasion,
itself, for evidence of a moment of spontaneous (progressive or regressive)
vision.

§ P rocess: The Elusive P resent. The quest for a purely spontaneous
present in Whitehead’s system may well be in vain.

Every actual event

occurs through a concrescence of past or objective actual events. The
creativity, the novelty, the aim of each occurring actual event is always

174

unique to itself but it is brought about by the creative potential s till contained
within those past actual events.

The influence of the multitude of past actual events, i.e., objective
occasions, upon the many becoming a novel one is called by Whitehead
efficient causation.

The influence of the eternal objects, the aim of the

concrescence, is called final causation (Whitehead). We usually imagine the
latter as lying in the future or a s teleological causation. This may be
metaphorically valid, but Whitehead also em phasizes the creative potential
which inheres within each objective occasion but is no longer a potential for
experience for that occasion. The creative potential within each objective
occasion is a potential only for the unfolding of a present occasion of
experience. It is in the combining, i.e. the concrescence, of past potentials
that the creative potential of the present event is realized. The aim, itself, can
only exist as potential within the influence o f an eternal object (which may be

understood teleologically) (category of explanation vii). The realization of
such an aim, however, can only come through the utilization of objective
occasions of the past: The many become one and are increased by one.
Though God is present at all stages in the process of becoming and
though the eternal objects are potentials for experience which may be
understood in the past in terms of their inherence in all objective occasions
and their paradigms for relating objective occasions into nexus and though
these sam e eternal objects seem to be potentials without form or substance
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on their own which lie in the future a s aims, it is our experience of temporal
process in the imagined present which gives us clues to all other cosmic
events. We experience the passage of time from past into future with all the
attendant changes in space-time and have a difficult time, as Whitehead has
indicated through his central thesis, trying to locate this present.
As narrowly as we can define the moment, upon examination we find
that moment to be in reality a process in which past and future are always
implicated. Even our sensory perceptions only allow experience of the
“presented locus” (p. 168) of actual events which are themselves in process.
The prehensions supporting these sensory perceptions are what bring them
into “presentational immediacy” (p. 61-65), but the prehensions are of the
causal efficacy behind the sense response. The prehensions are “a direct
perception of those antecedent actual occasions which are causally
efficacious both for the percipient and for the relevant events in the presented
locus” (p. 169).
An event at the atomic level may be an actual entity (or actual
occasion or actual event) and so, apparently, may God. Most things that we
perceive, it seems, are objective actual entities in some combination.
Something such as a rock is not an actual entity; it has no experience and is
not in process. Its constituent parts (molecules, atoms, or whatever),
however, may be actual entities in the nexus of rockness and they do have
experience. Their process is temporally unhurried (relatively speaking) and
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their memories and aims are limited to the most basic prehensions and
appetitive responses.
Our animal body has extended prehension through the se n se organs
and our mind has enlarged memory capacity and, it would seem, a wider
range of potential responses to efficient and final causality. Despite this, we
are not actual entities, either, but compounds of various subjective
experiences. Wallack (1980) puts it this way:
Similarly for other ca ses of sense-perception: a viewer is subject of a
sight; a sniffer is subject of a smell; a taster is subject of a flavor; a
sentient body is subject of a texture or an ache; and a s such all are
actual entities. The experiences of sense-perceptions, seeing,
hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling, are naturally very important
actual entities for p eo p le.. . . In fact, Whitehead allows that an animal
body is constructed so as to provide percipient experience of this sort
for the animal, (p. 19)
Memory, itself, is “a human percipient experience, although in different
mode, just a s are the sense perceptions” (Wallack, p. 19). Whitehead, as
noted, has also referred to this a s the prehension of efficient causality. The
point of this for my purpose is that even in the mode of so-called
“presentational immediacy” it is nof the immediate present which we are
perceiving, according to Whitehead, but the perceptions are separate
subjective entities which our minds perceive (i.e., prehend) in their causal
efficacy, their effect, and unify into the experience we call consciousness. To
perceive anything, we must perceive through the im m ediate past.
Another way of putting it is to simply recall that all actual entities are
diverse until creatively brought together into a concrescence of experience.
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It is only when the aim of the experience is subjectively satisfied that a novel
entity ceases to experience and becomes objectified as a past occasion
which can now be remembered (prehended, memorially perceived) to
influence the next becoming event. Complicated as this may sound, it seem s
clear Whitehead means that nothing can be perceived until it is a perceivable
object. And nothing is an object until it has ceased to exist as an
experiencing subject in process and has become an objective entity. A ll we
sensorially perceive are objects which have already entered the past.i

It must be remembered that, for Whitehead, all matter is creative.
These objective entities are not inert but continue to actively influence
experiencing subjects. “The past does not remain past; anything past is
presently effecting a present subject, and anything present is in process”
(Wallack, p. 142).
Prehension also provides for us an intuition of possibilities which
inhere in the past creative possibilities of causal efficacy and in the pure
potential of the eternal objects.

Being eternal, such potentials lie neither in

the past nor in the future but as pure potential they can only be envisioned as
being “before” or “around” the process of becoming. They are already
“within” the process by being contained in each objective entity and its
relationships but then they are no longer imperceptibly pure; as pure
potential they are intuitively apprehended only as final causes towards which
i Bergson’s duration again: intellect extends memory into the anticipated
future, from which “position" perception is achieved back through memory.
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we in the elusive present can aim our becoming. To prehend a pure potency
in and of itself without the causal efficacy of objective occasions is
inconceivable. Remembering is imagining. But perhaps it is such nonconceptual prehension of pure potency which brings some mystics to
withdraw from the world or find their only response in silence.
It would seem that as causal efficacy meets final causation there must
be an instant when the aim is chosen, a “flashpoint” of decision to move the
process of becoming toward a particular type of concrescence and
subsequent satisfaction. It would seem there must be moment of balance
when negative causation is excluded, positive causation included, and
teleological (final) causation accepted as purpose. This could be the
moment when imaginative spontaneity actually becomes an ultimate
necessity of process and the only actual and real experience of the present
we can possibly have.
Griffin (1988) implies that there is such a moment when the decision is
made or when the aim is chosen:
The momentary subject then makes a self-determining response to
these causal influences; this is the moment of final causation, as the
event aims at achieving a synthesis for itself and for influencing the
future, (p. 24)
It sounds like the moment has been found, until Griffin goes on to explain that
final causation is but a response to efficient causation in Whitehead’s system:
This final causation is in no way unrelated to efficient causation; it is a
purposive response to the efficient causes on the event. When this
moment of subjective final causation is over, the event becomes an
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object which exerts efficient causation on future events. Exactly what
efficient causation it exerts is a function both of the efficient causes
upon it and of its own final causation. Hence, the efficient causes of
the world do not run along a s if there were no mentality with its final
causation. An event does not simply transmit to others what it
received; it may do this, but it also may deflect and transform the
energy it receives to some degree or another, before passing it on.
(1988, p. 24)
This indicates that the “final causation” inspired by the eternal objects
does not just imply teleological or primordial potential, but also implies that
such archetypal potential inheres in each actual occasion. It does so through
the causal efficacy of the objective occasions which had their own ingression
of final causation during their concrescence. Though objective occasions
are no longer in process, the ingressed final causation—or eternal potential
—continues to be active through them. Past, present, and future are
simultaneously implicated in process. Teleological inspiration m ay be
activated through remembering. Perhaps som e of Whitehead’s “Categories

of Explanation” may summarize what I have been trying to elucidate:
Categories o f Explanation:

(i) That the actual world is a process, and that the process is the
becoming of actual entities. Thus actual entities are creatures; they
are also termed ‘actual occasions.’
(ii) That in the becoming of an actual entity, the potential unity of
many entities in disjunctive diversity—actual and non-actual—
acquires the real unity of the one actual entity; so that the actual entity
is the real concrescence of many potentials.
(iii) That in the becoming of an actual entity, novel prehensions,
nexus, subjective forms, propositions, multiplicities, and contrasts, also
become; but there are no novel eternal objects.
(vii) That an eternal object can be described only in terms of its
potentiality for ‘ingression’ into the becoming of actual entities; and
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that its analysis only discloses other eternal objects. It is a pure
potential.
(x) That the first analysis of an actual entity, into its most
concrete elements, discloses it to be a concrescence of prehensions,
which have originated in its process of becoming.
(xix) That the fundamental types of entities are actual entities,
and eternal objects; and that the other types of entities only express
how all entities of the two fundamental types are in community with
each other, in the actual world.
(xxiv) The functioning of one actual entity in the self-creation of
another actual entity is the ‘objectification’ of the former for the latter
actual entity. The functioning of an eternal object in the self-creation of
an actual entity is the ‘ingression’ of the eternal object in the actual
entity.
(xxv) The final phase in the process of concrescence,
constituting an actual entity, is one complex, fully determinate feeling.
This final phase is termed the ‘satisfaction.’ (Whitehead, pp. 23-25)
From this, I feel I can safely conclude that there is no "given” present
moment for the human subject or for any experiencing entity whatsoever in
Whitehead’s cosmology, unless it is the non-sensory instant (Bergson’s
intuitional duration) of apprehension of an aim toward an eternal object. As
one actual entity is objectified in influencing another, the ingression of an
eternal object is taking place. All actual entities in the process of becoming
are made of a great array of other actual entities and their concrescence and
influence by final causes is happening at different rates in different regions.
The satisfaction which occurs upon the attainment of “one complex fully
determinate feeling” (Griffin, 1988, p. 154) is a temporal movement from outer
to inner. As compound entities, we have feeling and consciousness, but
according to Whitehead the image of consciousness a s an ongoing stream of
actual durations may be appropriate after all.
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§Space-Tim e of th e M ythopoeic Im agination. Does an ongoing
stream of consciousness negate any chance for the mythopoeic
imagination? If the mythopoeic imagination can only exist in a spontaneous
present then it must. But a spontaneous present could have no substance,
no consciousness a s we know it, if all perceivable entities have already
become temporally objective. A spontaneous present could only be absolute
awareness of potentials for concrescence, the pure potentials of the eternal
objects. That is to say, substantially conscious of nothing, or of
everything—same thing—so its conscious content could only be nil.
This is what Whitehead implies about the primordially natured God,
creativity, and the eternal objects: that nothing can be said about them in
themselves. He does use the adjectives “non-temporal” and “eternal,”
however, and, as Wittgenstein pointed out, eternity is found neither at the
beginning nor at the end of time:
Proposition 6.4311: “If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal
duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live
in the present." (In Campbell, 1968, p. 676)
In this way, the present must contain all extra-temporal potentiality and
all timelessness, including the silent eternal objects. Similarly, silence is the
only “response” to such being-in-itself. Silence, however, is not mythpoesis.
Could it be that our sensory and self perceptions take place an “instant” into
the past, just as matter appears to ultimately consist of energy “particles”
travelling slower than the speed of light (Toben & Wolf, 1982)? If so, then the
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objective referents of memory and speech as techne can refer only to
themselves in a (vicious?) circle of repetition.
Most language is built on a response to other language whose
referents may be actual entities. The realistic, actual language Whitehead
employs is just such a self-referential theoretic code. Even though he
constructs a new terminology, his words all refer to actual entities within his
system. Every term refers to actual entities in their objective form: as efficient
causation, as past occasions, as objectively immortal in the mind of God.
Poetry, however, is sometimes perceived as turning away from the
possibilities of causal efficacy and attempting to allow language to speak.
Bachelard (1987) sees the poet as attaining a non-objective awareness,
similar to that of the mystic, but the poet, instead of remaining silent, becomes
herself the "objective” occasion for the speaking of such silence: “Poetry
then is truly the first manifestation of silence. It lets the attentive silence,
beneath the images, remain alive” (p. 25).
This sounds extreme, perhaps, but I am trying to map the source of
mythopoeic inspiration; many writers, visionaries, and mythmakers seem to
feel this inspiration is an important part of their art. Many also admit to a
feeling of dismay at the impossibility of attaining the full depth of vision hinted
at by the first rapture of inspiration. The actual occasion may achieve
satisfaction but the eternal object, or the archetype, or the Muse cannot
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occasions. It is similar to the inevitable fall of Eliade’s illud tempus—the
sacred time of creation— into the profane time of history (or the shrinking of
personal aw areness within the habitus).
This does not seem strange when it is considered that, from our point
of view, eternal objects must use a s tools for the expression of their
dynamism only individual human actual occasions which can act only from
the causal efficacy of past (objective) occasions.

Objective occasions are

nearly infinite; at least they have achieved immortality in the mind of God. An
electron may have a memory for the efficient causation of objective
occasions that had achieved satisfaction and become objective only micro
seconds ago. A human being, as a compound actual occasion capable of
both physical and mental prehension, may conceivably delve mem orially
well beyond his own lifetime. Because of the extent of aw areness of the

becoming actual occasion of experience (i.e., the present as process) we
humans also p o ssess a relatively vast capacity for memory. This leads to the
seeming contradiction that mythopoeic inspiration, though derived from an
unattainable present, expresses itself only through the depths of imaginative
memory.
Such memory increases human freedom which, apparently, worries
Whitehead in his ethical dualism. It certainly worries Griffin (1988), the
theologian who declares his “Whiteheadianism”:
The importance of efficient causes, i.e., of influence from the past,
does not diminish a s one moves toward the higher individuals;
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indeed, in a sense higher beings are influenced by more past events
than are lower ones. But the totality of efficient causes from the past
becomes less and less explanatory of experience and behavior, and
the individual’s own present self-determination in terms of desired
ends becomes more explanatory, (p. 24)
It seem s this enlarged capacity for reception and “present selfdetermination in terms of desired ends" makes the human creature more
valuable in Whitehead’s scheme of things. This value must be because of
the human ability to imagine unique possibilities. Since possibilities are
unimaginable without eternal objects, the human being must be able to
imagine possibilities by prehending/remembering the primordial influence of
creativity, in itself, without the mollifying influence of God in his primordial
nature (or by prehending, as “aim," toward the teleological influence of
creativity—since eternal objects are “eternal,” they must be in the eternal
present which we can only imagine as alpha or omega). To an ethical
dualist, such “present self-determination” can be understood as dangerous:
A world with more valuable creatures is therefore necessarily a more
. dangerous world, both because higher creatures can more radically
deviate from the divine persuasion for them and because this
deviation can create more havoc than the deviations of lesser
creatures. (Griffin, 1989, p. 43)
To a mythologist, however, this is the place/time of human creation:
By employing memorial antecedents as far, as deep, as wide as the human
mind can conceive, we are bringing to the present unfolding actuality
qualities not found within any language system in itself. The mythopoeic
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imagination may make words, poems, and narratives without necessary
reference to concrete objective actual referents.
As pointed out at the beginning of this survey, a cosmology is, itself, an
aesthetic rendering of universal reality. Whitehead even indicates that
process begins with imagination “like the flight of an aeroplane," and that any
metaphysical system requires “a leap of the imagination to understand its
meaning” (Whitehead, p. 4). Though thoughts and perception—our usual
selves—can never exist in the elusive present, imagination, inspiration, and
archetypal memory, by Whitehead's own suggestions, just may.
Whitehead’s system of reality as process can be seen a s ideal for
exemplifying both the habituated consciousness ( techne) and the
mythopoeic imagination (memot) in action.

Habituated consciousness

works and wants to work only from efficient causation, and does not expect to
need to look too far away in time or space to find appropriate causation to
extend into the next actual occasion of experience. Habituated
consciousness picks its aims from among past objective occasions and does
not expect the sudden inspiration from an eternal object in itself, either in a
non-conceptual instant or in the depths of the past.
The mythopoeic imagination, however, may be understood a s being
drawn to the murmur of a past so ancient it is hidden in the inorganic. Such
an imagination dream s of experiencing the unsayable then struggling to use
ancient referents to find a way to express such experience. The mythopoeic
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imagination seeks to make myths from myths and to take full poetic license to
express them in a manner which the rational mind will find confusing,
chaotic, or even dangerous.
Mythopoesis is not so easily classified as Griffin would prefer, it seem s
to this writer. Mythmaking is expression through the arts which work through
the materials of distant memory (Campbell, 1968). The aim of the creative
present is an inspired concrescence. The inspiration of the arts are the
Muses, which are, after all, the daughters of Mnemosyne—the goddess
Memory. It may be said that the mythopoeic imagination expresses that
which the habituated consciousness cannot perceive and only dimly
prehend. The mythopoeic imagination is not entirely conscious at all but
perhaps partakes of the mysterious essences of primordial awareness (i.e.,
the eternal objects) which deliver the potential and the need for mythmaking
and artistic expression.
Perhaps it begins to be clear why I feel Whitehead’s cosmology,
though denying consciousness of the instant, still ideally provides a schema
to describe the working of the mythopoeic imagination. Firstly, though
working within the theoretic paradigm, once Whitehead gets beyond the
ideas of process and relativity, he engages in a grand mythmaking
venture—from God’s three natures to his eternal objects (which are, it seems,
present everywhere as potential and nowhere as themselves). These
eternal objects suggest Jungian archetypes or what Hillman would personify
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a s deities: the source and end of imagination and the gravity of memory but
forever hidden in themselves (Hillman, 1975b).
The more a consciousness is able to prehend aims (eternal objects,
not “final causes”—nothing eternal can be final), the more that
consciousness is able to avoid determination from the more restrictive
essential causes. However, there are limitations on such free prehensions,
according to Whitehead, unless there is way of being which eludes our
present understanding in this “cosm os”:
But there is no such fact a s absolute freedom; every actual entity
p o ssesses only such freedom a s is inherent in the primary phase
‘given’ by its standpoint of relativity to its actual universe. Freedom,
givenness, potentiality, are notions which presuppose each other and
limit each other. (Whitehead, p. 133)
Still there is more or less freedom. The mythopoeic imagination is
freer and is given far greater depth of memory and perhaps even a greater
sense of inspirational presence than is the habituated consciousness.
Some, like Griffin, will continue to argue that imaginative freedom is
dangerous without God’s clearly defining for us the rights and the wrongs,
but Whitehead, himself, seem s more concerned with expressing his reality
than demanding imperatives of behavior. According to Prigogine and
Stengers (1984): “Whitehead understood perhaps more sharply than
anyone else that the creative evolution of nature could never be conceived if
the elements composing it were defined as permanent, individual entities
that maintained their identity throughout all changes and interactions” (p. 95).

188

At the sam e time, however, Whitehead had to explain the philosophy
of relation and of innovative becoming so he could avoid the idealist trap.
Each identity receives its identity from other identities: “In the process of its
genesis, each existent unifies the multiplicity of the world, since it adds to this
multiplicity an extra set of relations” (Prigogine & Stengers, p. 95).
The mythopoeic imagination surrounds Whitehead’s entire project, it
seem s to me, and is to be found wherever eternal objects or their effects can
be placed. Furthermore, the mythopoeic imagination is found in the power of
human memory, its ability to go beyond the immediate objective occasions to
such ancient objective occasions that we are dealing with foundational myths
of consciousness. It may be such mythopoeic imagination which can realize
its potential to express the finally inexpressible eternity of the present.

§ P o stm o d e rn S cien ce. So much has been written about “postmodern
science,” “visionary physics,” space-time anomalies, or what have you, that
there seem s little point in continuing the exercise in detail here. The
philosophies I have touched on, from the Tibetans to Whitehead, have in
common the denial of an objective reality which exists with or without us
basically as we presently perceive it. To so imagine a world whose objects
have the colour, texture, proportion, or position in themselves seem s no
longer tenable in the light of even high school physics. The visionary
physicist, Fritjof Capra, assures us of something, at least, “out there”:
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There is a reality, but there are no things, no trees, no birds. These
patterns are what we create. As we focus on a particular pattern and
then cut it off from the rest, it becomes an object. Different people will
do it differently, and different species will do it differently. What we see
depends on how we look . . . (Capra & Steindl-Rast, 1991, p. 165)
Bergson and Whitehead were not idealists in the traditional sense of
the term, yet their philosophies were expounded because of their anticipation
of the reversal of fortune realism, logical positivism, and mechanistic science
were to have. Perhaps Bergson was closer to the postmodern view of an
ultimately unknowable universe because he understood different times and
places to evolve different senses of duration (Bergson 1911/83). Whitehead,
on the other hand, attempted to explicate a “cosmology" (1978), which
implied an identical order in all times and places. Whitehead’s process does
emphasize creativity as the force behind that process so his system is
somewhat open-ended, yet it is finally limited—not by the eternal objects—
but by the providence of God.
Whitehead was, of course, a mathematician par excellence, and so
was perhaps drawn to totalistic orderings. He likely wrote Process and
Reality before he had ever heard of Kurt Godel or his proof that any axiomatic

system or its negation was unprovable within itself (Runes, 1961), yet he
implied the process of reality through time was not smooth and even but
subject to sudden alterations. As he stated in applying this to education.
The pupil’s progress is often conceived as a uniform steady advance
undifferentiated by change of type or alteration in pace. . . . I hold that
this conception of education is based upon a false psychology of the
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process of mental development which has gravely hindered the
effectiveness of our methods. (Whitehead, 1970, pp. 7,8)
Bergson w as not a scientist but was very much interested in the
science of his times and noted even in those pre-Einsteiniam days how local
conditions provided the relative conditions for the support or obliteration of
the unpredictable mutations in nature (1911/83). This localization of
phenom ena and the irreversible creative evolution of time has echoes today
in chaos theory (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984)2 with its implication of differing
vortices of order and sudden dispersal. Beyond this is Sheldrake’s
“formative causation” (1988) in which not just the way things react is different
in different times and places in the universe, but the way things are —the
fundamental physical laws—is different a s well. This is because of each
“morphogenetic” field’s “habits” as determined by its “morphic resonance”
—which sounds very much like memory. Such propositions seem to open
the way for a “creative evolution," a s Bergson predicted: Creatively
discovering alternate morphic resonances is to discover alternate realities.
Our time and space travels, however, seem to be drastically limited
within the laws of our present reality. There may be parallel universes or
different causational fields if we accept that “vibrations of thought patterns in

iThough Bergson and Einstein later engaged in public debates about
the nature of “scientific” or “durational” time (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984).
2W. E. Doll, Jr. (1988) has applied chaos theory in several interesting
ways to curriculum theory.
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specific harmonies structure all 'matter' and tight as we experience it” (Toben
& Wolf, 1982, p. 61). There may be the exotics of string theory, or all
possiblities from precognition to levitation, and some think dream,
imagination, and fantasy are the key to other worlds. Black holes may be
“breathing" creation and destruction into an anti-matter, faster-than-light
universe, just a s it does into our matter, slower-than-light one. As long as we
are “we," however, Homo symbolicus on the third planet from Sol, all of these
must remain conjecture.
Bergson and Whitehead changed reality by conceiving of time as a
uni-directional flow into unknowns. Like an improvisations! jazz combo,
these unknowns become knowns a s we harmonize with that which has gone
before. Again memory is seen as the creatrix. Prigogine and Stengers
(1984) have strongly come out on the side of time a s an arrow, one-way and
non-repeatable, though this may be questioned on at least two levels: One is
the question of the ultimate fate of the universe, open or closed. The closed
universe hypothesis suggests that everything will eventually cease
expanding and by its own gravity will go into an extended implosion in which
time will be reversed. Another is the idea of there being a timeless
“nothingness” or eternity within all moments of time: “There is no such thing
as time’s direction at the quantum level. All events exist concurrently.. . .
Bridges in the quantum foam can connect any event with any other event”
(Toben & Wolf, 1982, p. 75). And, of course, there is chance.
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Speculation and possibility run rampant and this is precisely why so
many of us have embraced the new physics, the new biology, etc. From
Einstein, Heisenberg, and Bohr to Hawking, Prigogine, and Bohm (et at.) the
perspectives on time of Bergson and Whitehead seem to have been at least
m anifested a s “real potential.” The deterministic prison of hard rationality

may actually have proven to be a hermetic container, for as the released 6 Ian
vital breaks through its seam s to reveal possiblities at least a s potent as our
“wildest dreams," it must be admitted that doubt at the irrationality of our
fantasies of better worlds would always have limited our actions in this one.
In the hermetic container of science and reason, techne may have been
transmuted into memor—which implies the potential of imagining closer to
potency, itself (as in eternal objects, archetypes, or—dare I say it?—gods).
Prigogine and Stengers (1984) give Bergson and Whitehead much
credit for anticipating changes in science: “Whitehead’s case as well as
Bergson’s convince us that only an opening, a widening of science can end
the dichotomy between science and philosophy. This widening of science is
possible only if we revise our conception of time" (p. 96). And further:
For [Whitehead], being is inseparable from becoming. Physics and
metaphysics are indeed coming together today in a conception of the
world in which process, becoming, is taken a s a primary constituent of
physical existence and where, unlike Leibniz’s monads, existing
entities can interact and therefore also be born and die” (p. 303).
Bergson and Whitehead imagined and intricately worked out these
possibilities before the sciences ran out of themselves to realize such an
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amazing “altarity" (Taylor, 1987). Postmodern science indicates that the
depth of memory, or, if you wish, the reach of imagination, may indicate the
way toward a reality we have always intuited. It consists of “the empty place
in the heart” (Dunne, 1988), but also of the m ateriality of language—a nature
that speaks and is spoken to. But for this, we shall have to go to an alternate
reality hardly recognized by science and philosophy, but a reality which
permeates them both: a mythopoeic reality.

C hapter 4: Mythology

"... it was not man who made myths but myths, or the archetypal substance
they reveal, which made man."

(Owen Barfield, The Rediscovery of Meaning, p. 75)

§Death of the Soul. Time has been perceived by Bergson and
Whitehead to have the property of spatial extension. The “revolutions” in
many fields of modern (or “postmodern”) science seem to agree that time is
the effect of the expansion of space. That is to say, we are always already
becoming, but never become; we are always already in process, but never

processed and complete. With this seeming escape from circularity—from
Nietzsche’s "amor fati" of the eternal return (1982) or Eliade’s cosmic cycles
(1963)—we have opened the way for many of our present myths involving
the irreversibility of time, including those of evolution, progress, and history.
Moreover, the movement toward an unknown opens the space for the
possibility of narrative: “a story line of pasts that determine presents and
presents that constrain futures” (Gould, 1987).
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Time’s arrow has been seen as a one-way trip to a predetermined
end, such a s in Biblical eschatology or the space-contractioni hypothesis, or
it has simply been regarded as irreversible (Prigogine & Stengers, 1987).
Stephen Jay Gould (1987) points out, however, that “arrows and cycles, after
all, are only categories of our invention, devised for clarity of insight. They do
not blend, but dwell together in tension and fruitful interaction.” The
repetition of analogous shapes and patterns in nature , 2 among other things,
convinces him that the human need for some sort ordered unfolding—time’s
cycle—is as real as time’s arrow: “The sam e tension and multiplicity have
pervaded our Western view of time. Something deep in our tradition
requires, for intelligibility itself, both the arrow of historical uniqueness and
the cycle of timeless immanence—and nature says yes to both” (p. 200).
A narrative or story needs the ongoing flux of the new or it becomes a
mere litany: “And every moment of this universe is new. That is, we now
realize that we live not in a static Newtonian space; we live within an ongoing
cosmic story” (Swimme, 1988, p. 50). But a storyteller must remember that
which has passed to be able to weave a storyline. Such remembering was,
perhaps, one of the major roles of the tribal storytellers. Within their
memories the past was contained and the time of beginnings could be

1f there is enough matter in the universe, its gravity will limit its
expansion and it will be “closed," and eventually contract upon itself.
1

2E.g: The unrelated evolution of wings on birds, bats, and pterodactyls.
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re-experienced in ritual, as Eliade indicates in the last section of The Myth of
the Eternal Return (1954) called, appropriately, “the terror of history”:

“Interest in the ‘irreversible’ and the ‘new’ in history is a recent discovery in
the life of humanity. On the contrary, archaic humanity ... defended itself, to
the utmost of its powers, against all the novelty and irreversibility which
history entails” (p. 48).
Stephen Jay Gould (1987) seem s to think that it is a fear of
uncontrollable events which causes us the anxiety of open-ended possibility:
“Most cultures have recoiled from a notion that history embodies no
permanent stability and that men (by their actions of war), or natural events
(by their consequences of fire and famine) might be reflecting the essence of
time—and not an irregularity subject to repeal or placation by prayer and
ritual" (p. 13). This is, of course, quite likely. Humanity would prefer to feel it
is part of a cosmic process which cares about it. On another level, however,
the whole notion of identity becomes central.
In a previous chapter, I indicated (by way of Eliade) the guilt preliterate
people seemed to feel as they experienced a personalized identity-in-time, a
guilt which had to be expunged through rituals of cosmic renewal. The guilt
and anxiety, then, must always have been made bearable as the myths and
tales of the gods of the illud tempus were told and retold between the actual
acting out of the time of beginnings. They “remembered” their ancestors,
their particular culture-heroes, and their gods with whom they once walked at
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the time of creation. They knew their souls —connected like a silver cord to a
beginning which was never far behind them.
We, however, have come to realize that the past is infinite, or at least
so deep that it is beyond our comprehension a s thinking hominids. Infinite,
a s well, seem the vast realms of space opening out around us (a “long way”
from the security of tribal territory). If there was the guilt of isolated self-ness
and the anxiety of open-ended identity for our primitive cousins, then for us
moderns how much more guilt and anxiety we must bear! As Pascal (162362) wrote at the beginning of this scientific era:
When I consider the short duration of my life, swallowed up in the
eternity before and after, the little space which I fill, and even can see,
engulfed in the infinite immensity of spaces of which I am ignorant and
which know me not, I am frightened, and I am astonished at being
here rather than there; for there is no reason why here rather than
there, why now rather than then. Who has put me here? by whose
order and direction have this place and this time been allotted to me?
The eternal silence of those infinite spaces frightens me. (Cited in
Barrett, 1986, p. 8)
This discovery of “deep time” (Gould, 1987) and the vastnesses of
space are what have led us to shore up our identities within the myths of
science and philosophy a s separate from all nature, according to William
Barrett in The Death of the Soul: From Descartes to the Computer (1986).
Mostly he sees the soul “dying" as we identify with our technologies, but in a
separate section called “the disappearing self," he expresses his disturbance
over the work of phenomenology, existentialism, and post-structuralism.
Instead of a “shored-up” self, he fears here a “desubstantialization of being,”
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especially a s revealed in the “nihilistic” work of Heidegger and Derrida:
“Thus there is a gaping hole at the center of our human being" (p. 140).
This conclusion has been reached by other persons from other times
and places who have considered the “hole” differently. Perhaps at this point,
however, it is safest only to say that a “desubstantialized se lf may be the
only self possible in the face of the conclusions of Bergson, Whitehead, and
postmodern science. It may be nearer the point of this mythic inquiry to
wonder how the self—or being—came to be imagined as “substantial” in the
first place. Since the self seem s most to be a construction of memory and
language, it is there we must look next.

§Linguistics. Narrative has been cited previously a s being the very stuff of
memory and it is memory which gives the self a shape. This being so, the
natural conclusion for those of us in curriculum theory is that we should
attempt to find ways to get students to discover the narratives which have
shaped them and to use narratives to move them toward becoming that
which they’d prefer to be. We can only hope “that which they’d prefer to be”
is not hateful, dangerous, or in some way socially reprehensible.
But what is a narrative? Is it a story with a beginning, middle, and
end? Are myths narratives? Many consider a narrative (and a myth as well)
to be a complete story. This brings up two problems which I will attempt to
consider: the political and mythical ramifications of closed narrative.
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Narrative theory has paradoxically become a source of “authority”
among literary critics, according to Bruce Robbins (1992), “in part because it
undermines authority”:

Within literary studies, narrative is everywhere spoken against, and
precisely because it is taken to embody authority.. . . In fact, the
distrust of narrative seem s to be a point of principle for critics as
diverse a s Roland Barthes and E. M. Forster. If narrative m eans
militant indeterminacy or relativism to some, to others it is something
excessively determined, a hyperstructured vehicle of dogmatic belief
that desperately needs to be relativized, it is associated with the
illegitimate authority of the foregone and of the pregiven telos, with
social or psychological resolution, with an orderly conventionality
imposed on the meaningless successiveness of historical reality, with
the tyranny of single, authoritative meaning. In short, narrative figures
at once a s an agency that produces skepticism and a s an object
requires skepticism. (Robbins, 1992, p. 42)
Robbins goes on to explain (referring to the work of Hayden White)
that closure m eans “moral principle." When a mere sequence of events is
brought to a conclusion under the authority of som e moral value, the
narrative achieves closure: the closure being a culturally-determined image
of life “that is and can only be imaginary” (p. 43).
Opposed to this, he suggests the “discourse,” the narrative mode of
presentation which is a bearer of indeterminacy in that it cannot be subject to
a single authoritative meaning. Such narrative discourse always implies a
movement between an assum ed speaker and assum ed listener (Robbins,
1992).
Mythic narrative seem s to have had this discursive quality, at least a s
long a s it w as oral. The storyteller—always claiming divine authority—would
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sing, recite, or tell his or her narrative combining familiar elements in unique
ways according to his or her audience, often without pause and on the spur
of the moment. There are even cases of group recitations (Eliade, 1978). Of
course, these spontaneous effusions had endings of a sort, but nothing like
the moral principles set forth as myth devolved into fable, parable, and
folktale (Thompson, 1955).
Moreover, a s for the preliterate peoples of Eliade's orgiastic
ceremonies of the eternal return, time w as not viewed in a historical context
whatsoever. Moral narratives could not develop until the development of
time's arrow within a centralized authority with a sen se of history, which may
have come with the long-term establishment of the first hieratic city-states
(Campbell, 1990). If time was re-established after immersion in the illud
tempus, often with the choosing of new nam es or new social positions, how

could long mythic narratives have had time to gain the material to grow?
Kristeva (1989) even notes that
In the language of the Abipones of Paraguay, new words were
introduced each year, for they abolished by proclamation all words
resembling the nam es of the dead, and replaced them with others.
Such proceedings obviously preclude the possibility of a narrative or a
history: the language is no longer a depository of the past; it changes
with the real passage of time. (p. 52)
Roland Barthes se e s mythology a s a “part both of semiology inasmuch
a s it is a formal science, and of ideology inasmuch a s it is an historical
science: it studies ideas-in-form” (1957/72, p. 112). Barthes understands
mythology to limit consciousness, the opposite of mythology a s the
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expression of the sacred of Mircea Eliade (1959) or the "creative myths" of
Joseph Campbell (1968). Barthes and other semiologists understand myths
to be the grand recits or meta-narratives of Lyotard (1984) which suggest an
outline, direction, and limitation for the consciousness of a people. Myth in
the closured narrative sense outlined above certainly fits the bill. In this
sense, both the ancient myths which prescribed limitations and supported
hierarchies and modern myths which do the sam e—patriotism, economic
growth, humanism, etc.—are closured narratives with moral imperatives for
conclusions. Instead of seeing “man as a mythmaker,” such ideologies may
be said to make “man as myth." To discover such "hidden” myths, some think
a new science is needed:
Considering man as language and putting language in the place of
man constitutes the demystifying gesture par excellence. It introduces
science into the complex and imprecise zone of human activities
where ideologies and religions are (usually) established. Linguistics
turns out to be the lever of this demystification; it posits language as an
object of science, and teaches us the laws of its functioning. (Kristeva,
1989, p. 4)
In this sense, engaging in dialogue in our classes, questioning
assumptions, and writing our memories of the formation of our beliefsystems, may be the necessary “demystifying gesture par excellence." If
myths are taken to be meta-narratives (Lyotard, 1984), or closured narratives
(Robbins, 1992), or ideologies (Barthes, 1957/72), then, indeed, myths (and
language as part of their medium) could become “an object of science,” as
Kristeva (1989) suggests.
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But there is a more imaginative, less-closured sense of myth within
and beyond the narratives of our remembering: “Myths do not ground, they
open" (Hillman, 1979, p. 89). The memory in language becomes mythic
when it loses the continuity of strict narrative, or, as some would say, when
deconstructed far enough. Kristeva’s own statement: “The question ‘What is
language?' could and should be replaced with another: ‘How was it possible
to conceive of language?”’ (1989, p. 5) already points the way to the mythic

mind, for we cannot conceive of language until we can conceive of
subjectivity—or until “speech began to speak the spoken” (p. 4).
Levy-Bruhl was an armchair anthropologist who had no doubt about
the ultimate superiority of science (Griffin, 1988), yet he was the one who
coined the watershed term participation mystique 1 (1926/85), to indicate the
manner in which the “savage mind” had a dispersed and contradictory
identity, at least in our terms. The “savage” could be both himself and
someone else simultaneously, or a totem animal or object. His identity could
even be that of an unseen “presence” or the group as a whole.
It is difficult for us to imagine such a state of affairs—from our state of
being—so we can only theorize from the outside about their state of being.
Yet, from the outside, it is worth quoting Kristeva at length, for she uses
linguistics to explain how primitive man “perceives the network of language
as solid matter (p. 53)”:

i Mystical participation: communal awareness: identity through difference
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What first strikes “modern” m an—experienced in today’s theory and
linguistic science, and for whom language is exterior to the real, a fine
film whose only substance is conventional, fictitious, and
"symbolic”—is that in societies that are “primitive,” or as they say,
“without history” or “prehistoric," language is a substance and a
material force. While primitive man speaks, symbolizes, and
communicates, that is to say, establishes a distance between himself
(as subject) and the outside (the real) in order to signify it in a system
of differences (language), he does not know this act to be an act of
idealization or of abstraction, but knows it instead as participation in
the surrounding universe. While the practice of language really
presupposes for primitive man a distance with respect to things,
language is not conceived of as a mental elsewhere, or as an abstract
thought process. It participates as a cosmic element of the body and
nature, and is joined with the motor force of the body and nature. Its
link with corporal and natural reality is not abstract or conventional, but
real and material. Primitive man does not clearly conceive of any
dichotomy between matter and spirit, the real and language, or
consequently between “referent” and “linguistic sign,” much less
between “signifier” and “signified": for him, they all partake in the same
way of one differentiated world. (Kristeva, 1989, p. 50)1
Language was another substance in a substantial world and any
reference to personhood was substantial, as well. The substantiality of the
world, itself, has by now been brought into question by process philosophy
and postmodern science. Philosophers like Barrett (1986), mentioned
above, have yet to relinquish their hold on the substantiality of the self.
Kristeva uses the Lacanian concept of “the real.” Alan Sheridan, in a
translator’s note to Lacan's Ecrits: A Selection (1977), explains this important
concept this way:
The “real” em erges as a third term, linked to the symbolic and the
imaginary; it stands for what is neither symbolic nor imaginary, and
1“Referent”: the supposed object, “signifier": the phonic image,
“signified”: the concept, “sign”: signifier and signified. (Saussure, in Kristeva)
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remains foreclosed from the analytic experience, which is an
experience of speech. What is prior to the assumption of the symbolic,
the real in its “raw" state (in the case of the subject, for instance, the
organism and its biological needs), may only be supposed, it is an
algebraic x. This Lacanian concept of the “real” is not to be confused
with reality, which is perfectly knowable: the subject of desire knows
no more than that, since for it reality is entirely phantasmatic.. ..
Hence the formula: “the real is the impossible,” ... the ineliminable
residue of all articulation, the foreclosed element, which may be
approached, but never grasped: the umbilical cord of the symbolic.
(pp. /x-x)
This “real" cannot be remembered in our reality, which, if not entirely
linguistic, is representational. In fact, myths as fictions of narrative closure
may be understood as the very barrier which makes “the real impossible.” As
subjectivity came to be transcribed in language and time simultaneously
became perceived historically, memory developed as self-schema (Ross,
1992) which, I submit, takes basically a narrative formj in which form most of
us spend our lives attempting to attain a desired climax, i.e., closure.
Schema theory is based on the self’s objective view of itself which it
has learned through experience over time. Considering the self, as we know
it, to be the result of the space created in language for subjectivity, the
schema theory of memory points to this self’s protective fallibility, as noted by
Jeremy Campbell (1989):
The self tends to preserve existing knowledge structures in memory by
resisting evidence that might render them suspect, because any
1Despite the computer analogy preferred by Ross and most cognitive
psychologists: “Those who approach the study of memory from the standpoint
of information processing differentiate among three basic stages: encoding,
storage, and retrieval" (Ross, 1992, p. 23).
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disruption in the way knowledge is organized in the mind could make
it less useful. Big Brother, the revisionist historian, preserves the
illusion of his own infallibility by turning a blind eye to awkward facts. .
. . Between what we do and what we say we are, stands the schema,
which is more consistent than the behavior it mediates. (255)
Self-schemata, though transformable, are what we know as “livedreality." How did this dream of unique and consistent identity emerge from
the actual world of language (leaving aside the “real," for the moment)?
Kristeva (1989) makes a case for subjectivity being written into
language. She postulates a graphic system being at least simultaneous
with—and possibly earlier than—vocal language. She notes that “speech ...
does not isolate the act of signifying—its verb—in a mental elsewhere” (p.
62). She traces writing throughout history in Language and the Unknown
and concludes that very different sen ses of self are concomitant with different
forms of writing.
In India, writing seem s to have come late so that “language tended to
become removed from the reality from which it was hardly distinguished by
other civilizations, and that linguistic operation became ‘mentalized’ as a
signifying operation, with a subject as a place of meaning. Man and his

language were thus placed like a mirror that reflected an outside” (p. 82).
This led, according to Kristeva, to the highly idealistic philosophy of India with
its world renunciation and idea of the transcendental self (or soul). This
transcendence led to the understanding that the self—atman —is in reality
brahman, the “AH” (O’Flaherty, 1980).
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Perhaps second only to India in the complexity of its mythological
narratives, Greece is famed for its development of Western humanism and
logic. Kristeva suggests these developments also came as a result of the
attention paid to language as a formal system. The Greeks “conceived of
language a s autonomous, and, by the sam e token, of themselves as
autonomous subjects.. . . Greeks thought of themselves as subjects existing
outside this language, as adults in possession of a real distinct from that of
words, in whose reality only children believed” (p. 106). The result was
individualism and the idealistic Platonism which so strongly influenced later
Christianity, as noted in the last chapter.
My point here, however, is that the narrative self—the sense of a
unique subjectivity with its unique history—seem s to have appeared first: as
language lost its “solidity” and became an abstraction a s writing was
“subjected” to study and, second: a s abstract language abstracted the
subject (who was studying it) which could then imagine (through writing!) that
it transcended language.
This is, “apparently," reality: inseparable from storied narrative (or
schematic memory processing) and forever lost to the “real.” Forever?
Despite denying the reality (or retrievability) of the real, this real has never
ceased to create the need to attempt to conceptualize it, to actively deny “it,”
or in some way to indicate it. The transcendentalism and/or idealism just
mentioned may have a trace of connection to this real a s the “umbilical cord
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of the symbolic,” and not just be a displacement of language. Vedantists
refer to the all, Buddhists refer to the void, and more recent writers have
attempted a number of contortions to get language to evoke or indicate
beyond itself: from Derrida’s “trace” (1978) to Taylor’s “altarity” (1987) to
Krell’s “on the verge” (1990). Kristeva, herself, has mentioned the “gaping
wound" of memory (1987), Carrin Dunne the “empty place in the heart” of
memory (1988), and, of course, there’s Barrett’s “gaping hole” (1986).
Such terms may not refer to the nothingness of a “raw” animal, prerepresentational participation mystique, but only to the absolute impossibility
of representing or even imagining it directly, that is, of narrating the real. If it
cannot be narrated, it cannot be remembered. Paradoxically, it seem s that
between the real and the self stands memory (which is the self).
Heidegger has obliquely suggested that the only way of becoming
aware of this pre-imagistic real is through a forgetting to remember the self:
The ecstasis of forgetting something has the character of
disengagement vis-a-vis one’s ownmost having-been, indeed in such
a way that this disengagement-in-the-face-of closes off what it faces.
Because forgetting closes off having-been—such is the peculiar
nature of that ecstasis—it closes itself off to itself. Oblivion is
characterized by the fact that it forgets not only the forgotten but also
the forgetting itself. The vulgar prephenomenological view of things is
that forgetting is nothing at all. Oblivion is an elementary mode of the
temporality in which at first and for the most part we are our own
having-been. (1927 lecture. In Krell, 1990, p. 331)
Heidegger’s language must turn somewhat upon itself to avoid a
narrative entrapment. Ecstasis means more than rapture: ex-, out + histanai,
place, or -stasis, standstill (as in time), so it implies being out of one’s
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s e n s e s —as revealed to the self. Becoming a s a process which includes
one’s own “having-been,” may be a s close to the “eternity of the present’ as
we can envision from here. This oblivious present—Lacan’s real—need no
more be assum ed to be without action or aw areness than be assum ed to be
with it. “Awareness,” unlike “consciousness,” can be imagined without an
object—a non-objectivized state comparable, perhaps, to participation
mystique. Such a “state” cannot contain the qualities with which memory

works, such as representation and identity, yet Nietzsche (1982) has
suggested the possibility of a return to this sta te —which could only be known
as a return through som e memory-like action. Krell (1990) points out som e
of the paradoxes involved in the Nietzschean experience or ecstasis of the
eternal return—the very antithesis of the "irreversibility” of time:
Nietzsche’s experience of eternal return, of the vicious circle,
announces a rupture with the unilinear sen se that dominates the erect
and oblivious body. By conjoining commencement and end, direction
and goal, the circle confounds the history of thought, for which the
body is a property of the self. The body, as the site and the product of
contradictory pulsions, reversible pulsions in the sen se that they
prevail, bide their time, pass, and return, gains a new centrality for
thought. The thought of thoughts, eternal return, is thus a bodying
thought, une pensee corporante. (pp. 278, 279)
If thinking contains within it the antithesis of its seeming progressive
volition, that is, if what is said in language always implies a what-is-notsaid—a s in Lacan’s (1977) concept of the unconscious seam or in Derrida’s
(1978) neologism la differance—then the only way to recover that antithesis
is through self-forgetting. Self-forgetting—the ecstasis of oblivion—implies a

209

(deferred?) point-of-action which does the forgetting, so, as I say, the
“bodying thought” need not imply an inanimate nihilism. It probably does
imply, however, a sort of spontaneous courage-to-be (Hillman, 1988) in the
face of the great anxiety of self-abandonment—an averted glance, as it were,
from the linguistic schemata of self toward what Heidegger (1987) called “the
strange and terrible":
The origin of language is in essence mysterious. And this means that
language can only have arisen from the overpowering, the strange
and terrible, through man’s departure into being. In this departure
language was being, embodied in the word: poetry. Language is the
primordial poetry in which a people speaks being, (p. 171)
This is in line with Kristeva’s conception of a linguistic sense of "one
differentiated world” (1989, p. 50, above) when language was “solid,” or, as
Heidegger says, “language was being.” Here, for the first time perhaps, we
have an indication of form taken by that non-abstract language: poetry. It
was Paul de Man (1971) who declared that “poetic language names the
void” (p. 18). This “poetic language” need not be construed as the selfconscious self-expression which so often passes for poetry today, or as the
product of
... English poets who grew up on Greek
(Id have them sing in chorus, cheek to cheek).
(Roethke, “I Knew a Woman,” 1958)
Heidegger, and de Man, seem to imply more the speaking of language itself,
that is, of being itself. In such an instance as this—and most artists declare
it—the body becomes only the means or the medium “through which a
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people speaks being.” Heidegger calls this poetry. In the next section I shall
call it myth, and Jam es Hillman refers to it most often as image. Such
speaking, or expressing, or creating, or acting quite properly has no proper
name at all. This creative reality appears to stand opposed—or “beyond,” or
“within,” but never quite here or now—to the reality constructed by the mind
to serve the body’s survival and reproductive needs. It is a mythic reality—
perhaps one step from the “real”—something Daoism envisions a s existing in
a continuum of its own with or without us:
There, in the atmosphere of absolute freedom, the images associate,
intermingle, and interfuse with one another according to their own law
of symbolic evolvement, drawing among themselves and by
themselves mythopoeic pictures of Reality. From the standpoint of a
Lao Tzu or a Chuang Tzu, these mythopoeic pictures, being
essentially archetypal, reflect more faithfully or more fundamentally the
true structure of reality than what is afforded by sensation, perception
and reason. (Izutsu, 1981, p. 31)
With the mention of “mythopoeic pictures," we are closing in on the
“subject” of myth. Myth is seen here as a creative essen ce involving, as
Heidegger indicates, “a people” and so is not merely a cultural story which
has been ideologically evolved into narrative closure. This is myth as
narrative discourse in “one differentiated world”—a participation mystique in
which all are sayers and, perhaps, more importantly, all are listeners.
The concept of memory is clearly being opened to two senses: one,
the narratives of self-schema in which information is processed to support the
illusion of a substantiated, substantial self, and, two, mythic memory—
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Mnemosyne—which desubstantiates, desubstantializes, and destabilizes the
self for the sake of a mythopoeic language achieving substance:
Mnemosyne, daughter of Sky and Earth, bride of Zeus, in nine nights
becomes the Mother of the Muses. Play and music, dance and poetry
are of the womb of Mnemosyne, Dame memory. It is plain that the
word m eans something else than merely the psychologically
demonstrable ability to retain a mental representation of something
that is past. Memory thinks back to what is thought. Yet as the name
of the Mother of the Muses, “Memory” does not mean an arbitrary
thinking of just anything that might be thought. It harbors and conceals
that to which at any given time thought must be given, in everything
that essentially unfolds and appeals to us as having being and havingbeen: Memory, the Mother of the Muses: thinking back to what is to be
thought—this is the source and ground of poesy. (Heidegger, 1977, p.
352)

§Origins of Myth. This sectional epigraph is meant ironically: The origins
of myth cannot be discovered any more than the origins of language or of
religion. Yet the past two centuries have seen a great deal of fascinating
mythmaking under the ethnocentric rubric of the scientific study of myth, a s
though to define or narrate the origins of myth can escape from Eliade’s
(1976) view that “Myth is ... always an account of a ‘creation’ of one sort or
another, as it tells of how something came into being” (p. 23). So that our
“scientific inquiry" into myth’s origins is, as always, a mythmaking venture, as
is my inquiry into the mythic world behind memory.
Myth has been understood in many ways to many different people. It
is religion in the sense of sacred stories for many peoples of the world today.
Thanks to the earlier work of C. G. Jung and the massive success of the more
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recent work of Joseph Campbell, myth has risen somewhat in the public
mind from its former status a s a “false tale” to “symbolic truth.” Now ancient
or preliterate mythologies are read with delight far from their contexts in the
hope of finding the common patterns which will reveal important truths to an
educated public grown weary with the monotony of Judaeo-Christianity.
Curriculum Theory has turned to myth in many ways over the past
years, encompassing both above definitions. Patriarchy has been found to
be "just a myth" even a s the myths of “The Goddess” are being accepted in
som e circles as direct revelation. Is it even possible to indicate an essen ce
to our rhetoric about mythology, much less a meaning or definition? This
section attem pts both to look at our explanations for myth and our feelings
about its place and the “nature” within it. The last section of this chapter
aspires to evoke myth in the deepening light of what is known a s “archetypal
psychology." If we can comprehend mythic memory more clearly, perhaps
we may be able to find a place for it and its effects in our theories and
fantasies of educational curriculum.
Mythology is a story, simply that. It is a narrative of events which have
been experienced and, a s such, it is also at the core of non-narrative writings
and speech, including explanation and description. To explain something is
to make reference to cau ses and effects: in other words, to tell the story of
genealogies and the unfolding of events through conflict and cooperation.
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To describe something is to open the world of adverb and adjective, of simile
and metaphor, the subtle colourations of story.
I have been describing a dichotomy of memory, as techne and as
memor to indicate that the territory ascribed to memory once encompassed

much more than it now does (chapter 1, Krell). Furthermore, thinking as the
product of experience whose purpose is to name and manipulate empirical
reality has been set against mythopoeic thinking which creates experience
by naming and responding to “invisibles”: “This drive to nail with a word a
reality of a categorically different existential status from the status of any
components of practically usable experience, this unceasing effort to find a
name for what is not contingent, gives the constitutive quality to human
mythopoeic activities" (Kolakowski, 1972/89, p. 132).
Thirdly, a line has been drawn between reason and intuition, between
logos and mythos. In common parlance, logos is acknowledged as real but,

in the following passage, Heidegger (1977), for one, grants equal status—at
least—to its other: “Historians and philologists, by virtue of a prejudice
modern rationalism adopted from Platonism, imagine that mythos was
destroyed by logos. But nothing religious is ever destroyed by logic; it is
destroyed only by the god’s withdrawal” (p. 352).
Lastly, and perhaps most interestingly, a question has been raised
over the shape of time or perhaps one should say over the very reality of
time. Time as linear and irreversible is often identified with practical thinking,
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looking to the future, whereas time as cyclical or somehow ordered is more
often based on metaphysical or mythical thought in which language must
transgress its own limitations (Kristeva, 1989). It is fascinating that Bergson
and Whitehead, philosophers of duration and process (irreversibility),
conceived of, respectively, “the spirit” and "God in three manifestations” as
somehow representing the timeless. This is the keynote of all mythic or
metaphysical thinkers, according to Kolakowski, though he does not address
the important question of whether such thinkers express a need or respond
to an intuition:
It does seem in fact that the sam e common motivation appears in all of
them: the desire to arrest physical time by imposing upon it a mythical
form of time; that is, one which allows us to see in the mutability of
things not only change, but also accumulation, or allows us to believe
that what is past is retained—a s far as values are concerned—in what
endures; that facts are not merely facts, but are building blocks of a
universe of values which it is possible to salvage despite the
irreversible flow of events, (pp. 4, 5)
Both kinds of memory, both kinds of cognition, must have existed in
the bodies whose minds shared in a participation mystique (or, contrarily, the
cultural Mind whose separate bodies—members—performed distinct actions
in the life-drama of mythic re-membering or commemoration?). The very
drawing of differences, however, is an effect of re-cognition, a defining kind of
attention, so it seem s likely there was no aw areness of separate modes of
awareness. The primitive, as has been said, lives in an active, substantial,
mythic universe, likely a universe in which technological memory was merely
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understood within—as a little brother or sister—the larger memor of the
cosmic creation to which s/he was always returning.
Whether or not it was the development of alphabetic script, as
Kristeva (1989) has indicated, or simply the worldly power engendered
through the calculation of the logos, a divorce did take place from the world
of myth, and it seems to have appeared almost suddenly in logical Greece.
As early as the sixth-fifth century B.C.E., Xenophanes was “profaning” the
gods of Homer (Eliade, 1978), something that would have been literally
unthinkable in a much earlier time—not because of religious obligation or
enforcement, but because, if language was as solid and real as Kristeva
indicates above, then so precisely were the gods. One would be strangely
perverse to profane powers which were present.
Contrary to the suggestions of Kristeva (1989), there is strong
anthropological/archeological evidence for Homo symbolicus farther back in
time than the Mousterian period of the cave paintings in France (ca. 35,000
B.C.E.). The grand hallucinogenic quality of these cave paintings illustrate
the representational or symbol-making faculty of humanity in full operation. It
may true that, as Kristeva (1989) has said above: “Considering man as
language and putting language in the place of man constitutes the
demystifying gesture par excellence" (p. 4), but there is no way to

i Alphabet: alpha, beta, etc—in order, in a straight line.
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demonstrate that the representations of this period included vocalizations,
though there are patterned notches in rock and bone, suggesting words.
Thomas Mann’s (1934) famous statement about the futility of
searching for the origins of humanity, or language, or culture still applies. Yet
perhaps it is worth quoting to demonstrate the sense of abyss surrounding all
our seeking, the dark and deep abyss of the human psyche itself:
Very deep is the well of the past. Should we not call it
bottomless?
Bottomless indeed, if—and perhaps only if—the past we mean
is the past merely of the life of mankind, that riddling essence of which
our own normally unsatisfied and quite abnormally wretched
existence form a part; whose mystery, of course, includes our own and
is the alpha and omega of all our questions, lending burning
immediacy to all we say, and significance to all our striving. For the
deeper we sound, the further down into the lower world of the past we
probe and press, the more do we find that the earliest foundations of
humanity, its history and culture reveal themselves unfathomable, (p.
3)
The unfathomableness of the psyche is itself a “mystifying”
phenomena, as is the earlier suggestion of Levi-Strauss that language—
objects signifying—“could only have been born in a single stroke" (Kristeva,
1989, p. 46). Man a s the measure of all things may be demystified by
considering him a product of language, but it is a powerfully mystifying, even
eerie, suggestion that humanity awoke one morning to find itself within an
utterly new world of representation. Did our distant semi-human ancestors
suddenly find themselves with the need and ability to sit around their fires at
night and spin narratives about the day’s hunting and gathering adventures?
Perhaps it was the momentous occasion of first mastering that strange and
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dangerous dancer, fire, that first caused the hair on the backs of our
ancestors to stand on end with the awakened sense of the uncanny. Or
perhaps some extraterrestrial phenomenon—such as the unexplained black
monolith from the film 2001: A Space Odyssey (Kubrick, 1968)—appeared to
nudge humanity into beginning its representational journey into high
technology.
The genus Homo now appears to go back at least four million years
during which time its members diffused across the planet from Africa,
learning to use (but hardly improving upon) crude stone tools (Campbell,
1990). The first indications of symbolic thought appear, however, with Homo
sapiens neanderthalensis. Joseph Campbell (1976) hints at another

possible explanation for the origin at about 60,000 B.C.E. of Homo
symbolicus, the producer—and product—of “signifying objects”:

We now begin to find burials, and at one important site, at Shanidar in
northern Iraq, there has been recently discovered a cave containing a
number of burials, in one of which the body had been laid to rest on a
bier of evergreen boughs overspread with flowers, the pollens of
which could still be traced, and all of which have turned out to be
plants with hallucinogenic properties, (p. 46)
Furthermore, beneath the bones of this particular male were found the
bones of two females and a child (Campbell, 1990). Burial alone suggests
some sort of belief in an afterlife, and the extra burials even hint at a type of
suttee sacrifice. It seem s at least worth considering the possibility that
participational symbolic consciousness “awoke" through the mystical effects
from the ingestion of hallucinogenic plants. The grave may have been that of
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a sham an whose visions, “archaic techniques of ecstasy” and “mantic
journeys” have been suggested a s prototypes of all religious activity and
possibly all representational activity whatsoever (Eliade, 1964).
Burial also suggests ritual farewells and the possibility of the mourning
which attends such things. Time and again, from individuals widely
separated in space and time, mourning as been cited as the origin of
remembering a s memor—the mindfulness which creates (Kristeva, 1987;
Dunne, 1988). Krell (1990) says that “mourning and memory are scions of
the sam e semantic vine" (p. 284), but then goes on to wonder, Derrida-like,
whether there can any mourning but “mourning in default” (p. 284):
The very linguistic multivalence of the word m &m oire ... whether
masculine or feminine, singular or plural, preserves the cryptic quality
of mourning. . . . Mourning does not (allow) rest. It pushes ahead. The
desire to think and speak in memory of a departed friend is the intense
desire for and affirmation of the future. It engages the bereaved in an
alliance, not for purposes of progress or power, but toward an
uncertain future to which one nevertheless must say “yes.” (p. 288)
Krell writes enigmatically but suggests that imagining may be a
response to remembering and Campbell (1976, 1990) indulges in free

speculation, but each in their own way may be opening out the possibility
that mythopoeic mindfulness need not have appeared with the vocalizations
or written markings we generally refer to a s language. After the logical
Xenophanes, it was widely assum ed that myth could only exist a s language
and, specifically, a s narrative, though the narratives could be depicted as
icons or in art or performed in ritual or drama. When the scientific study of
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myth was begun, Max Muller declared myth to be the result of what he called
a “disease of language.” He referred to this as homonymy and indicated it
with the example of names losing referents and being mistaken for deities, as
in the formula nomina = numina (Eliade, 1976).
Language cannot refer to anything outside of itself, it is now generally
conceded (Kristeva, 1989), but, on the other hand, its very structure and
rhythms may have evolved from actions done in response to the sudden awe
of memor. Ritual dance is a widely supported candidate as the primary
response1 —whether it is conceived as group elaborations worked out over

time or the possessed gyrations of an individual shamanic trance (or,
perhaps, rituals mimicking sacred shamanic trance movements). This idea
still has wide support, especially among anthropologists, who understand
ritual to antedate myth as narrative. Among the more famous ritualists are Sir
Jam es George Frazer (1890/1959) and the classicist Jane Ellen Harrison
(1903/1991).

Others following this principal but who judge iconography

(often of rituals) whose meaning has been forgotten to be the source of most
mythic narratives include the Swiss classicist, Walter Burkert (1985), and the
poet Robert Graves (1960/80). All of the ritualists, according to Eliade
(1976), “take for granted that the fundamental element of religion and of
human culture is the act done by man, not the story of divine activity” (p. 19).

1“So the darkness shall be the light, and the stillness the dancing.”
- T . S. Eliot, "East Coker” III, 128. Four Quartets (1944).
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The main import of presenting such a point of view is to indicate that
myth and narrative need not be identified. When I suggest that there may be
myths concealed in memory, I do not mean we are creating our stories within
the structure of, say, Gilgamesh’s existential quest or the battle of Marduk
and Tiamat, but that the “empty place” within memory may refer to a sort of
Dionysian immersion in rituals of participation mystique in which the self and
its specific memory were lost, but not, perhaps, in what Heidegger called the
“ecstasis of oblivion” (above). I am suggesting that Kristeva’s “solid” world of
language within which the self was conceived may well have already been
within a pre-conceptual world of mythic realism. “Mythical realism"
postulates the aesthetics of imaginative perception to be actually found
“outside,” in nature, not in the mind or “unconscious” (Boer & Kugler, 1977).
“Pre-conceptual” has, of course, become a near verboten in this
postmodern era where the authority of language has been given its due. The
pre-conceptual is inconceivable, of course, like Lacan’s real. Kirby's
prenarrative structures, structuralism itself, and even Whitehead’s eternal
objects and Jung’s archetypes have attempted to indicate the formative
tendencies which affect language but seem to reside in some deeper natural
substratum or, perhaps, firmament.
Archetypes may be imagined as inspirational telos, or remembered as
pure potential. When the archetypes manifest in language, they are
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experienced as real: "The primitive mentality,” writes Jung (Ker6nyi & Jung,
1949), “does not invent myths, it experiences them” (p. 101).
The similarity appears more than just passing among Plato’s world of
ideas, Whitehead’s eternal objects, and Jung’s archetypes. None of the
above can be revealed. In fact, normal reality conceals their greater reality.
All are beyond the reach of memories, a s such, but anamnesis takes us
toward Plato’s ideas or forms. As hidden movers, each—as has been
mentioned with regard to Whitehead’s eternal objects—is a present absence
(Derrida, 1978). It may be in this latter sense that such “hiddens” provide the
only trace of meaning or referent within a language network based only on
the differentiation of signification. Assuming no transcendental signifieds,
Foucault has indicated that language can only speak towards this absence:
The presence and absence of the gods, their withdrawal and
immanence, defined the central and empty space for European culture
where there appeared, bound in a single interrogation, the finitude of
man and the return of time. The nineteenth century is commonly
thought to have discovered the historical dimension; it was able to pen
history on the basis of the circle, the spatial form that negates time, the
form in which the gods manifest their arrival and flight and men
manifest their return to their ground of finitude. More than simply an
event that affected our emotions, the death of God profoundly
influenced our language; the silence that replaced its source remains
impenetrable. . . . Language thus assum es a sovereign position; it
rises as coming from elsewhere, from a place of which no one can
speak, but it is a work only if, in ascending to its proper discourse, it
speaks in the direction of this absence. (In Taylor, 1987, p. xvii.)
The “death” of the all-consuming God which gave an understanding of
meaning to all speech and writing has re-opened the avenues to what was
once called pagan sources of meaning. Whether Jungian archetypes are
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simply dismissed as biological instincts made conscious or if they are
merited as the structures that open the way into myth and ritual, thus
language, they still sound very similar to the gods experienced by various
pagan peoples.
Eliade (1976) describes myths with seeming approval as possibly
preceding language as archetypal expressions. He explains that “myths are
for Jung the expressions of a primordial psychic process that may even
precede the advent of the human race. Together with symbols, myths are the

most archaic structures of the psychic life.” Campbell (1976), who has
derived much of the background of his heroic ontology from Jung, agrees
with the primacy of the archetypes, but points out the term derives from the
Elementargedanken, “elementary ideas” of Adolf Bastian (1826-1905). He

also points out that such structures are not original to the West:
The Hindus, like Adolf Bastian, have noticed and named the
distinction between Volker- and Elementargedanken, ethnic and
elementary ideas. Their terms for the sam e are desi and marga. Desi
means “that which is local, provincial,” and refers to those forms of
myth and ritual that we recognize as culturally shaped, and whose
areas of origin can be mapped. Marga, on the other hand, means
“path or track, trail of animal, to be followed,” and this is precisely what
is implied by C. G. Jung’s term, “the archetypes of the unconscious.”
(1976, p. 59)
Such a formative concept—which is claimed not to be—is obviously of
vast importance. In the next section, Jam es Hillman simply personifies such
vague structuring agents as “Gods” (1975a, 1975b, 1981). Those who have
worked with aesthetic interpretation or dealt with human expression at all
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have found such structures emerging from behind the grand diversity of
human creativity almost inevitably (Frye, 1957; May, 1975; Eliot, A., 1976;
Doll, M. A., 1988; Neumann, 1989). Yet to recognize such patterning is not
the sam e as the scientific recognition of an actual mythical or metaphysical
agent of such patterns, as Kolakowski (1972/89) emphatically states:
The presence of this intention does not guarantee the existence of the
referents. It is only evidence of a need, alive in culture, that that to
which the intention refers should be present. But this presence cannot
in principle be the object of proof, because the proof-making ability is
itself a power of the analytical mind, technologically oriented, which
does not extend beyond its tasks. The idea of proof, introduced into
metaphysics, arises from a confusion of two different sources of
energy active in man’s conscious relation to the world: the
technological and the mythical, (p. 2)
Writing about such imagined structures as archetypes, he also points out,
must be more literary—more mythopoeic—than literal:
Jung and Eliade have attempted to demonstrate that individual myths
are locally and historically determined particularizations of that myth
which makes up the common archetypal pool of mythical
consciousness, although it manifests itself only in culturally
designated specifics. These attempts themselves appear to form part
of mythopoeic endeavors, and it is difficult to imagine how one could
endow them with the status of a hypothesis. They are perhaps worthy
of our attention as ecumenical efforts, that is, as elements of an
endeavor which remains within mythical consciousness; but, it seems,
they are unlikely to succeed as an effort which attempts to make
mythical consciousness the object of scientific reflection only. (p. 8)
The structural anthropology developed by Claude Levi-Strauss (1966)
has seldom been questioned a s to its hard-worked scientific base. Yet, he,
too, indicates a pre-linguistic something. His later work recognizes that the
structure of myth—“raw” myth—is closer to music than to language (Eliade,
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1987). His earlier work had noted that the mind seem s to work with concepts
or with images, but rarely with both simultaneously. Here he is interpreted as
noting, as did Kristeva (1989), the substantiality of mythic thought: “The basic
characteristic of mythical thought consists in its concreteness: it works with
signs which have the peculiar character of lying between images and

concepts. That is, signs resemble images in that they are concrete, as
concepts are not; however, their power of reference also likens them to
concepts" (Eliade, 1976, p. 22).
This “betweenness" of myth draws away from myth as story only. It
implies having an intention of its own. Between som e sort of primordial
chaos, or Lacan’s real, and our differentiated conceptual consciousness,
myth seem s to have interceded—suddenly—with spontaneous responses
(actions) or representations (images or substantial names). Alexander Eliot
(1976) sum s it up—poetically—in this way: “Although it cannot be defined,
myth may be pictured in a way. It is the glistening interface between
consciousness and creative chaos” (p. 282).
As we move to the less scientifically-constrained Far East of Daoism.i
we find the image being described a s the limit of the knowable, but that in no
way prevents a mythopoeic attempt to evoke the “real” of the “No-Image”:
The No-Image is here represented by the metaphysical Nothing, the
Imageless as Lao Tzu himself calls it. The Imageless is formless.
Absolutely no form is visible. But from the very midst of this darkness

iCorrected pronunciation of “Taoism."
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of formlessness, as if by dint of the natural law of self-articulation, there
come out visible forms, at first vague and indistinct, but turning soon
clear and distinct. As soon as these forms become distinctly
discernible, they are reflected in the mind and produce there
mythopoeic images which, from then on, follow their own course in
mythopoesis. That which is indicated by the formula: “From No-Image
to Image” is thus in Taoism a symbolic or mythic reproduction of a
metaphysical vision of Being, in which one witnesses the primordial
Nothing as it goes on producing interminably out of itself images of its
own, which, spreading out in all directions, finally establish
themselves as the phenomenal world. (Izutsu, 1981, p. 7)
Though language is forbidden to go beyond itself (Kristeva has even
indicated that idealism—and other forms of transcendentalism, such as
subjectivity—is a “disease of language,” or, at least, a creation of it), I am
introducing the mythopoeic possibility that myth, in itself, may consist of
actions and words which derive from a peculiarly liminal area of awareness
which Izutsu describes by the term “image," an area with experienced
imaginal forms and presences. About archetypes, nothing concrete can be
finally known. About Daoism’s “Nothing," nothing can be concretely known.
The mythic image, however, seem s amenable to experience, perhaps even
the substantial experience of a people, who could then express its reality in
narrative discourse—without the moral imperatives of narrative closure.
This world of images is not unknown to us. Far from it. We experience
it nightly in the shifting landscapes of our dream s with their preternatural
lighting which seem s, somehow, to illuminate from within. Memory
flashbacks seem often not to have the slightest vestige of story, but, instead,
to present themselves as inexplicable imagery—unconnected even to the
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events unfolding within the narratives of our daily lives. Images without the
hermeneutic of narrative can bring us to the brink: They threaten to disperse
consciousness with the images of our identities appearing only as other
flickering presentations on the verge of dis-appearing as chaotically as they
had appeared. The world of images must indeed be the "strange and
terrible” phenomena of the beyond of language, as Heidegger (1987, p. 171)
has described. Without naming, without narrating, such unbridled imagery
must often have seemed what we would call a hallucinogenic nightmare. It
suggests what Alexander Eliot called above “creative chaos,” and—in this
god-infested dreamtime—only perhaps the shared desperation of the
discourse of mythopoeic tales could provide the ordering and the
imagination to contain the images.

This seem s to be the primary reason why Jam es Hillman declares
mythology to be creative and not enclosured. He suggests that “mythical
fictions stimulate imagination. They generate cosmological imaginings and
further the soul’s speculative freedom,” and he quotes Whitehead from
Process and Reality (p. 115) in this regard: ‘"Imagination finds its easiest

freedom among the higher categories of eternal objects’” (1989, p. 221).
So, to return to the theme of this section, the origin of myth, we find the
ordering of images may not have appeared until myth found its logos. The
logos of “mytho lo g / is the part of the word which meant “tale” or “story,” in

Homer and the early Greek poets. “Myth,” itself, derives from muthos, “word"
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(Levin, 1960, pp. 103, 104). From this perspective, a myth is neither a fable,
folktale, ritual afterthought, description of divinity, nor even a narrative in
itself, though it has since been considered all these things and more. An
overview from the 1960s indicates this riot of opinion:
The first problem, then: there is no agreement as to what the myth and
ritual pattern actually is. Not only is this true of students of literature
who must, after all, take their materials from the anthropologists,
archaeologists, pre-historians, psycho-analysts, historians of religion,
folklorists, and classicists, but it is equally true of the very experts in
those fields. I know from personal observation that Frankfort turned
livid at the sound of Frazer’s name, Rose savages Graves, Graves
gores Jung, Guthrie deplores Comford, and bound volumes of The
Journal of American Folklore are thrown at Raglan and Hyman for
criticizing Thompson. As a matter of fact, no myth and ritual pattern as
such exists or ever existed in any real sense; it is a modern, scholarly
reconstruction of diverse materials drawn from divergent sources.
Moreover, and this is even more exasperating, there is no agreement
as to the meaning of myth itself. To Whalley, a myth “...is a direct
metaphysical statement beyond science.. . . Myth has as its purpose,
its source and end, revelation”, to Watts, it is the philosophia perennis;
to Wheelright, “it is...a set of depth-meanings of perduring significance
within a widely shared perspective", to Graves, it is “...the reduction to
narrative shorthand of ritual mime performed on public festivals” or,
contrariwise, the antique story of the White Goddess, or, even more
contrariwise, politico-religious history; and as a final example, myths
are "...mistaken explanations of phenomena...founded on ignorance
and misapprehension they are always false, for were they true, they
would cease to be myths," and this, ironically enough, was Frazer’s
opinion. (Weisinger, 1960, pp. 135, 136)
It seem s to me we have heard enough of the definitions of myth from
the outside, from our academic perspective. The narratives of mythology
give the impression of the ordering of experience through storying. To further
gain insight into the image within myth itself, however, I feel we need the
imagistic perspective of what is called “archetypal psychology.”
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§Remembering the Soul. The leading archetypalist, Jam es Hillman,

applies the term “myth" with different emphases in different places. As story,
he employs the myths of Ancient Greece, since he understands our cultural
roots (and thus our psyche) to derive especially from that region which
supplies the paradigms and guidance in the work of abnormal psychology:
Following Jung along this path is the main work of archetypal therapy.
Much of what I have been attempting at Eranos since 1966 has been
along these lines. We have looked at the myths and the implications
for abnormal psychology—of Eros and Psyche, of Dionysos, of such
figures as the puer aeternus, Saturn the senex, the child and Hades in
the Underworld. In these different examples we saw that the
pathological is inherent to the mythical. . . . Our deepest intention has
been to move psychopathology, the basis of the field, from a
positivistic nineteenth-century system of mind and its disorders to a
non-agnostic, mythopoeic, psychology of the archetypes. (Hillman,
1983a, p. 11)
Hillman’s psychology of the archetypes is openly mythic and does not
even attempt the scientific hypotheses of Eliade or Jung. He makes the
move away from a rational ordering of concepts or a rational ordering of
memory to explain psyche or myth, which, as Kolakowski indicated, are not
subject to explanation. Instead, he declares that all our rationalizing works
within the substantial reality of language, as Kristeva (1989) said above
about primitive humanity. The archetypes act upon a people’s mythopoeic
responsiveness to create mythos through them. The sounds produced name
a “solid” reality, and this reality continues to create words through
differentiation, not forgetting their mythic origin. If, at least in its origin, myth
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was the word of words, the concept of the concept, or the meaning of the
sound—as mu is to muthos —then it must have been a datum of direct
experience, a revelation. This does not imply, however, a revelation of pure
godhead or pure form. According to Hillman (1979a), a s with Kristeva, the
“form" and the “word” are identical:
It is as if the archetypal material chooses its own descriptive terms as
one aspect of its self-expression. This would mean that ‘naming’ is not
a nominalistic activity, but realistic indeed, because the name takes us
into its reality. We might even submit that there is an archetypal
selective factor involved in the invention of terms. Let us call this an
archetypal sem antics or phonetics on which archetypal hermeneutics
is based. After all, to lead archetypal significance out of the language
of psychology suggests that the significance is already ‘there’ in the
words, their roots or their sounds, (p. 25)
It appears he is saying that “archetypal substance” gave forth
language in one form or another, yet Hillman would agree with Heidegger
(1987) that “It is in words and language that things come into being and are”
(p. 13). Hillman (1989a) declares the pre-existence of archetypes, but such
archetypes have no form in themselves. Even a via negativa, he implies,
does not promote a relationship with the formless: “We may assert an
absence of form, but can we imagine this absence, this form lessness? The
world egg and eros (the generative joiner) are inherent in Chaos and Night,
and even the Titans have names" (p. 222).
In this way, it seem s, the early responses to awakening in a
dreamworld of chaotic images were language-like representations: the

musical forms suggested by L6vi-Strauss, or the representations of artwork
or dance. As a s been suggested elsewhere (Derrida, 1978), such
representations were not re-presentations at all, but actual presentations
because their articulation was the thing, in itself, for the first time. To
remember deeper than our own representations (including ourselves) is to
find ourselves in the “creative chaos" of dreams: “I do not consider dreaming
as a piece of the psyche like a textbook chapter listed along with memory,
perception, emotion, and the like. Dreaming is the psyche itself doing its soulwork” (Hillman, 1979a, p. 201). Psyche or soul, according to Hillman, is that
very archetypal substance, which, like Whitehead’s eternal objects, is eternal
and “surrounding” life. The soul—a central term “revitalized” in archetypal
psychology—never leaves its bottomless depth in “death,” yet, in its striving
into life, “Soul seeks to understand itself beyond itself” (1989a, 216). We, as
representations in the world, cannot “fathom" the soul-work of dream, but we
may experience it as dream or as mystical participation:
We do not understand enough of this soul-work because we are not
altogether in its place; we are not “dead,” not all psyche, once we have
left the underworld and returned to our various other soul parts as
listed in the textbook. (Hillman, 1979a, p. 201)
So language may constitute reality in Heidegger’s sense and conceal
the real, in Lacan’s sense, but it is the dreamlike—horrifying or
exalting—quality of myths which seem to exist a s “glistening interface”
between the underworld of soul (the real?) and our daylight reality. In this
light, myths are not the creations of words but, in a twisted sense, the words
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are the form of myth. Whether the “word" made reference to a memory of an
experience or was, in fact, a spontaneous conjuration followed by memory,
the original mythic experience m ust have included a representation of an
apperception: an image. Without the centrality of image, archetypal
psychology with its em phasis on seeing-through is simply another mode of
denial, a s Hillman says: “My via negativa, though different in content
because of its call of soul-making, the vivification of imagination, and the
restoration of the Gods, still retained a s method the critical, skeptical analysis
such a s we find in bare existentialism, linguistic philosophy, operationalism,
and deconstruction theory” (1989a, p. 216).
The image, however, is considered the central datum of experience in
the unbordered field of mythic psychology:
An archetypal image is psychologically "universal" because its effect
amplifies and de-personalizes ... such an image is universal because
it resonates with collective trans-empirical importance. . . . And the
universals problem for psychology is not whether they exist, where,
and how they participate in particulars, but rather whether a personal
individual event can be recognized a s bearing essential and collective
importance. (Hillman, 1983a, p. 11)
The image a s carrier of dream a s well a s of myth is a multi-sensory
impression revealed primarily through emotion. But though the image is
understood to have archetypal content, even it is not solid or final, som e sort
of ultimate particle. Instead of an image being trivialized through some
dream interpretation or extended a s one item on the plotline of a narrative,
the image is instead merely the surface appearance of an emotion. The
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more closely the image is examined, the more images are revealed—like
fractals within fractals. This is what Hillman (1979a) m eans when he says
that the mythic image only opens and that the image is all we can know of
what is beneath it:
All that we have claimed for the dream cannot be established by
experience or be grounded in myth. Myth doesn’t ground, it opens.
We remain in the perspective of depth, with nothing more reliable
under our feet than this depth itself. We take depth psychology literally
at its word, because depth is a metaphor that has no base. . . . Image
is psyche and cannot revert except to its own imagining, (p. 200)
The image is understood to be anterior to the concept (including the
conception of “image”). The very word, conception, refers not to a birth from
within but is from the Latin verb, concipere: to take to oneself (Morris, 1982),
a s though the concept were a sort of personalized “after-image" of unplaced,
impersonal experience of the image, in itself.

Archetypal psychology, then,

though never defining myth per se, would likely consider myth to be an
expression of the experience of the supra-personal image. Myth is the name
of that experience, taken within, a s it w ere—subjected (not projected).
Mythology is the narrative of such names:
When we think mythologically about pathologizing, we could say, as
some have, that the "world of the Gods” is anthropomorphic, an
imitative projection of ours, including our pathologies. But one could
start as well from the other side, the mundus imaginalis of the
archetypes (or Gods), and say that our “secular world” is at the sam e
time mythical, an imitative projection of theirs, including their
pathologies. What the Gods show in an imaginal realm of myth is
reflected in our imagination a s fantasy. Our fantasies reflect theirs, our
behavior only mimetic to theirs. We can imagine nothing or perform
nothing that is not already given by the archetypal imagination of the
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Gods. .. . Since their infirmitas is essential to their complete
configuration, it follows that our individual completion requires our
pathologizings. (Hillman, 1980, pp. 3, 4)
This implies that our “wholeness” cannot be whole, drawn together as
it has been from a plurality of archetypes. Our narrative selves are made
from much earlier narratives of the gods, each expressive of the inarticulate
grandeur and madness (from our “all too human” perspective?) of a
particular archetypal configuration. Each configuration contains a desirable
face and an undesirable shadow, and we each participate in many such
configurations, according to Hillman. No configuration is unique unto itself
but only seem s so because of its differentiation from others—and all
participate in each other: so like language.
We know of such archetypes—such “Gods"—from their imaginative
expression in mythic tales. Today, of course, myth means little more, in
general parlance, than illusion. Archetypal psychology would likely accept
such a definition. It is difficult to shed light on the archetypal definition of
myth when the very term, “definition", is rooted in the Latin de: off + finis: end,
boundary (Morris). To define is to set boundaries, which myth as word has
already begun and which myth seeks to carry us through. If the project of
archetypal psychology is to “see through" the mythology to the image, then
this boundary must be one that is permeable. Myth, it may be extrapolated, is
illusion, as is the substance of all language.
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The mythic is everpresent and all-pervasive because language, itself,
is a construction of images. One has only to delve into the origins of words to
discover something perceived, or something done behind the source of the
sound made to indicate the image (or the idea of the image). Today we
accept words literally, within the singular self. This may be as the result of
Kristeva’s alphabet subjectivity or because we have been subsumed in the
Western/Northern fantasy (Hillman, 1983b) of only a singular knowable
—God—which we now imagine to be isolated “inside” of us, our chief cultural
ailment, according to Hillman (1983b). The “outside" world is treated
logically and as objectively real, but impersonal.
It may be impossible for us to decipher a “prelogical mentality” (LevyBruhl, 1926/85, p. 78, p. 295) when we are creations of logos. A return to
animal participation mystique in nature without speech would be the end of
humanity, but within the web of language, especially academic language,
primordial images become obscured and we believe our speech to be more
concrete than its referents. We become prisoners of our own device. Is this
because we believe literally in the image T?
Even the continental philosophies of language—such as the
linguistics section above—seem to have expunged the Dionysian excess of
emotion from all our conceptualizing, from all our imaging. Whether
language is seen as an abstract representation of real referents or a system
of differences referring only to itself, it seems to have forgotten the emotional
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necessity of bringing together fragments of feeling to create a “moment,” what
Whitehead called the concrescence of the occasion. Hillman refers directly
to Whitehead in a startling passage calling for the mythically real moment:
I wish Whitehead were still around to take down structuralism and the
deconstruction that follows it, because they continue this indifference
to the actual occasions of the phenomenal world—this image here that
is immediately presented and not some other—reducing what is as
forts et origo to abstract structural relations or troping it
transformatively into something else. Anything can be anything.
Polysemous has come to mean polyethylene, polyurethane, utter
plasticity—Proteus become a monster, the changeability of form
become a mockery of form. All relations: a web of endless intricate
relations—and no spider. (1989a, p. 225)
The spider here may be the response, the overwhelming emotional
response, to the presumably sudden and direct experience of a polytheistic
real, a phantasm a of images in which “I” was as minor a player as the

background scream in a nightmare. This response and the memory of it may
be the beginning of mythic aw areness—certainly more memor than techne.
Early mythographers began their investigations with the powerful
monotheistic assumption of the self. Everything that was not a product of
immediate perception was understood to have no objective existence, and
the only possible a priori was the arithmetical structure of reason, itself.
Mythic explanations and divine presences were and are understood to be
mere products of imagination projected onto the environment. Roberts
Avens (1980), for one, suggests we have it reversed, that imagination is a
sort of sixth sen se which includes all the others: Rather than projecting
images “out” in some sort of holographic wish-fulfillment, we language-
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beings, instead, receive them “in,” like a wind-chime receives wind, and we
express such images as the chime uses its form for music: “For quite
possibly the primitive had no ‘insides’ to begin with. Perhaps ... instead of
being a camera obscura (something like a box with one single, very small
aperture), he was an Aeolian harp, or wind harp" (Avens, p. 26).
We today, especially in the West/North, continue the internalization of
imagination, but Avens (1980) avers we are mistaken to think we have
repressed it: “This is not to imply that the Westerner has lost or succeeded in
eradicating the imaginative power of his soul: imagination survives
resplendently not only in art but also in the pathetic entanglements of
mundane life” (p. 11).
Jam es Hillman (1986), too, considers “civilization and its discontents”
and the psychopathologies of daily life to be where lived myth has fled:
If the Gods have become diseases, then these forms of chronic
disorder are the Gods in disguise; they are occulted in these
misshapen, inhuman forms, and our seeing through to them there—in
all forms of chronic disorder in ourselves and our city—is a grounding
act of culture. The education of sensitivity begins right here in trying to
see through the manifestations of time into the eternal patterns within
time. We may regard the discontents of civilization as if they are the
fundamentals of culture, (p. 20)
In fact, Hillman insists that recognizing the “metaphorical necessity” of
seeing through our inwardness is archetypal psychology’s “world mission.”
He understands that, metaphorically, “inner" and “down” are the places to
soul-search according to Jung’s well-known dictum: “The gods have become
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diseases; Zeus no longer rules Olympus but rather the solar plexus, and
produces curious specimens for the doctor’s consulting room.” ( C W 13 §54):
Human aw areness fails in its comprehension not because of original
sin or personal neurosis or because of the obstinacy of the objective
world to which it is supposedly opposed. Human aw areness fails,
according to a psychology based on soul, because the soul’s
metaphorical nature has a suicidal necessity, an underworld affiliation,
a ’morbism’, a destiny—different from dayworld claims—which makes
the psyche fundamentally unable to submit to the hubris of an
egocentric notion of subjectivity as achievement, defined a s cognition,
conation, intention, perception, and so forth.
Thus, that sen se of weakness, inferiority, mortification,
masochism, darkness, and failure is inherent to the mode of metaphor
itself which defeats conscious understanding as a control over
phenomena. Metaphor, a s the soul’s mode of logos, ultimately results
in that abandonment to the given which approximates mysticism.
The metaphorical transposition—this ‘death-dealing’ move that
at the sam e time awakens consciousness to a sen se of soul—is at the
heart of archetypal psychology’s mission, its world intention. (Hillman,
1983a, p. 22)
This notion of an "unconscious”—which is consciously revealed in
“morbid” fantasies—is unlike Freud’s repressions and very different from
Jung's collective archetypes. In this vision the soul reaches into the
dayworld through us, yet it remains steeped in the beyond of death. This
metaphoric unconscious sounds much more like that suggested by Lacan

(1977) who speaks of our subjective mode of knowing simultaneously
creating an un-knowing, so our saying is always divisive and our knowledge
never totalizable: The light imparted by our speech must also create a
shadow. It is this metaphoric and metamorphic moving into shadow that
reveals Hillman’s (1983a) path to a shady sort of enlightenment:
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The perspective darkens with a deeper light. But this metaphorical
perspective also kills: it brings about the death of naive realism,
naturalism, and literal understanding. The relation of soul to death—a
theme running all through archetypal psychology—is thus a function of
the psyche’s metaphorical activity. The metaphorical mode does not
speak in declarative statem ents or explain in clear contrasts. It
delivers all things to their shadows, (p. 21)
Hillman’s journey into a deeper light is a sort of via negativa. To
penetrate the security of "self-esteem” and comfortable ego-structures (the
literalized mythos of conceptual belief) is to leave us exposed to all the
hidden aspects of daily life. Death is that darkside with which we would
prefer not to deal, but which is always present in the further reaches of what
Hillman calls soul. Myth, as the word, may live us through it or myth, a s the
word, may guide us back to those primordial soul-images. It must be clearly
stated that Hillman’s “seeing through” is neither merely a glimpse of oblivion
nor the seeing through to the light of the “primordial soul-image.” Hillman
(1989a) indicates that our “soul-searching" brings "soul-making” to the world:
We practice an alchemical metaphysics: “account for the unknown in
terms of the more unknown.” Notice here that this further unknown
beyond is a more ; at the sam e time that emptying is going on, so is
filling. In the act of deconstruction there is constructive aim. (p. 220)

§Archetypal Mythology. To understand archetypal psychology’s use of

myth, the “archetypal" label cannot be left out. Myth’s narrative fabrications
can be slowed, dispersed, or deconstructed to see through to the primordial
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images composing them. For it is such archetypal images that reveal a god
or the flow of a mythologem. 1
Myth in itself—the mythologem—is not story with a beginning, middle,
and end. Mary Doll (1988) indicates that myths are not closured narrative,
stories which end with a moral lesson: “Myths, we could say, have a curious
Beckettian quality. As stories that never come to an end, myths build upon
basic patterns, giving an opportunity to create endings and to re-create
beginnings" (p. 1). Mythologems becom e em bedded in expanding
mythologies, which use them freely in all sorts of stories which, again,
become enlarged or adapted in the retelling. Homer’s works are neither
myths nor mythologies but they encom pass both. It may be the narrative
structure and the later development of expository prose which bury the
mythologem deeper and deeper in the archeological substrata of psyche. In
this way powerful mythic images become appropriated by forces seeking
only social indoctrination. Mythology is perverted into ideology, and an
image of the wheel of life or its reverse, the wheel of remembering or
creativity which cycles the opposite way—both swastikas2—can be
transmogrified into the wheel of death and horror: the Nazi swastika.

1A mythologem is a recurring mythic motif, which, like an image or a
god, is subject to further dispersal and greater depth upon close study.
2Sanskrit: svastika, a sign of good luck (Morris, 1982)
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Jung considered the archetype to become hidden as mythic stories
gained in complexity and in the shifting of perspective. Elaboration
increased conscious objectivity and supported social orders but also
disguised the memory of the primal mythic image:
Another well-known expression of the archetypes is myth and fairy
tale. But here too we are dealing with forms that have received a
specific stamp and have been handed down through long periods of
time. The term “archetype” thus applies only indirectly to the
“representations collectives,” since it designates only those psychic
contents which have not yet been submitted to conscious elaboration
and are therefore an immediate datum of psychic experience. In this
sense, there is a considerable difference between the archetype and
the historical formula that has evolved. Especially on the higher levels
of esoteric teaching the archetypes appear in a form that reveals quite
unmistakably the critical and evaluating influence of conscious
elaboration. Their immediate manifestation, as we encounter it in
dreams and visions, is much more individual, less understandable,
and more naive than in myths for example. (CM/9 §1:6)
Even in myths, and by this Jung means tales, the archetype has been
altered by “conscious elaboration.” If the early myths were expressions of
transpersonal archetypal experience which mythologies collapsed into
narratives, then “fairy tales” are even more so (Miller, 1976), and so on into
the matrices of the novel, expository prose, and political propaganda.
The notion of “conscious elaboration” becomes somewhat curious
when mythos is understood as “word.” How is it that the form of the original
archetype can be disguised through the increasing complexity of the “word”
which first brought consciousness?
Here we come to the creative force of archetypal psychology:
imagination. To imagine is to do just that—elaborate an image, imaginate it
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into separate constituencies and give a face to the archetype. Imagination is
understood, not as another human faculty such as Jung’s intuition, but as the
formless prime mover, similar to Whitehead’s "creativity,” from which both
myth and language spring:
Language, like myth, originates in imagination.. . . It is for this reason
that naming must be regarded as the very essence of the mythical
process of imagination.. . . It is impossible to ascertain the age of
language and myth since their origins lie in pre-history. Nevertheless
it would seem very plausible ... that they are twin creatures, springing
from the sam e tendency to se e reality imagistically or symbolically.
Both language and myth are part of the same basic mental activity.
(Avens, 1980, p. 88)
In claiming Jung as a forerunner of post-modernity, Casey (1987a)
suggests that myth is drawn from "the transpersonal foundation of
imagination and language" (p. 105), as suggested by Saussure and
Chomsky: “Language is no more a matter of an individual speech-act (la
parole) than primordial images are affairs of the isolated ego” (pp. 104, 105).

Conversely, it seem s that imagination when employed by the animal
survival drive—order, growth, reproduction—may also be the hidden force
behind the definitions and divisions we have made throughout the centuries,
at least according to the French historiographer, Paul Veyne (1988):
I do not at all mean to say that imagination will bring future truths to
light and that it should reign; I mean, rather, that truths are already
products of the imagination and that the imagination has always
governed. It is imagination that rules, not reality, reason, or the
ongoing work of the negative.
This imagination is not the faculty we know psychologically and
historically by the sam e name. It does not, through dream or
prophecy, expand the fishbowl in which we live. On the contrary, it
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creates boundaries. Outside the bowl is nothing, not even future
truths, (p. x//)
We have the seeming contradiction that myths awakened
consciousness with the expression of the apperception of primordial images
and that myths proceeded to disguise those primordial images. How is this
possible?
Hillman would respond, I believe, that the archetypes are revealed in
myths in which the presence of gods and goddesses (as the face of the
archetype) is central. As narratives elaborated, the deities becam e symbols
and soon disappeared from the world altogether, becoming constituents of
the non-realm called the “unconscious.” The mesh of the masks multiplied to
appear a s a solid barrier. The only myth surviving is that of the “real,” the
“literal,” and the objective sensory world. Behind it all is the One, i.e., God,
and stumbling around within it is the self, the representational T, which is
considered to be singular. Narcissistic narrative is this mythos which serves
only to augment “self-esteem” or support ego-structures. In The New
Polytheism (1981), David L. Miller warns:

It is not that anything is “wrong" with narrative expression. Nor do I
wish to take back anything I have said recommending attention to it—
The danger I se e lies rather in how one views a story or how a story is
used. Narrative form is no better than abstract ideation if it is used
ideologically, that is, for ego-security. This is particularly important to
note in a time when story-form enjoys a more than passing popularity
in philosophy, theology, and literary criticism, (p. 17)
Today, a s Miller indicates, narrative form has been taken so literally as
to be transmuted into the dogma of empirically verifiable scientific discourse
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and into the anti-mythic, anti-aesthetic, self-enclosed world of academia.
Furthermore, we believe we are our stories, often to our confusion in the face
of erratic experience, as literary art often reveals. Miller continues that
if stories are believed to be a crutch that help ego hobble back into a
modicum of control... then the stories of the Gods may be as
disappointing as the social ideologies and the monotheistic theologies
which replaced them. Enthusiasm for narrative-form can become just
one more idolatry” (p. 18).
Archetypal psychology has looked to myths and mythic tales to help us
break from our self-enclosure.

According to Hillman, we have turned our

back on the multiple forms of the anima mundi (world-soul), and, as a result
of pathologizing the gods within, all we know of the world is from the
obsessive study of ourselves—so like the deluded occupants in Plato’s cave
analogy studying their own shadows.

We create "literal self-delusions"

today so we can feel proud and secure in our singular “I.” Hillman indicates
this “paranoid drive toward unified meaning” is nothing but the senex—
fearful old a g e — archetype in action. Archetypal psychology abandons such
a drive, and Hillman suggests there is “merely the method of epistrophe and
a consistent attitude, but no attempt at overall coherence” (1981, p. 132).
Hillman has indicated the development of this totalized and totalizing
self may have derived from the Enlightenment inversion of the objective
monotheism of the West, perhaps another reason why the mythic path is
seen as a “deeper light” and not enlightenment. This polytheistic path should
have interest for anyone wishing to avoid a totalized ideology or even a
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scientific theocracy. It may have implications as widespread in curriculum as
background for a multicultural curriculum (Edgerton, 1992) or for world-order
studies (Smith, 1990).
The method of engaging the archetypal memory, called “epistrophe"
by Hillman above, is a far cry from autobiographic recitation. Its mystique is
clearer than its method. Hillman sometimes calls it a psychologizing of the
past; it seem s nearer either literature, psychoanalysis, or even
deconstruction. He suggests not taking the “givens” of the past and reducing
them, but taking them and “twisting" them:
The particular virtue of the psychological mind is its twisting of the
given; seeing through, hearing echo and implication, turning back or
upside down. The psychological mind makes the given imagistic,
fantastic. Hence its affinity with both the pathological and the poetic,
and hence, also, its distance from the programmatics of action and the
formulations of the sciences. .. . Where scientific abstractions seek to
posit what is really there in the given, substitutive for it and constitutive
of it, our abstractions seek to drop the bottom out of the given. (1989a,
pp. 217, 218)
This is the archetypal remembering Hillman calls “epistrophe,
reversion, return, the recall of phenomena to their imaginal background ...
regarding phenomena in terms of their likenesses” (1979a, p. 4)J This may
imply a dramatization of the stories of one’s past, or, perhaps, an expressive
poetics. An acting-out with others—what was once called psychodrama—
may be useful. But these specificities fail to express the “twistedness,” or
1Hillman credits Henry Corbin, the Islamic scholar, for the original
method of fa 'will which means literally, he says, “to lead something back to its
origin and principle, to its archetype.” (p. 4)
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“madness,” of what Hillman means. Far from the Freudian couch of shameful
confession or even the Jungian/Campbellian fantasy of “awakening to the
myth I am living,” Hillman (1979a) suggests we should intrude many of the
forgotten gods in our re-storying: Pan and Aphrodite, certainly, and maybe
even the god of masks, Dionysos, who presides over the madness of
carnival. Our approach to the Underworld need not be a somber procession
after the grim reaper or psychotherapist but, instead, the ribald reversion to
carnival shadow in the wake of the archetypal trickster:
We follow the clown into the circus by entering a perspective of
rebellion against the dayworld order; rebel without cause or violence.
Turning topsy-turvy, we deliteralize every physical law and social
convention in the smallest things that we take for granted. Through
him we enter the perspective of the fantastic soul, clown as depth
psychologist. Imagine, Freud and Jung, two old clowns. ( p. 180)
This is not the sort of activity that one expects to find in schools, even
in advanced autobiographical or lifewriting classes. Yet the “problem” of
multiple Ts" has come to be expected by some researchers into narrative
inquiry (Connelly & Clandinin, 1991). Most of these Ts" are resisted,
especially in classroom situations, and others allowed only in unique
circumstances like carnival. Hillman says there is an archetype with the face
of a god behind the collection of each “I” and each god speaks in a different
mode, some of which may seem insane or obscene. To conjure this god out
from its concealment, we may have to write in its language. This is akin to
dialoging with what Watkins (1990) calls “invisible guests,” though Hillman’s
epistrophic approach may mean identifying with each god, each “mood”:
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Reversion through likeness, resemblance, is a primary principle for the
archetypal approach to all psychic events. Reversion is a bridge too, a
method which connects an event to its image, a psychic process to its
myth, a suffering of the soul to the imaginal mystery expressed therein.
Epistrophe, or the return through likeness, offers to psychological
understanding a main avenue for recovering order from the confusion
of psychic phenomena, other than Freud’s idea of development and
Jung’s of opposites. . . . Epistrophe implies return to multiple
possibilities, correspondences with images that can not be
encom passed within any systematic account. (1979a, p. 4)
This is imaginal memory (Perlman, 1988) but it is a more accurate
reflection of our actual experience. As a singular self-schema attempts to
deny or forget most of what we experience and even what we do (Jeremy
Campbell, 1989), allowing the other characters in us to speak deepens,
widens, and perhaps even adds other dimensions to our awareness. To
speak from the position of the abandoned child, or the wild woman, or even
the fearful senex is to give voice to what was once only unexplained emotion.
Our experience, according to this view, is always archetypal
experience. Our singular self* is the conceptualization (“to take to oneself”)
of an inconceivable singular deity. To allow myth to awaken us to the world
and the multiplicities of being, Hillman, Avens, Miller, Paris and others of the
archetypal school have made the polytheistic move, which Hillman describes
a s unavoidable: “The question of polytheism is posed by the soul itself as
soon a s its perspective experiences the world a s animated and its own

iThe subjectivity abstracted from language need not be singular.
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nature as replete with changing diversity. That is, as soon as the soul is
freed from ego domination, the question of polytheism arises” (1983a, p. 35).
Behind and between our rationalizations and narrative enclosures are
multiple archetypes which are phenomenal images. Hillman (1977) has said
that Jung’s “noumenal archetypes” are beyond the reach of language:
Furthermore, unlike Jung, who radically distinguishes between
noumenal archetype per se and phenomenal archetypal image,
archetypal psychology rigorously refuses even to speculate about a
non-presented archetype per se. Its concern is with the phenomenon:
the archetypal image. This leads to the next step: “...any image can be
considered archetypal. The word ‘archetypal’...rather than pointing at
something archetypal points to something, and this is value....by
archetypal psychology we mean a psychology of value....'Archetypal’
here refers to a move one makes rather than to a thing that is...” (pp.
82-83)
The memory which lies behind all our knowing is drawn through
remembered value and image back into the gravital complexes he identifies
as “Gods and Goddesses." These, he says, are not objective beings but are
(archetypally) present in all our perceiving, so are understood as
effective—and affective— presences within us and within the world:
As I have spelled out in several later writings, psychological
polytheism is concerned less with worship than with attitudes, with the
way we see things and place them. Gods, for psychology, are neither
believed in nor addressed directly. They are rather adjectival than
substantive; the polytheistic experience finds existence qualified with
archetypal presence and recognizes faces of the Gods in these
qualifications. Only when these qualities are literalized, set apart as
substances, that is, become theologized, do we have to imagine
through the category of belief. (Hillman, 1981, p. 129)
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Yet, If “memory believes before knowing remembers,” as Faulkner is
quoted in the epigraph, then memory is itself the gravity which holds the
Gods, the archetypes, together enough to provide an inner integration for
subjectivity. We—our sole selves—are the objects of memory. The mythic
perspective of archetypal psychology, then, is a journey of feeling and
humility. Humility because our ego-structures come apart when subjected to
the “pathologizing” effects of the gods and goddesses. The form of the deity,
however imagined, can only be constructed from the fragments of our own
experience, like a whirlwind’s appearing only through that which it draws into
itself. The resulting wisdom is that we are mere products of the “word,” that
our self-concepts are mythic structures over an abyss of memory, and that
our actions are, in truth, under the sway of many “divisibles.” As Gilbert
Durand (1976) puts it:
in traditional thought man experiences himself as multiple, diverse.
There is no pride in traditional man; he feels himself “divided up”
between sleeping and waking, good and evil, angels and demons. It
has taken all the discoveries of contemporary depth psychology to
bring the ego back to this modest pluralism, to show that behind its
triumphant consciousness the unconscious proliferates
disquieteningly. (p. 89)
This may lead us to the edge of such an abyss, humbling indeed for
the self-inflated or those with forgetful "lightness of being.” Archetypal
psychology implies that we live our myths indeed, but everyone knows myth
means illusion. It is something the Hindus and Buddhists of the East seem to
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have had no trouble imagining: It is the denial of vanity, the awareness of
vast subconscious suffering, and the insight that what
we experience as our individuality (my emotions, my temperament, my
mannerisms) is no more or less than a collage of mythical images.
The “I” a s the experiencer is also in the myth; it is not single and
unique, but many, a flux of vicissitudes, an archetypal illusion of selfidentity; it is samsaric and imaginal. The first metaphor of human
existence is that "we are not real.” (Avens, 1981, p. 72)
It is this “disquieting” journey into the “morbisms” of the shadow side
why the seeing through (or "feeling through”) to the myth or mythic image
must be understood as humbling to the central self-schema, but self-creative
to the other images who afflict us as moods, intrigue us in visual flashes,
cause “beside myself’ actions , or who populate our dreams and reveries.
It is all images to the archetypalist. Or, to put it another way, it is all
poetry, in the broad sense of image-evocation. Since the archetypal
psychologist would not be such were s/he to express him or herself only
mythopoeically, s/he instead writes prose as an aesthetic rhetoric. Hillman
has indicated his own words should not be taken literally but as a rhetoric to
open the soul to the mythopoeic image behind or through the words (1983a,
p. 19). The identity of myth with the images of creative literature is hinted at
here, and archetypal psychologists quote poets extensively to support their
mythic habit. Hillman indicates, however, that myth is the chosen rhetoric of
what he has called “soul-making":
Even if the recollection of mythology is perhaps the single most
characteristic move shared by all “archetypalists,” the myths
themselves are understood a s metaphors—never a s transcendental
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metaphysics whose categories are divine figures.. . . More important,
however, is that the study of mythology enables one to perceive and
experience the life of the soul mythically. (1983a, p. 20)
It seem s Hillman’s via negativa has proved itself to be a wa regia, as
well: the royal road to awareness. Myth for the archetypalist is not a theology
and not what most would consider a psychology. For Hillman, such
distinctions mean little next to the possibility of attuned awareness (not
“consciousness,” which implies an object):
It hardly matters to me whether theology or psychology brings
awareness to our baggage as long as awareness comes. Rather than
separating the theo-psychic mixture, let it continue. It will anyhow. It’s
an authentic compound, for the soul itself is just this sort of mixture.
(1981, p. 128)
Myth is not found in the words of mythological stories, folktales, or
even poetry. Though muthos may mean word, archetypal psychology means
the experience of the mythic image, and this, it must be noted, is as
dependent on the perceiver as on the poet The poet need not be

consciously making references to myths, even symbolically alluding to them.
The mythic image is what is evoked by the poet and potentially by the reader.
As Jed Rasula (1979) says with reference to a line by poet Charles Olsen:
Myth, then, is not a content of the poem, but rather the envoy of its
visionary circumference. And within the domain that circumference
establishes, both interior and exterior cosmos permit configurations of
their powers and persons, allowing us the vision that “mythology is not
reference / it is inner inherence” (p. 114)
It is the aesthetic sense of the “inner inherence” of the myth or the sense of
an image which constellates our experience which Hillman indicates is the
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“royal road" to ensoulment. Whitehead’s eternal objects, final causation, also
projected their effects through an inner inherence in the objective occasions.
Waking dream s are not all living nightmares, not all pathological. By
soul-making, Hillman at first seem s to have meant a personalized soul. The
personalized soul is not being made, but is the hidden source of the making
—■it seeks to re-make itself in the world. In his more recent writings, Hillman
(1989a) seem s to understand our task to be to bring the World Soul, anima
mundi (which includes m y soul), to consciousness. This re-membering of

archetypes is not that cloud-puffy world of imagination, but the life of this
world, ensouled nature presented a s an Arcadia of presences:
At the furthest reach of the cosmological imagination stand the
animals. They extend the planetary Gods beyond mythical fictions to
actual presences of vigorous life, there above in the dodecahedron
and here below, creeping, swimming, and flying among us. The
universal in the particular, eternal repetition of form, walking
archetypes, (p. 223)
I understand Hillman not to mean a return to preconceptual, animal
aw areness, but a uniting of human aesthetic aw areness with the mythic
presences of the “outer” world: The way in is the way out. Even language
need not be the “ossification of experience" but instead, used and responded
to mythopoeically, it may even create archetypal experience. Anima-animal
interpenetration and humanity’s non-egoistic remembering of the world seem

1Plato’s ultimate metaphysical shape ( Timaeus 55c), a 12-sided figure
with a pattern of animals on it: “A very physical sort of metaphysics here.”
(Hillman, 1989a, p. 222)
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to be some of the deepening highlights on the endless, trackless, mapiess
journey through myth and symbol to living archetypal presence—inner and
outer unveiled. Or so archetypal psychology would have it.
A concentrated definition of archetypal memory might be: the mythic
and affective associations we make towards an archetype. In this

formulation, a myth is a particular image of experience which we
valuate—charge with emotion—according to its place in a primordial image
(archetype) and give it voice. The archetype places experience. The myth
functions prepositionally, as Hillman has noted (1979b, p. 133), to assist in
this placing and speaking. Such writing would be emotionally textured, as
well, rich in adverb and simile.

§Loose Ends. In this sense, we do not p o ssess the mythic complex; it

possesses us. This can be positive—the myth of equality, or negative
(though my valuations may be culturally relative )—the myth of racial
superiority: “Myths seem very persistent, despite their perpetual difficulties.
They have caused and continue to cause, much damage. Myths have
always led people into the abyss and still do horrible things” (GuggenbiihlCraig, 1991, p. 32). In this sense, the unquestioned myths we live tend to
keep us unconscious, victimized. Myths, themselves, are amoral.
We can, however, come to be conscious of the mythology that guides
us. Through studying myths, soul-searching, and, most of all, through the
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mythic identifications involved in lifewriting, we can speak the voices and see
through to the images of the mythic complex which guides our feelings, but
we can never see the archetype, in itself. The senior Jungian in Zurich, Adolf
Guggenbuhl-Craig says: “Archetypes are forces of the soul. They were not
'm ade’ or ‘created’ by humans. Symbols, however, through which humans
try to comprehend archetypes, have been created in part by us” (1991, p. 80).
The other creative "part" is the archetype which imbues the images
and symbols of our life with meaning within particular mythologies. It is not
too late, I hope, to point out that a s Kolakowski (1972/89) opposes empirical,
technological thinking to mythic thinking, so all Jung’s, Eliade’s, and
Hillman’s ideas on archetypes cannot be called empirical science, but have
more value in explaining intuition, inspiration, and emotion: “As is the case
for everything of a psychological nature, archetypes cannot be scientifically
observed, photographed, or measured. In short, they cannot be discussed
objectively. Hence, the theory of archetypes is also a mythology”
(Guggenbuhl-Craig, 1991, p. 80)
To deal with such storm-centres of the unconscious, archetypal
psychology has proposed a mythmaking venture: Provide the archetypes
with faces and deal with them as our ancestors have always dealt with
powerful forces “outside" of ourselves which have enormous influence upon
our lives: a s deities. Talk to them, become them and let them talk. Jam es
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Hillman, himself, prefers those of Ancient Greece, though of gods,
goddesses, demons, and angels, the world has images aplenty.
The predominant myth of our time, according to Guggenbuhl-Craig
(1980, 1991), is the myth of progress, which encompasses other such myths
as that of development, improvement, and growth. It creates the situation
where behavioral psychologists greet each other with, “Good morning! How
am I doing today?”
In the field of curriculum, the extension of this complex is the myth of
instruction, that individuals are storage tanks of information, and that nature
(or the gods) provides nothing. We can even test to see how much is stored!
The media continually remind us of the woes for us all when “others” have
not lived up to their information-storing capacity. Everyone must progress
further up the ladder of instruction. The more you’re taught, the readier you
are for life. This is, we are told, only being “realistic.” Like all mythologies,
this story has a darkside. Like all mythologies, it has seemingly infinite
systems of justification. Like all mythologies, experience seem s to “prove” its
truths. Memory as techne rules: even art classes have to be justified in terms
of results.
There is no way out of a social mythology, Jungian and archetypal
psychology indicate, unless we come to recall the foundational myths of its
origin, objectively (as it were). The possession can only be broken through
the creation of new myths: symbols and images that seem to inhere in other
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instincts, that seem to be needs of another id. New myths will be disruptive,
disturbing, or revolutionary, but the archetypalists seem to feel they can be
ultimately life-enhancing if they return our soul(s) to the world.
The curricular implications of such a soul-making necessity are
manifold and richly suggestive and will be examined in the final chapter.
Much of this chapter has been an attempt to trace conceptual memory back
into its primordial images. It has been suggested that the solid reality of such
images return to us memorially in dreams and hearken us back to LevyBruhl’s participation mystique, Kristeva’s (1989) one differentiated world,
Heidegger's (1977) dasein, and Hillman’s ensouled world—where other
voices may speak through us.
We do not want a curricular “ecstasis of oblivion” (Heidgger, 1927. In
Krell, 1990), I do not think, unless in the forgetting of the self we can discover
a more selfless elan vital within which to live. Hillman has hinted at such
purpose by comparing soul-making with love when he says
we go through the world for the sake of its soul-making, thereby our
own. This reading suggests a true object libido, beyond narcissism, in
keeping with Otto Fenichel’s definition of love. Love can only be
called such when “one’s own satisfaction is impossible without
satisfying the object too.” If the world is not satisfied by our going
through it, no matter how much beauty and pleasure our souls may
receive from it, then we live in its vale without love. (1989b, p. 70)
Memory is the substance of culture and requires practice to live its
evocations. Such areas as autobiographical writing, conversation, or
drawing, as well as imaginal dialogues, imaginative myth participations, and
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writing from the “other’s” perspective, are all potential awareness bringers.
Lifewriting from an archetypal memory reaches for a kind madness, a kind of
madness which simultaneously subjects itself to consciousness. This is
autobiographical epistrophe, when the drunken god, or the rebellious child,
or the misunderstood angel, may be allowed an imaginal conversation:
The adventure of ideas occurs already in the tongue itself in its
adventure of language, that risk of speech, unpredictable diction. Who
knows what is coming next? But advent is not the future as a temporal
projection. It is a project of language: in the adventure of words
themselves. For words are little mythical beings, popping up in
jottings, fictions generating fictions, trailing their genealogies as
etymology, making music and echo in phonetics, dancing their syntax,
perishing and coming to be, more and more of them asking to come in,
crowding forward over the exhausted heaps of wingless cliches.
Words are angels. 1 (Hillman, 1989a, p. 230)
Most important, however, is the change in lived reality that a mythic,
polytheistic memory brings. Remembering ourselves historically, “broadens”
us, as they say. Remembering ourselves as having multiple centers of self
whose depth exceeds our grasp can only deepen us, open us to what might
otherwise be an isolated, threatening world. But remembering ourselves
amidst the phantasma of primordial imagery, and still being there, can be
nothing less than change at the level of metamorphosis. There is no reason
to assum e such creative remembering of the future has ever taken place.
An ensouled world is not so full of insecure, power-hungry senex
figures who glower their way through our short span together. Life is play,
i Angelos, message-bearer, but Hillman sees the world as a messagebearing world or an angelic cosmology (1989a, note 26).
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the myths remind us, even if the play may be very serious, indeed.

Realizing

that the stories of “I" are not even the centre of each of our own worlds allows
this "seeing through"—so similar to deconstruction—of the archetypalists to
include the masks of others, as well as each of our own dearly beloved
masks. Dionysian experience in various dramatic situations may reveal
whole complexes of masks available for the wearing.
We (as a collections of subjects) may not be real, so we should feel
more courageously ready to create each day as though it were our last. But
as Gilbert Durand, one of the proto-archetypalists, reminds us: “For the
sorcerer it is always dawn” (1976, p. 102). The power of memorial imagery
creates each day as though it were time’s first. It is the sorcerer whose place
is never certain, because mythmaking—writing— approximates magic.
Myth reaches down into the depth of time behind us, and it has greater
implications for education in the depths of time ahead of us. Hillman’s body
of rhetoric centered on “pathologizing” and the “death dealing” journey into
soul-making have the aroma of the first step of initiatory processes, involving
loss of identity and ritual death. There is no goal, according to Hillman, just
as the mystery rites never speak of what is ultimately revealed. Ovid
understood that “inhering” in all mythology is life-altering experience; that is
perhaps why he called his famous collection of mythic tales Metamorphoses.
In this way, Hillman (1979d) calls for a restorying, a soulmaking of the world:
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I have come at this from a psychological viewpoint, partly because I
wish to remove story from its too close association with both education
and literature—something taught and something studied. My interest
in story is a s something lived in and lived through, a way in which the
soul finds itself in life. (p. 45)
Simultaneoulsly, he refuses his own mythic epistrophe for what he
envisions a s the appropriate storytelling for schools. Disappointingly, he
expresses the curricular view of the educational tradionalist who knows what
culture is, without leaving room for multicultural views or even alien gods:
Which stories need to be told? Here I am orthodox, holding for the old,
the traditional, the ones of our own culture: Greek, Roman, Celtic, and
Nordic myths; the Bible; legends and folk tales. And these with the
least modern marketing (updating, cleaning up, editing, etc.), i.e., with
the least interference by contemporary rationalism which is subject to
the very narrowing of consciousness which the stories themselves
would expand. Even if we be not Celtic or Nordic or Greek in ancestry,
these collections are the fundamentals of our Western culture and they
work in our psyches whether we like it or not. We may consider them
distorted in their pro-Aryan or pro-male or pro-warrior slant, but unless
we understand that these tales depict the basic motifs of the Western
psyche, we remain unaware of the basic motives in our psychological
dynamics, (p.45)
It is strange that Hillman, a s a psychoanalyst who listens to personal
stories, should relegate curriculum to objective story-studies. I feel lifewriting,
at some point, could be used experimentally as epistrophe to awaken voices
and bring light to faces we have either forgotten or never listened to before.
These invisible guests could be encouraged to speak and act through us as
educated mediums. The curriculum might revitalize the experience of both
person and world.

It may have to move from its buildings. Knowledge,

according to the archetypalists, will have to make room for gnosis, a more
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active alchemical way of knowing which may lead to experiences of death
and rebirth during this lifespan. At least it should be so if we dare imagine
that archetypal psychology has a form of gnosis to offer lost souls. It was
Durand (1976) who said: “Being is a call to transmutation” (p. 101), a way of
being too unpredictable for modern technical control and so not considered
in present schooling. The bell rings and we rigidify. The bell could ring, as in
Zen temples, as a signal to awaken. At least according to the myth of a
mythology of a lost world of archetypal realism!

§Backward masking. I have perceived memory as an active principle in

the natural world and in the subtle dynamism of matter. I have invoked the
world of primordial images as a sort of chaos from which mythologized
images emerged, usually in the form of daimons and deities, to dwell among
people as culture-bringers.
Mythic images elide into mythic concepts, and language becomes the
caravan which conceals its sacred cargo of images. The world becomes the
word and naming creates things, “the one differentiated.” Mythology is at the
heart of every ethos and inspired narrative discourse provides the mode for
the keeping the world ensouled by returning it to the illud tempus.
Periodically, the cargo is opened and the mythic image re-experienced
through hallowed ritual and dance, song and chant.
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Language becomes aware of itself and subjects “discover” that they
are the creators of it, so the space of subjectivity is displaced within
language. Narrative appears as stories with a beginning, middle, and end.
The moral imperative in this closured discourse is overseen by custom and
law, by the class of priests and kings and by the soldiery of the hieratic citystate. Language is perceived as one-way communication from subjectivity to
subjectivity. Language becomes commerce. History is begun. Time is
discovered. Individual subjectivities become aware of their personal
histories: Memory—through narrative and imagery—tells me who I am. The
world becomes object and I internalize its soul as my own: until even that is
forgotten and the amnesia of self is begun.
Though time is now understood to be irreversible (Prigogine &
Stengers), remembering, it seems, is that which allows us to venture upon
the journey of the eternal return. There is, however, no remembering beyond
the self which is a narrative creation. The paradox, as stated by Klossowski
(in Krell) and Heidegger (1962), is that the “beyond of language” (Heidegger,
1977) can only be approached through the “oblivion of self-forgetting”
(Heidegger).
What is beyond the narrative of self? According to the archetypalists,
concealed within language and semiology and therefore possible to “re
vision” (Hillman, 1975b), is the primordial image—the mythic image which
seem s to have suddenly and mysteriously brought about our peculiar sort of
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human awareness, though without narration life must have been very like a
waking dream. For Hillman (1975a), memory as epistrophe—imaginal
resemblance or identity—is the way to recover archetypal imagery.
Existential experience beyond or before this imagistic reality can only
be indirectly inferred as “Absolutely Other”i (Otto, 1917/73) or as the “raw”
state of the organism in Lacan’s (1977) impossible real: “the umbilical cord of
the symbolic.” It may be negatively suggested by the “No-Image” of Lao Tzu
(Izutsu) or the “Nothing” of Zen (Izutsu). Or it may be nothing at all.
Having traced memory “forward” and then invoking the ecstasis of an
“eternal return” back through myth to the “unthinkable” primordial image, I
suggest that the return to such images is nothing less than the fertile bed of
the imagination. It is for this reason I pose the formula that imagining is more
a mode of remembering than remembering of imagining. As the image leads
into the opening space of futurity in imagining, so the creative arts best
express the mindfulness of memor.
Mindful of this, I shall now turn to literature, and especially poetry, as
“disciplinary” referencing points to explore the phenomena of my own
experiences of memory and to provide a hermeneutic for the potential
evocation of meaning therein.

iH ere, less the otherness of God than the “absolutely unknowable.”

C hapter 5: The Coil of Time and the Recoil of Memory

"That a thought rises only by descending, progressing only by
regressing—inconceivable spiral whose ‘pointless'
description proves to be repugnant. ”

(Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche et le Cercle Vicieux. Krell, 1990, p. 278)

§“Being and Remaining...” (Beckett, Krapp’s Last Tape, 1983): Only
everything remains to indicate the void from which we have come. Being
forever remains curled around its empty centre, its gaping wound (Kristeva,
1987)1. Like the black holes around which swirl spiral galaxies, this null
point both sucks energy into non-being and expels it out into being (Toben &
Wolf, 1982). It neither is nor is not.
Those in the curriculum field who have been working to recover the
suppressed memories hidden within institutional jargon (e.g., Huebner,
1975; Apple, 1979; Anyon, 1988; Franklin, 1988; Giroux & McLaren, 1989;
Kincheloe & Pinar, 1991; Pinar & Reynolds, 1992) or who have been
developing lifewriting practices to discover or transform the memories within
the habits of individual students and teachers (from Pinar, 1972, to Witherell
& Noddings, 1991, and Graham, 1991. See chapter 1) have found no source,
no fountainhead within the labyrinth of self from which all truth flows. The
Absolutely Other (Derrida, 1992; Otto, 1927/73) before/outside wordworlds

i Kristeva sometimes means the yearning for the mother’s body.
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eludes language and must do so. If I am but a concatenation of words, is
there any use looking within, before words, for whatever it is I might be?
Lifewriting cannot tell what the life is that is writing, it can only use the
self to express the trace (Derrida, 1978) of its unspeakable end, absentpresence, and origin. Gasch§ (1986), notes the “quasi-transcendental”
status of Derrida’s notions of trace and differance. “The absolute past is
retained in the trace” (Krell, p. 182). Such a trace is of a past, as Merleau-

Ponty has said (1945/78), which has never been present. Krell (1990) adds:
“To envisage such a past, however darkly, is to have experienced the failure
of the traditional model for memory” (p. 7). Once narration begins, the
lifewriter can only gather the scattered bits and inferences of the alreadyspoken everything in a vain attempt to transcend the wordworld’s closure.
We emerge into everythingness. The senses mingle incestuously.
Nothing is distinct or differentiated. Everything is no-thing. How is it we
come to be as distinct entities? Let me personalize: In what manner did I
become an /? Is the motive force behind this much-maligned, much altered,
much-abused body my soul? my genes? m e?
I remember remembering when I could have gone back. That is to
say, I can no longer remember a time when I did not remember a time before
(just as the “ancients” always memorialized previous ancients). They and I
cannot recall beginnings, or the non-time before time. But I remember
articulating (in some manner) that I could recall feeling that I need not “come
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out,” that I need not follow the seduction of the smiles encouraging me to eat,
to hug, to smile back. I remember thinking that I had felt that I could go
back/before/within/ouf—and what a tingling of bliss danced around such
dissolutive potential! I could just shut off the synesthetic sensory bother and
fall back to oceanic bliss. Oh yes: "Not in entire forgetfulness.../But trailing
clouds o f glory do we com e...” and all that. Earth may “fill her lap with
pleasures of her own ” (Wordsworth, 1807a) but nothing like the

transpersonal joy that urged me back, senseless but serene.
Unease crept through: Some inkling that / who was on the verge of
making such a momentous decision (Good Lord, it’s “To be or not to be...”)
would not be there for the next decision. Such a thought could not arise from
the blissful nowhen of absolute memory: I was already attached to the dis
ea se of self. I remember remembering that I would embrace the "inevitable
yoke" (Wordsworth) so / would not dissolve. It was bliss or being: Why

choose being?
Perhaps it has to do with double glance of Hermes, the god of
boundaries, looking both ways at once, to being and non-being (LopezPedraza, 1989). Only one "way” chooses, however. With the act of
choosing, being is aware of being: both ways becomes duplicitous.
The secret bliss transmogrifies into omnivorous horror. I fear I will be
lost. The terror stalks when the sen ses darken and desperately I seek to
sunder identity from its unspeakable source. One flees into the world, but it is
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a chaos of multiple selves in such action which is expressed by Beckett in his
possibly autobiographical novella, Company (1980):
What visions in the dark of light! Who exclaims thus? Who asks who
exclaims, What visions in the shadeless dark of light and shade! Yet
another still? Devising it all for company. (1980, pp. 59, 60)
One becomes "one” by entering the stories of others—company—and,
through naming and subtle allusion, learns who one is. There is an
existence aware of itself existing which “enconceptualates” a self from the
concepts projected by the world: “I’m in words, made of words, others’
w ords.. . . ” (Beckett, The Unnameable, 1983). The words congeal until we
find ourselves in Graves’ “Cool Web” (1927): “There’s a cool web of
language winds us in,/Retreat from too much jo y or too much fear. . . . ”

Now I know: “I,” “me,” “mine,” refer only to my secret being: the unified
entity inferred by reference. This in-ferred singularity of differences isolates
me but fills me with the power of secrecy: I now nurture yearnings which will
strengthen my place in this realm of denial. I now know the name for the
bliss/threat of unbeing and I will never forget it: They call it “death.”
I lie alone in my oblong room at night aware that falling to sleep is like
falling into the abyss. I do not close my eyes until dreams take me without
consent or knowledge. Instead, I listen and look in fear—the fear is of me. I
recognize it and hold it to me. There are rage and desire, as well, but they
are the stuff of the shifting shadows behind the always partially open door of
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my clothes closet. They swirl in the darkness under my bed which seeks to
draw me in. They are not o f me.
I hear the voices of my parents rise in the next room, the pat of my
sister’s bare feet as she sneaks to the bathroom. Silence. Then I hear
insidious whispers and muffled laughter which I cannot comprehend. I feel
compelled to an attuned intensity.
Who is talking? More mysterious still: Who is listening? / am the self
who loves the world so the world must love me ("If I should die before I
wake..."). I am good. / shall try not to strain into the dark or listen to its fearful

suggestions in the thunder, in my dreams. The shadows straining for
freedom from the hidden corners of my room are not me—Not ME!
If I cry in my terror it will bring her to my bedside: “It’s only a dream,"
she will say but I will extend my whimpering in an attempt to keep her longer.
She knows I am good. / wish no harm on anyone. The rustling, breathing
dark places are evil and seek release in the act. But why do they attempt to
draw me to them? /? la m good.
I am told of death but it is an abstraction no more real than “God.”
Death is for others. I exist. And there are I things I want. I learn to bargain
with the dark whisperers and they eke out their needs through the subtle
social sanction of sexual fantasy. The “clouds of glory” (Wordsworth)
dissipate in compromise: Duplicity. Rationalization. Narrative.
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My secret, private world grows until the day com es when I doubt the
existence of others. Am I the only one with inner thoughts, emotions, and
dream s? Why are their eyes always so veiled? My solipsistic enormity
begins to imagine the world as a vast test existing only for me. Today I am
grateful I did not objectify others a s only moving matter—the hell-trip of
psychopathology.
Even Narcissus leaves the mirror-stage (Lacan, 1977) at som e point. I
had been telling Clyde about what I had learnt about the size of the universe.
We looked at the arching night-sky over the Saskatchewan prairie while I
described with growing awe the stars that were planets, and the Milky Way in
which our sun was but one among billions, and other stars which were
actually other galaxies, also numbering in the billions. Clyde becam e so
frightened his freckles jumped and he ran home. I lay back and picked out
one distant blue star and let it study me a s I tried to comprehend.
Of course, I could not. But I fell back—fell before —as the hypnotic
blue light enlightened me as to my utter insignificance—an insignificance so
incomprehensible as to be astonishing. I w as silent for days after that, never
able to explain to my mum how I had come to wet my pants at my age. Nor
can I recall today. The bliss abyss tells no tales.
The years of self-construction again are poised over an action. Now
my boyhood self hungers for something vital missing, which must, I assume,
be in the world. The world seem s a mystery, but with a prize within. All the

268

tales I have been told since infancy and the Greek myths I have just been
absorbing seem to unite into an urge to seek some great treasure. School
has stolen the adventure, but now I have discovered a better use for
language than “phonics” or grammar: writing whatever is imaginable,
whatever my fancy damned well pleases.
There is a complacency to self when it learns its script, when its stories
have become memorialized and relegated to ritual. Ah, the sweet
contentment of those who have named the abyss, placed it, and filed it. For
such, writing is always labour at least, and sometimes a serious threat. I
found great liberation in my adventure stories, a liberation through the
limitation of writing. At this early stage, I had to forget who I had memorized I

was, and listen darkly or in the air for all that I imagined I could be:
As though in order to begin writing one did not have to forget or
otherwise suppress, most of what memory and reminiscence have
meant; a s though the entire matter of memory, reminiscence, recall,
recollection, revery, and repetition were not an endless overture
arising out of an absolute past and capable of infinite development; as
though one were not always writing on the verge of both
remembrance and oblivion alike. (Krell, 1990, p. 1)
At this stage, all that “I could be” was still idealized from the memory of
the world with its opening for a hero of one face or another (as in Campbell,
1949/68). Writing opened the world and gave me a more realistic place
within it (than thinking it was me). A quest, however envisioned, becomes a
con-quest unfulfilled when the imagination roams like the wind, unattached,
ungrounded. All the holding-pens for heroes awaiting the cattle call, heroes
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that will never be, become the overcrowded bins of braggadocio. The dream
fades, and even Ulysses must look for novelty:
Little remains; but every hour is saved
From that eternal silence, something more,
A bringer of new tilin g s ... (Tennyson, 1833)

Other dreams come, no longer of conquest, but of a return. The scene
changes. The body ages. Desire becomes a relentless dominatrix.
Frustration, itself, is not enough to keep me going. My attention wavers, but
the self-collection urges me on through my meagre accomplishments. I want
more. I want the beyond. I read astronomy. I want transcendence. I want

out. Yes, drive on. Yes, I dream...
Of driving alone, without luggage, out a long peninsula,
The road lined with snow-laden second growth,
A fine dry snow ticking the windshield,
Alternate snow and sleet, no on-coming traffic,
And no lights behind, in the blurred side-mirror,
The road changing from glazed tarface to a rubble of stone,
Ending a t last in a hopeless sand-rut,
Where the car stalls,
Churning in a snowdrift
Until the headlights darken.

(Roethke, 1964)
I have become a being fearing his demise, desiring his predominance:
fearing his desire and (O anxiety!) desiring his fear. I am tensed in extension.
I re-collect the mystic art of veiling my soul: persona. I am one for and to the
world.
One interacts. One becomes a subject—which is to say an object.
One rationally orders one’s self-tales for immediate delivery, available on

270

call. At last, one succumbs to history, a larger totality of one. One seeks to
find one’s place, to embed one’s narrative in the Grand Narrative. The
private motivators of fear and desire become compressed, repressed, and,
finally, sublime-ated into the Grand Fear, the Grand Desire. One putrefies in
blandness and dare not question why one continues at all.

One slinks into

unity. Beckett, as always, hears the voices of a sundered soul:
I don’t know, perhaps it’s a dream, all a dream, that would surprise me,
I’ll wake, in the silence, and never sleep again, it will be I, or dream,
dream again, dream of silence, a dream silence, full of murmurs, I
don’t know, that’s all words, never wake, all words, there’s nothing
else, you must go on, that’s all I know, they’re going to stop, I know that
well, I can feel it, they’re going to abandon me, it will be the silence, for
a moment, a good few moments, or it will be mine, the lasting one, that
didn’t last, that still lasts, it will be I, you must go on, I can’t go on, you
must go on, I’ll go on, you must say words, a s long as there are any,
until they find me, until they say me, strange pain, strange sin, you
must go on, perhaps it’s done already, perhaps they have said me
already, perhaps they have carried me to the threshold of my story,
before the door that opens on my story, that would surprise me, if it
opens, it will be I, it will be the silence, where I am, I don’t know, I’ll
never know, in the silence you don’t know, you must go on, I can’t go
on, I’ll go on. (The Unnameable, 1983, pp. 190, 191)

§Seif-Shapes. From the "gaping wound” of blissful non-existence, my

story has unfolded outward bound. It seem s to describe the dream of a linear
trajectory from the terror of losing the self ascribed to me to the uniting of that
self with its source in the semiotic totality of culture. The symbols of this
Lebenswelt, primarily language, camouflage the secret yearnings of
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divergent memories and less sociable selves. The Lebenswelt describes not
just a space but aspires to control time, as well.
Bergson (1911/83) understood differently: “But, a s regards the
psychical life unfolding beneath the symbols which conceal it, we readily
perceive that time is just the stuff it is made of” (p. 4). Time not as the
ideology of linear progress would have it, but as the continual becoming into
unpredictable convergences. Bergson (1911/83) believed we need more
than the security of mental calculation; to tune into the “time of nature,” we
need creative intuition:
The first kind of knowledge has the advantage of enabling us to
foresee the future and of making us in some measure masters of
events. . . . It symbolizes the real and transposes it into the human
rather than expresses it. The other knowledge, if it is possible, is
practically useless, it will not extend our empire over nature, (p. 343)
Space, the other face of time, also lacks extension into the future.
Extension disappears beyond immediate perspective, as the parallelism of
Ojrailway tracks dissolves into infinity in the distance. Where, then, can I/we
find the shape of my/our destiny? Or is it even possible, as Beckett
worries,hnhgbbbvbv to find “the threshold of my story”? Surely it matters to
what climax my/our story portends?
Can I recall my bliss? No. Can I expect such bliss to await me? No /
cannot. If there is only the “going on,” it is a journey into the same timeless
void which precedes existence. “Timeless voids” can hardly be compared as
merely “similar." What reality can there be between poles of the abyss?
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What can we imagine suspended, bridge-like, between nothingness and
nothingness? All that may exist are what Paul Veyne (1988), calls the
“palaces of the imagination”:
These palaces are not built in space, then. They are the only space
available. They project their own space when they arise. There is no
repressed negativity around them that seeks to enter. Nothing exists,
then, but what the imagination, which has brought forth the palace,
has constituted, (pp. 121, 122)
Veyne maintains that, as the Greeks lived their myths but most often
disbelieved them, we, too, can hope to find no truth “awaiting.” Life “goes on”
mythically—as if—with intention deeper than belief:
Nothing equals the assurance and perseverance with which we
ceaselessly open these broad extensions into the void. . . . The
opposition between truth and error is not on the scale of this
phenomenon. . . . Even the opposition between truth and fiction
appears as secondary and historical; the distinction between the
imaginary and the real no less so. (p. 122)
The irony of Veyne’s last phrase seem s necessary to indicate this
existential courage, even in the face of “factual” nihilism. It is in the richest of
ironies that Beckett (1965) suggests imagination’s imperturbability: “No trace
anywhere of life, you say, pah, no difficulty there, imagination not dead yet,
yes, dead, good, imagination dead imagine” (p. 7).
The world of primordial images, group fantasy, imagination—call it
what you will—cannot be subverted by turning from the world. As Jung was
quoted in the last chapter: "The gods have become diseases" (CW 13§54)
and our angels may become demons. It was in my twentieth year that I
awoke from the dream of self to the awakened dream of the world; it was that
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sam e year that I began the plummet into all the hells the whisperers can
conjure and the further hells a culture without wisdom can devise.
Post-transcendence, I find myself signed up on the grand tour of
“maturity.” Freud’s “reality principle” kicks in and I can now put away the
illusions of childhood for the real illusions of adulthood. But our
scientific/consumeristic metanarrative tells me nothing: I live, I talk, I process,
I die. The well-advertised proclamation is that by identification with the
omnipresent Grand Narrative that a kind of immortality is attained. No longer
need oneself worry about personal memories, about unfinished stories,
about unnameable fear. "Objectify, objectify/identify, identify..." The whispers
are now those of the Grand Stage’s promises.
I have learned and listened and now I identify personal memory with
historical memory and am assured that we are on the grand train to
revelation. We strive together for given ends. We imagine that by being
certain of our facts we may control our destiny. Even my life story becomes
literalized as a resume, memorized for easy identification. Lifewriting
becomes recitation.
Does knowing the truth—as in a chronicle—add to our awareness in
the present? Not according to Veyne:
But on rare occasions it happens that a bend in the road permits the
travelers to look back and see a long stretch of the road and all its
zigzags. .. . This retrospective vision speaks truly, but it does not make
the road any more false, since the road could not be true. . . . Could
this be because I wrote this book in the country? I was envying the
placidity of the animals, (p. 128)
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To catch an accurate backward glance reveals only the illusion of our
se n se of controlled direction. The crazy mesh of “roads” behind reveals only
present bewilderment. Veyne seem s to prefer the “placidity of animals” to a
human mind carrying on in delusion, forgetting that "The time has been, that,
when the brains were out, the man would die” (Macbeth . III. 4. 77, 78).
We become listeners only to our own semiosis, caught in our own
cycles of repetition and forget to rem em ber to listen fo r nothing. We become
concerned with righting the past and seeking the chain-link cau ses for the
present just a s we predict the future and attempt to make it so. Without a
sen se of presence we become caught in the nothingness of symbolic time
and can no longer apprehend even a trace of timeless nothingness, like
S tevens’ “Snow Man”:
For the listener, who listens in the snow,
And, nothing himself, beholds
Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is. (1923)

In this land of forgetting, the “official” timeline is just that: a line. From
the womb to the tomb, we march on in our dutiful progress and it is
considered to be in the utmost bad taste to dwell on personal deaths. In Big
Story, death is only a vulgar imagining. But my death lies “ahead,” dressed
up in marble and dirt. The less I wish to think of it (by, say, working for “the
good of society”), the more the awaiting tomb drains life of all savour, the
more purposeless seem my palaces of the imagination, and the more I fee!
the weariness of the social procession:

"O plunge your hands in water,
Plunge them in up to the wrist;
Stare, stare in the basin
And wonder what you’ve missed.
“The glacier knocks in the cupboard,
The desert sighs in the bed,
And the crack in the teacup opens
A lane to the land of the dead.

(W. H. Auden, 1940)
“The lane to the land of the dead” or “the nothing that is” is the
inevitable result of living a linear narrative. We have no preconceptual
memory to postconceptually project. Try as we might, we do not remember
how to die. Certain religions, of course, indicate that dogmatic transgression
makes a difference in the afterlife—“Heaven or Hell, baby”—or in the
metempsychosis into the next life, but such results are very much their story.
Our pseudo-scientific metanarrative position seem s to be that death is
simply one character’s departure from the grander story. Death may be a
place or state, but that state must be inalterable and final (in one way or
another), so it is certainly unconscionable. Whether ethereal gratification (for
all) or oblivion (across the board) or spiritual transmigration (automatic), the
metanarrative m essage is: Life h as nothing to d o with death.
We are here (but do not remember how) and our private existence
does not matter in the slightest, except as it impacts on Big Story. My own
story can be nothing more than “a tale told by an idiot” (Macbeth. V. 5. 26,27).
What possible purpose, then, for autobiography in education, for research in
teachers’ stories, for lifewriting? One’s appearance on the stage of time is so
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brief and meaningless, in itself, that it must be asked whether teaching, itself,
has any purpose other than the furtherance of the larger goals of society,
however they may be perceived.
All this alters as my vision of a life becomes shapeshifted. Is a life a
meaningless round, a meaningless line, or a shifting palace? What is the
shape of a life? What is the shape of this life?
After saying each life has “its own particular delineation, its distinctive
form and direction, its own ’teleological unity’,” thus suggesting a line, Jam es
Olney (1972) admits that, finally, “no one can foredraw the exact shape of
destiny.” Our experience in the life surrounding us, on the other hand, where
presumed self m eets presumed self (and they elide into unheard harmonies
and imperceptible presences) Olney describes more a s a ripple effect:
The self of each of us, that one source at which we experience life, is
surrounded by a complex and sometimes, no doubt, bewildering
series of concentric circles: those greater and greater abstractions
derivable from the single concretion and the final reality of individual
being, (p. 326)
The circular shape of life has been assum ed by our species since we
were driven to periodic rituals of cosmic renewal (Eliade, 1954, 1963). Since
Gilgamesh sought eternal life, narratives of the hero’s journey created the
individual quest, described by Joseph Campbell (1949/68) a s beginning with
“The Call” and ending with “The Return," a circle despite the changes to the
adventurer. Many have considered the seeker's journey as an archetype of
everyperson’s life-joumey, and sometimes beyond life (e.g. Henderson &
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Oakes, 1963; van der Leeuw, 1950/64). In the latter case, the circle must not
be understood as inevitable, for would-be heroes are sometimes overcome
by the trials and the temptations of the quest—one of the greatest threats
being forgetfulness of purpose, as on the island of the lotus-eaters or
drinking from the waters of Lethe.
Conversely, Heidegger and Hillman have been interpreted as having
the similar project of forgetting or seeing-through the heroic ego as a kind of
soul-making journey to nowhere (Avens, 1982). Mary Doll (1988) also
understands Beckett’s central characters to be an inversion of the heroic ego:
“Beckett’s quest by male questers begins a far more difficult task for modern
consciousness—the task of undoing the ego in an attempt to rediscover the
soul, or psyche” (p. 20).
In either case, the wonderful faith remains that a lifetime of individual
integration, or egoistic disintegration, affects the whole (“we go through the
world for the sake of its soul-making...” Hillman, 1989b, p. 70) and radiates
Olney’s “concentric circles,” which Roethke (1964) expresses this way:
The pure serene of memory in one m an—
A ripple widening from a single stone
Winding around the waters of the world.
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§An E ctoplasm ic L istener? Much depends on the interpretation of that
“single stone” or the sense of memory here employed. The individual self
and even “mind” are seen a s linguistic constructions by phenomenologists,
semiologists, and by narrative theorists:
If we believe so strongly in such an internal subject it is perhaps
because we have imagined such an entity to exist; we were either told,
or somehow been misled by, stories and theories that posit such an
ethereal being. (Kerby, 1991, p. 1)
This position should not be seen as validating the Grand Narratives
over the “pure serene o f memory, ” I do not think. Even here, the imaging
power of the soul may have primacy. The self the world gave me took the
burden of my desire and the shadow of my soul. I experience that self in
isolation but can also listen to its mutually formative dialogue with the
world—the circle of mutual interpretations, a s Kirby (1991) explains:
In hermeneutics this circular dialectic (which need not be construed as
a vicious circle) is seen a s one of parts and wholes: the parts can be
understood only in relation to the whole they comprise, and vice versa.
In light of this insight we are perhaps justified in concluding that it is
especially through the unifying action of narration that temporal
expanses are given meaning, (p. 3)
If my self is indeed comprised of and in narratives, then my lifewriting
must powerfully affect that self and its compositional memories; and if that
self is so affected, then so must be the whole which shares the hermeneutic
circle with that self. Does this imply that the memorializations of the whole
are also somehow altered?
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Lifewriting or an artistic representation can never enconceptualate a
self or the truth of life. / live a story, la m creating my story—tragic, nihilistic,
or mutant—right here before you. But there are larger circles of stories
around me. The occasions of existence (Whitehead, 1978) expand my
memories and my potential for further action. Much of this action enm eshes
my being with those of others, like expanding ripples from thrown
sto n es—meeting, overlapping, yet still retaining individual patterns.
I w as deceived from the beginning when I learned "I” and imagined I
w as alone in my private sphere of aw areness. I did not know that this was
part of my cultural heritage—the myth of the individual. I did not know my
desires and fears were so obvious to others and so shared with them, their
form given in language.
I find I am both listener and teller. The teller summarizes: S eif is
constituted in and through relations with others. Relations are culturally
determined. C ulture’s form is narrative, b u ilt with language. M em ory takes
form through narrative. S elf takes form through memory. S elf as persona is
a linguistic construct adapted to cultural demands. Culture, language, and
se lf are sublim ations/expressions o f desire (or, more nicely, concern).
Lifew riting—written narrative—is relational as well as being self-constitutive:

Either a s participant or as an observer, a s one who p o ssesses limited
or complete knowledge, the narrator cares. Even though he may
know all and observe from the extreme edge of the text, the narrator
remains focused on the textual world and is concerned about the
outcome of the events occurring there. (Richardson, 1989, p. 42)
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My complacent self can hear only my own recitations and those of the
world which augment them. I do not write complacently for I write toward a
deferred position which listens for my words. This lifewriter, here on paper, is
has another memory entirely than he who watches TV or chats over coffee;
but the being who listens may not attain to the attributes of being at all,
especially the necessary levee of (active) memory. As I write, I may
approach this waiting silence and find my words forgetting me. Maslow
(1973) has observed that
the creative person, in the inspirational phase of the creative furor,
loses his past and his future and lives only in the moment. He is all
there, totally immersed, fascinated and absorbed in the present, in the
current situation, in the here-now, with the matter-in-hand.. . . This
ability to become ‘lost in the present’ seem s to be a sine qua non for
creativeness of any kind. But also certain prerequisites of
creativeness—in whatever realm—somehow have something to do
with this ability to become timeless, selfless, outside of space, of
society, of history, (p. 58)
Perhaps this “timelessness” of creativity is the result of becoming
attuned to that listening non-presence who recedes as I approach. I could
not write anything without an uncertain teleology, but that timelessness which
draws existence from me-in-time could not do so without that self-in-time.
The unnameable at either end of life (or so we linearly imagine)
cannot possibly in itself attend to harmonics of being (or so I imagine). The
unnameable as an empty centre from which being arises and to which it
returns (or so we circularly imagine) is always present as unnameable: “The
hidden harmony is stronger than the visible” (Herakleitos. In Freeman, p. 28).
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To perceive the harmony, however, to be attuned to its pre/post
primordial/teleological presence requires a trace of self to remain “outside" or
somehow apart from the circle of the recollected, social self. This revenant is
in a “position” of silence, solitude, and attunement (atonement?). This is a
“transparent” self which needs its social subjectivity only to express the
“hidden harmony” in whatsoever way it may dream fit (including using the
memories of the recollected self as an instrument, as it were). Does this
ectoplasmic listener have aw areness which goes far beyond its original self

structure (though its expression, if it choose to have one, could not)? Forever
in company, real or imagined, the listener cannot be heard, but the self must
forgo distraction to attune to it: “The capacity to be alone thus becomes
linked with self-discovery and self-realization; with becoming aware of one's
deepest needs, feelings, and impulses. ” (Storr, 1988, p. 21)

This ghostly, timeless self-silence—a silence which listens—seem s to
draw from the creations, repetitions and memories of time but is not drawn (of
itself) into the prison of time. This Absolutely Other must be of the same void
within memory I had morbidized under the grim concept of death. 1 But
concepts are in time, and are real. With a concept like death before us, no

lOf course, the concept of death can always be reduced simply to mutual
concern: “To use death to justify narrative, however, is to appeal to a matter of
broad and, a s it were, democratic interest. Here the authority of narrative,
hence that of those who interpret narrative, rests not on skepticism—or, finally,
on death itself—but rather on the number of human beings who acknowledge
death as their concern" (Robbins, 1992, p. 49).
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wonder we seek to control the future! But what I had called death is Other
and not conceivable. It is a lta rityi here implied in Mark Taylor’s (1987)
discussion of the French philosopher, Maurice Blanchot:
Blanchot stresses the unsettling interplay of time and death. Being,
which is never present as such, is a tendency toward I'a-venir. From
this point of view, being is a being-toward “the nonarrival of that which
comes toward.” By interpreting the absolute future, which approaches
without arriving, in terms of “death and dying," Blanchot is led to an
unexpected conclusion. If death only approaches, I (or the I) never
die. “One never dies now,” Blanchot points out, “one always dies later,
in the future—in a future that is never actual, that cannot come except
when everything will be over and done. And when everything is
accomplished, there will be no more present: the future will again be
past.” . . . The impossibility of death does not mean that life is eternal.
To the contrary, the silence of Midnight is the speechless tolling of le
glas that echoes in and through all things and every one. The
impossibility of death is the “non-event” in which the Impossible itself
draws near. ( pp. 242, 243. Blanchot quoted from The Space of
Literature.)

I could say I have eased away from the sales pitch of Big Story by
changing my relationship to death. But it is not at all clear that any sort of
relationship can be said to exist with an Absolute Other that cannot be said,
in itself, to exist! I have found that both silent reverie (back) and creative

action (toward) involve large doses of anxiety because of the uncertainty of
relating to anything.
Jorge Luis Borges (1992) attempts to write from the position of the
silent other but finds only uncertainty and a sense of inevitable appropriation:

i “Altarity" is Taylor’s neologism whose suggestions are complex, but the
mingling of “alterity” with the silent awe evoked by “altar” may suffice.
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I tried to to free myself from him and went from the mythologies of
the suburbs to the games with time and infinity, but those games
belong to Borges now and I shall have to imagine other things.
Thus my life is a flight and I lose everything and everything belongs
to oblivion, or to him.
I do not know which of us has written this page. (p. 41)
Can one be the silent other, even to oneself? The active imagination,
the active listener, the active memory: all imply action in the here and
now—the eternal present—not passive adsorption in the self-affirming
narratives offered by the culture-industry or in complacent relationships.
Ginette Paris (1990) connects the active memory to the prenarrative image
as the relation between the goddess Memory and her daughters, the Muses
of the arts:
It’s an active memory which breaks into consciousness through
archetypes, dreams and myths, fantasies, symbols and artistic work....
But it is not just of the past, a taped recording; it is constructive,
evocative, poignant, and the beginning of musing as Mnemosyne was
the mother of the Muses, (p. 121)
This “musing” is akin to reverie and has for its material all the
microversalsi of memory. The hint here is that creative action—possible only
with a non-self-centered memory—may take one through the portals of fear
and desire, take one beyond the finitude of the socially-constructed subject,
take one into the realms of microversals piercing past and future. Bachelard

1Microversals as opposed to universals: all the discrete and discordant
phenomena of past existence and perhaps existing unbound in the future as
well. They suggest Whitehead’s eternal objects but also space/timeindependent “quantum fluctuations” (Toben & Wolf, 1982).
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(1987) pierces my verbosity: “Poetic images condense infinite meanings in
elliptic associationsi' (p. 28).

Poetic reverie seem s to take the particular phenomena of existence
(and this means phenomena remembered, if perception is understood as
time-delayed through memory) and folds them back upon themselves in
“elliptic associations.” Lifewriting—since we all have lives, no matter how
limited the attention our living may receive—must be one of the first motions
toward such reverie. Lifewriting may attain to a reverie which finds the
archetypal past projected into the future as epistrophe: a resembling or re
assembling or dissembling. Or, as Taylor (1987) interprets Nietzsche, as

repetition:
In repetition, the past that is never present is reversed and appears as
the future that is always deferred. The guise of this future is death.
Death ... is the present absence or absent presence that forms the
ever approaching-receding horizon of human experience. The
“beyond” of death opens with repetition, (p. 96)
A folding-back or elliptic association is not merely a repetition,
however. It suggests the power to (ap)perceive through attuned memory.
The (ap)perceiver must be a self whose centre has been replaced (through a
kind of death) by a shifting (and shifty) transparency. In such “ecstasis,”
Heidegger infers that “for the most part we are our own having-been” (quoted
earlier, in Krell, p. 331). The “creative core” is nowhere and no-thing and so
everywhere and all.

285

§Experiential E xcursus. We all sat around the cabin waiting. Setsuko
glanced at Jarot from time to time, hopefully, it seemed. She rose and looked
out into through the sheltering conifers down toward Nanoose Bay then
sighed and returned to her mat. Jarot sat splayed—hands on the floor, legs
akimbo—against the log walls. He glanced up suddenly at regular intervals,
looking about nervously, then reverted to stillness, eyes inward. Was he
worried about the effects of our ingestion, or that there would be no effects at
all? Jake sat with his long limbs curled around himself, poking listlessly
through the dust on the plank floor with a twig he had found among the
firewood. His red-rimmed eyes looked especially withdrawn framed by his
wild hair and the thick black beard covering the rest of his face. When would
it arrive? How would it arrive? Was it already present?
So strange to begin my excursus with a description, yet so natural to
the introduction to a narrative. It’s all there: I see it in my mind’s eye as I
survey the room as though I were there in my twentieth year, though no else
will ever see the pictures of my words. Me and three others, shifting
positions, looking about, scratching ourselves absently. Sniffing ...
“We’re monkeys!” I exploded. “We’re all monkeys!”
The hair on the back of my head literally stood on end as the
realization from some incomprehensible centre within me rushed up my
spine and burst over me. It’s not that I didn’t know it before, but now I saw it:
We were four monkeys—groping, scratching, sniffing, and waiting.
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I have no idea why it seemed such a wonderful insight; the others
were less than profoundly impressed. “Yeah, so what?” Jarot asked.
Setsuko, who usually encouraged all Jarot’s thoughts, looked less than
comfortable with my pronouncement.
Only Jake studied his thin, hairy paw, twisting it experimentally, and
agreed with amusement: “Jeez, we sure are."
We talked about it forawhile, Setsuko wanting to know if that was "all”
we were. My astonishment filled the room but I clearly did not have the
words to convey it. The conversation dwindled and I felt deflated. I went
around to each person in turn attempting to get them to feel “the air rise"
when we talked together and to feel it fall when we abruptly ceased. In each
case, as soon as we ceased our dialogue, I felt myself fall back into a kind of
torpor—an animal darkness? I pondered on monkeydom and language as I
settled back in my place. Then it came from the other “direction."
I felt something opening up just above my head. As it expanded, a
tingling joy began to seep from me toward it. Simultaneously, my thoughts
began a rapid-fire attack to prevent me from going into this “something." I
tried to tell the other three that something very powerful was happening, that I
knew it was good—even wonderful—but I wasn’t sure I should let go and go
into it. They all had some response but I recall them mainly looking
disinterested. Jarot even seemed angry. Setsuko wanted to know what “it”
was. Jake wanted to know what held me back.
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What held me back were all the “what ifs” constructed in language. I
felt as if this ecstatic opening would change me forever. It might mean
insanity. It might mean an embarrassing effusion of love for my friends. It
might be my death. It might... Even attempting to explain slowly closed the
circular opening in the air. Words, themselves, sealed the crack in the egg.
No one understood me anyway.
Even now I feel like someone attempting to put the images of his most
important night dreams into words, knowing in advance how boring and
foolish such experiences seem in ordinary parlance. D. T. Suzuki (1964), the

Zen interpreter, has put it this way: “Language deals with concepts and
therefore what cannot be conceptualized is beyond the reach of language.
When language is forced, it gets crooked, which means that it becomes
illogical, paradoxical, and unintelligible from the point of view of ordinary
usage of language or by the conventional way of thinking" (p. 182).
We had a pleasant day, built of our fantasies of what “a trip” ought to
be. We built a bonfire on the beach, made neat sparks and spun fiery logs.
And got further confused in the tangle of relationships: Setsuko thought she
was following a heroic Jarot. Jake thought Setsuko was the most beautiful
Japanese doll in the world. There was little evidence of what Jarot thought. I
could think of nothing but what had touched me, opened then closed, yet, no
matter how hard I tried, I could not imagine what my alternative had been:
“Concrete experiences are valued more than mere conceptualization.
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Language is secondary. In Zen, consciousness in its ordinary scientific
sen se has no use; the whole being must come forward” (Suzuki, p. 179).
The very next day we invited in a far more potent guest brought by Bill
and Jim, the two American hippies who lived in the big cabin up the hill.
Returning from one of their regular excursions across the border into
Washington state, they told us we were in for a special treat. Two hours later
I thought the ground on which I was lying w as really very thin and that I was
going to break through it at any second.
Setsuko had gone to the Americans’ cabin to help make cabbage rolls
and Jarot walked on the embankment talking about submarines to Jim. Jak e
noticed my dejection and asked how things were going. “I think I’ve lost my
soul,” I told him. The words had just run from me. I previously had no idea of
any such thing. With the words, I fell even lower, a s though the earth would
open, a s though I would die.
Jake stood and looked at me. “Don’t say that. Don’t say you’ve lost
your soul. Do something!” And it seem ed to me he looked sideways directly
at the path leading up to the sunny hillock.
Then I w as running up the path. I was running to keep ahead of
myself, I think now. At that time, I was running so I could not be thought.

There were thoughts, voices, clamouring in at me from all sides. They
speeded up so fast the words merged and becam e feelings—all the private
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little daily feelings that I knew so well, all the feelings that were the being
called "l."
All those habitual ways of feeling, it seem s to me today, must be
composed of thoughts too condensed to even register a s such. And all those
frightened, desirous thoughts came to me from the outside, were memorized
by me, and becam e the guardians of my subjectivity.
What happened next I know is beyond telling, but perhaps I can
suggest a few crooked images: As I burst from the shade onto the sunlit crest
of the hillock, the thought-feelings seem ed to whirl together all at once and
become one, like the stream ers around a maypole winding their limits and
wrapping around their central core. I felt an inner “bursting from the shade”
a s I rode the spiral out through the “opening” above my head. It was
orgastically sudden and powerful, but then I was out: outside of my head and
into the world, and awake, it seem ed, for the first time in my life.
My awakening was composed of no new sensory data. Today, the
word “awareness" has much power for me because that is as close a s I can
come to describing my state during those hours. I was still my body but I was
not inside of it—I was not enclosed in the feelings and thoughts of isolated
subjectivity. I was in the world and of the world. Yes, it was like “a dream
come true,” because the world had all the “glory and the freshness of a
dream” (Wordsworth, 1807a).
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In the silencing of the inner clamour (which I had long since ceased
hearing as anything but “white noise”), I was aware of the richness of the
natural symphony around me. It seemed that whatever tree or bush I
directed my awareness upon would come alive with the songs of birds and
insects. Even stranger was that, on this summer day which had been
perfectly calm, each tree or bush I listened to seemed to dance and quiver as
an errant breeze laughed through it. In fact this "errant” breeze seemed to
follow my attention wherever I took it.
But I see I am on the verge of waxing ebullient with poor poetry to
crookedly express my hours awake, and among. It was a peculiarly
internalized and unpoetic language which had isolated me and from which I
had escaped and to which I would have to return.
Jake ambled up. He saw I was transformed and peppered me with
what seemed to me foolish questions about the “afterlife” and such things. I
was in the breeze and was indifferent to his questions, not even sure I
understood them. But whenever I attempted to respond to my friend, Jake, I
strangely could not get past two words before I had lost him. “What?" he
would ask, growing irritated. “What is it you’re saying?” My words were not
complex. In fact, they were unadorned and simple. But there seemed to be
no longer a "wavelength” or what some might call a culturally-given set of
mutual understandings. He could not hear me because I had leapt through
the enclosing (w)rap of mutual understandings which give words meaning.

291

Though I cannot conceptualize my experience satisfactorily, it was the
experience, a s Suzuki says above, which matters. My “whole being” had
“come forward,” not just my narrational consciousness. In that sense, the
experience w as transcendent, but, a s Suzuki cautions:
There is in every one of us, though varied in depth and strength, an
eternal longing for “something” which transcends a world of
inequalities. . . . “To transcend” suggests “going beyond,” “being away
from,” that is, a separation, a dualism. I have, however, no desire to
hint that the “something” stands away from the world in which we find
ourselves, (p. 179)
My experience w as transcendent into the world—which h as never
been a s real again—not beyond it. It was, I think, a condensed satori, in
which a pattern usually taking years w as followed. Suzuki notes that
anybody, modern a s well a s ancient, knows very well that there is a
certain critical moment in his life when he is about to start his arduous
career of spiritual turmoil. When he faces this moment and goes on
struggling for som e years, he finds himself in a peculiar state of
mentality, which borders on an utter feeling of despondency. He is
sinking lower and lower, yet he knows no way to stop it or recover
himself from it. The feeling has various degrees of intensity according
to different temperaments. From the point of view of satori experience
this is a good sign showing that the mind is prepared to turn away from
its old way, that is, from its outward way of seeing things, (p. 192)
I certainly went "to hell” before going “to heaven.” In my case,
however, "heir w as also awaiting soon after “heaven." As the sleepiness of
consciousness returned I found I had no conceptual m eans to explain my
unexpected experience. It was, I suppose, the end of innocence for me. I
spent the next years in a kind of madness, seeking a way to incorporate my
“mystical participation" into my self-schema. I changed my major to

292

philosophy (which only added questions) and—as though daily
consciousness were avenging itself—I began to think my way into the
ground. I did not party and even lost interest in Lainie, my supportative
girlfriend, though I did sneak some time for questions with Setsuko. I could
no longer sleep at nights as my thoughts ground on, seemingly with a life of
their own. No one I attempted to turn to had anything for me but dismissal.
Now, looking back, I can see my hillock enlightenment in a more Zenlike fashion a s “nothing special.” I no longer pour over Eastern philosophy
for “answers," or even seek answers within our wordworlds. Yet, my
experience seem ed important to narrate because it is phenomenologically
real and it explains both my faith in an extra-linguistic reality and the drawing
power of a concept such as anima mundi. L6vy-Bruhl’s participation
mystique, Kristeva’s (1989) “one differentiated,” and Hillman’s soul-making

all seem to refer to the project of re-awakening to the world as I have known
it, both as one and as many. In a hermeneutic project on archetypal memory,
I could not betray my own experience in a world of living images by denying
it, and thus giving all power to the concretizing of conceptualizations.

§Self D eceptions. Many of us, I fear, drown in our language-worlds.
Teachers, students, and administrators in educational discourse
communities are especially prey to such subjugating subjectification. Is
complacency any wonder? Explanation, fact, and knowledge are thought to
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be true now and always. Cultural assumption is what shapes the subject
who sh ap es her memories. And facts become just that: recorded data, inert
ideas, memories impaled.
Myths and gossip forever change form and content in the telling, and
memories retain vitality only a s long a s they do, too. Language need not
impale the imagination unless we live in databanks. Imagination, according
to Bachelard (1987), needs language to find its form and “boast” its will:
How unjust is the criticism which se e s nothing in language but an
ossification of internal experience! Just the contrary: language is
always somewhat ahead of our thoughts, somewhat more seething
than our love. It is the beautiful function of human rashness, the
dynamic boast of the will.. . . The will must imagine too much in order
to realize enough, (p. 30)
Any writer (even this one) knows the experience of struggling to keep
up with his words. Yet, words, too, can remain only socially functional within
a socially functional self, f cannot recall my origin or se e ahead to my
demise. / exist like an electrical instant between dual poles of
incomprehension. The language of this self kills reverie and imagination,
perhaps why som e artists cannot bear to have their biographies imprinted.
Language which dances away from precise literalism seek s a deeper
harmony. It is the harmony of tension between opposites: but that tension
must be modulated to produce harmony. The transparent self which
imaginatively speaks is not a product of one line of self-ish memory but is
instead present in the absence between speaker and listener (even
imagined listener). Poetic speech is also attentive listening, and may even
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give a trace of substance to the listener. The speaker is the listener and by
being so finds the altar of transmutation, especially when transforming the
voices of one’s past. Anthropologists Langness and Frank (1981) note that
a striking feature is autobiography’s transformative power. Through
this medium, people who exist somehow on the margins of
mainstream America and its values have shaped self-images of their
own design. Among these, blacks, pacifists, women, expatriates,
homosexuals, artists, political dissidents, and others have described
their own feelings, actions, ideas, desires, relationships, aspirations,
and efforts to survive—in their own w o rd s.. . . Autobiography, at its
very core, is a process of self-creation. When autobiographers are
conscious of this process, they can use its power in the struggle for
personal freedom. For the autobiographer, and for readers influenced
by published examples of people claiming the right to define
themselves, autobiography can be a revolutionary act. (p. 93)
Autobiography may be revolutionary, or it may be enconceptualating.
A literal chronicle of my life would serve little purpose here, other than to
concretize my identity. “I didn’t know why a replicant would collect
photographs,” asks Deckard, the Blade Runner, wondering about androids
who have come to realize their “pasts” had been implanted into them.
“Maybe they needed memories” (Scott, 1982). As we hunger for totalized
identities, we wish to grasp and imprint the past. Lifewriting which re-collects
unchanging facts can only seek to record, not transmute. Literary lifewriting
expresses all the phenomena of this life, including its fantasies and dreads,
its dream s and deceptions, its psychedelic awakenings. Am I not lifewriting
right now? Am I not lying to declare these words before you as true?
The most eloquent representation of Hermes is probably the bust with
two faces: one is turned toward humans, the other toward the Gods,
thus symbolizing the dual meaning of all reality, the double meaning
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of all speech. The wisdom of a myth that makes Hermes the patron
saint of liars as well a s the God of communication is apparent,
suggesting that communication and lying are part of the sam e
archetype. (Paris, 1990, p. 62)
L6pez-Pedraza and Paris indicate the hermetic quality of creative
discourse—not in the sense of hermetic enclosure but in the sense of
alchemical transmutation or the hermeneutic imagination (Smith, 1991). I
write or speak in this vein to escape the enclosure of my social subjectivity to
imagine toward a kind of listening: The speaking which results is a mimicry
of the voices of the Muses, the daughters of Mnemosyne (the goddess,
Memory), who “sometimes tell the truth, sometimes lie" (Hesiod). But this,
too, is dichotomized as either/or. The intuitive act is more enigmatic, as
Herakleitos understood: "The lord whose oracle is a t Delphi neither speaks
nor conceals, but indicates” (Frag. 93. Freeman, p. 31).

But how can I write without a sense of self from which to write? How
can / indicate unless I tell the truth of myself, my past? Once that self is seen
from the narrative position—as part of the hermeneutic circle—existing only
as I tell it in the present, it becomes understood that there is no pre-existent
self to be true to. Lejeune (1989) expresses the quandary of the
autobiographer:
I believe that when I say “I," it is I who am speaking: I believe in the
Holy Ghost of the first person. And who doesn’t believe in it? But of
course it also happens that I believe the contrary, or at least claim to
believe it.. . . In the field of the subject, there is no referent. To a lesser
degree, and more candidly, many autobiographers have outlined
analogous strategies. We indeed know all this; we are not so dumb,
but, once this precaution has been taken, we go on a s if we did not
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know it. Telling the truth about the self, constituting the self as com
plete subject—it is a fantasy. In spite of the fact that autobiography is
impossible, this in no way prevents it from existing, (pp. 131,132)
I imagine this writing to be through myself. The self I have represented
as being me emerged seduced by the senses and soon became an "entity”
fleeing in terror from the bliss of non-being. Over and against Other, this self
becomes a being inscribed in negativity. An awakening to a participation
mystique with the living dream of nature only returned me to a self hating its

own narrative barriers. I imagined my quest a s a linear journey into
meaning, but now feel it as meaningless concentric circles around an empty
centre. I, like any self, cannot remember anything before my own existence.
However: “Paradoxically, in this land of forgetting there is also a
remembering (which does not re-member),” as Taylor (1987, p. 168)
enigmatically writes.
It may be my remembered memory is a fantasy and only a wish for the
womb and/or the tomb, as Kristeva suggests. It may be my hours of
transcendence, though actual, have brain chemistry explanations. Life need
not be meaningful. And yet, if it is accepted as such, why do I (and others like
Kristeva and Beckett) wish to write that “meaninglessness”? Does the selfforgetfulness involved in writing toward the absent listener create meaning
for the "listeners in the snow"? Perhaps the selves in flight from “death" on
the march of progress can deconstruct their memories in symbolic
lifewriting—to reveal the despair of our lost souls.
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Carrin Dunne (1988) agrees that memory folds around a sense of
irretrievable loss. She suggests that memory first began in our early
ancestors a s they mourned departed loved ones. The charged coils of
tension in the “creative furor” she equates with the “passions of the soul”:
Without mourning there would be no self-awareness; the act of
mourning is the replication of the whole self upon itself. . . . The
original folding back or mourning can be construed as an instinctive
reaction to pain for which there are many analogies on the physical
plane: a wincing, flinching, contracting or recoiling from hurt. The
recoil of the organism has its counterpart in a recoil of the soul. An
unforeseen effect of recoil is an intensification or concentration of soul,
a beginning of convergence toward a center. In contrast with scientific
knowing which by cutting, splitting and distinguishing achieves
distance and detachment—a “cool” mode of knowing—the awareness
which comes to pass through mourning has to be characterized as
“hot,” a building up of energy through infolding, a birth of what has
been known classically as the passions of the soul. (p. 114)

§Labyrinths. So, at last, the title of my tale comes back to me. If
life—natural life—has a shape, it must be imagined. But, imaginatively, that
shape is spiral: as in a power-coil or the double helix of the DNA. We act and
create a past in expanding ripples from an empty centre. We cannot recall
such an “empty centre,” of course, since it is not a part of memories (and self),
r

but in moments of deep nameless yearning, or Heidegger’s anxiety, we may
recoil from our natural unfolding to an infolding — that "remembering (which
does not re-member).”

To reveal this absolute paradox within lifewriting, a story may be
appropriate. Some of the ancestors of this mongrel soul told the tale of the

298

three Norns who guided the destiny of humankind toward its miraculous end
by nurturing and caring for Yggdrasil, the Nordic Tree of Life. It is their love
which makes the tree spread its foliage into unknown regions. But, as a
natural metaphor, this tree has its roots down a s deep a s it is tall, deep into
chthonic regions of the uncreated. Here the Dread Biter gnaws at the roots
and is as much on the verge of destroying Yggdrasil a s the Norns are of
furthering its growth. Dunne continues the story:
The Norns give us a hint of the heaven of memory. There is also a hell
counter-pointing their heaven, and figured by the Dread Biter. That
memory can vacillate between such opposites has to do with the fact
that at the center of human reality, indeed of all reality, is a no-thing,
which I have called the empty place in the heart. The empty center
may give rise to the most exalted religious reverence—as witnessed
by the relationship to the Void (sunyata) in Buddhism or to the Debir,
the Holy of Holies in which stood an empty throne, in Judaism —or it
may inspire unmitigated terror and horror. We may se e the Tree [of
life] as being gradually healed and transfigured through the
ministrations of the Norns, or a s being slowly but surely undermined
by the Dread Biter’s continual gnawing at its roots, (p. 122)
Dunne seem s bold in her pronouncements about reality’s centre, but I
feel confident in saying that I, too, know nothing. The tree of memory is also
the tree of imagination, and imagination’s verdant foliage can only spread as
far into the abyss a s deep a s memory has spread its roots into it. Ch’iu-ti Liu
expresses this image in “A Tree that Travels with its Roots” (1992):
Separation is pregnant with connections.
Trees are parted by the wind,
and ye t parts o f the wind—but Listen!
Your breath touches ten thousand plants,
that measure the sky with their own stalks.
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You embrace them into a chorus of the Whole:
they belong to your songs, as your songs belong to them.
The same way shall you embrace your own roots.
In your memory of swamps trembling with algae,
you will teach your roots to walk into a tre e ...
O Tree, O Tree, I see in you ten thousand trees,
and you stretch into a landscape.
You who is at home in his travelling.
You: my first and last
IMAGINATION.

(original emphasis)
Imagination may be suppressed in the name of “reality” and emerge
only morbidly or pathologically, or it may be employed—with remembering—
to guide us to the thresholds of our stories. By imaginative lifewriting—
toward the silence which listens—or by sharing our stories and visions in an

atmosphere of Norn-like care, we may imagine the Tree of Life to be
flourishing, the palaces of the imagination to be expanding the life-space in
which we commune.
Imagination, however, is not just the brave trunk and the verdant
foliage. Such imagination disappears like whimsy—without a ripple.
Imagination directed down—backwards, if you will—discovers the roots and
nurtures their descent. Instead of the Dread Biter mangling the roots of
Yggdrasil, it is conceivable that we may take some of the Norn love with us

and nurture their re-membering. Remembering goes against the uncoiling of
nature and so brings with it anxiety and dread (but not the “terror and horror”
of denial). Remembering beyond our personal histories requires active
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imagination, but imagination cannot exceed itself, cannot create its own
archetypes: “Every psychic process is an image and an ‘imagining’,
otherwise no consciousness could exist...” (Jung, CW11§889). Even the
primordial images of "collective” memory are limited by their mode of
representation—the empirical world of our sen ses (though there may be non
represented, intuitional feelings of the “sixth” sense) We may re-member the
roots, or we may re-collect the debris in the rootcellar of our palace (choose
your metaphor), but we cannot imagine or remember nothing.
Yet, this recoil suggests a (painful) return of self-consciousness from
the outer rim of the spiralling of time. Dunne suggests that a sort of
archetypal remembering—an imaginative reverie or epistrophe—has its
source, here and now, in that centre which is everywhere. Archetypal

remembering, creative action toward, or listening in the silence is not a
choice of self-consciousness but a need of the soul to “se e through” selfconsciousness. Archetypal remembering seem s not to concretize the self but
to drain it of its refrains and colours and its semblance of substantiality: A
certain anxiety seem s to be unavoidable!
Forgetting the self but using its materia prim a—alchemy’s “earthy
materials” (Grinnell, 1973/89)—the imaginative autobiographer (or any
seeking soul) allows the unnameable to glimpse itself. In this sense,
lifewriting is the fount of all literature. Its purpose is not to recollect and
“harden” the self, but to “forget” the self and begin a strange journey in an
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archetypal wilderland. As Mircea Eliade (1977/92) expresses this threshold:
“A strange amnesia, full of surprises—for in the void left by forgetting, all sorts
of unreal personages creep in and incomprehensible events take shape” (p.
2 1 ).

What journey is this that partakes of both the coil of time and the recoil
of memory? It can only be that age-old “pathless path” first ventured upon by
those sham ans who dreamt while aw ake—The Labyrinth:
Since the Labyrinth pattern describes a certain combination of two
opposing spirals (one centripetal and one centrifugal), in general the
symbol represents a relationship between involution and evolution.
The myth manifests a principle of exclusion and selection. (Conty,
1992, p. 5)
The labyrinthine journey of the soul through time is here represented
by Patrick Conty as the maze where creative memory opposes (yet finally
augments?) synchronicity with nature. Conty continues, however, not
satisfied with that image of the quest for awareness: “But is that not a
prevalent theme that we can find in most myths? This sort of interpretation
obtained from above does not answer the underlying question: what is
there?"

What is there? In the centre of the labyrinth? Outside of it? Why,
nothing. I am not going to suggest that the potential self who listens—forever
deferred—somehow hints at a kind of “eternal life.” All I know is the journey
through time, but “Only through time time is conquered," as Eliot (1944, p. 16)
oracles in Four Quartets.
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"Conquered” may have suggestions of self as self-conquistador, but
this “nothing” is just that: there’s nothing there to conquer! The question is as
meaningless as when we ask "cosmologists” what is outside or what was
before the universe. All there is is space-time; and I would add that our
knowing even this is because of our dwelling in the aforementioned “palaces
of the imagination," which exist in "the only space available.”
This is, course, one of the abstractions of Eliot’s Four Quartets: In our
journey through time, we may find a centre of timelessness. 1 By maintaining
a trace (or thread) of self-awareness, I enter the labyrinth to seek the nothing
from which I was first expelled. Using the unique jewels and les fleurs du
mat of my own life experience—and the microversals of time—that nothing

uses me for “its" awareness:
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive we started
And know the place for the first time. (p. 59)

This is a return/recoil: Yes, of course! But our crazy trail back has left
its wondrous music and shapeshifting. We followed our Muses and heard
the cries and whispers because we cared. We cared from our empty core.
To care in this way is to “forget the self" and allow the empty place in the
heart to speak. To listen in this way seem s to me to be an act of love, and
just as replete with uncertainty. Our labyrinthine journey may bring back to
i Compare Heidegger’s (1968) transformative path: “a circular
happening through which what lies in the circle becomes exposed” (p. 18).
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the void the unique, once-in-a-lifetime bargain-basement deal of a life—this
life: the materia prima through which the Unnameable listens: “The very act
of listening initiates communion with other living things. My own hunch is
that some such patient listening gave birth to human language, to music and
poetry, to vision and to joy” (Dunne, p. 122).
So lifewriting in my life and in my classes has meant more than a mere
recounting, as though some psychoanalytic truth were awaiting discovery.
Oh, such recounting may have its place, especially for those complacent or
youthful selves who have never yet realized their stories. But others are
ready to permeate the ego and expand the palace of the imagination in
which they dream a life.
in my story, I feel that sense of self often shimmer and I await the
fantasies, ruminescences, and dreads which will certainly inundate. I seek
solitude at such times, but it would not be honest to say I was alone. As Mary
Doll has expressed: “Objects, images, mirages, dreams, hallucinations,
ghosts, voices—these mantic speakings come from the soul. In order for
their prophetic voices to acquire meaning, however, the viewer must let go
habituated patterns of perceiving” (p. 14). If I am alone, I am alone with the
ancient myths, the archetypal presences, which are the shape of imagination.
This before you, I submit, is lifewriting—more fantasy than fact, no
doubt. Yet it is such written fantasy which I am suggesting deepens and
nourishes life by connecting us to the epistrophe of archetypal memory.
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Imagining or remembering within concentric circles suggests it makes
no difference whether it is directed forward or backward, up or down, outer or
inner. To avoid building castles in the sky instead of grounded palaces of the
imagination, however, it seem s to me profoundly more important to
understand imagining as a kind of remembering than remembering as a kind
of imagining. In this way, we will not forget our primordial roots:
Considered a s a dynamic image, the root assumes the most diverse
powers. It is both a sustaining force and a terebrant force. At the
border of two worlds, the air and the earth, the image of the root is
animated paradoxically in two directions, depending on whether we
dream of a root bearing to heaven the juices of the earth, or of a root
going to work among the dead, for the d e a d .. . . (Bachelard, p. 84)
By remembering to the edge of our wordworlds, to the abyss
“Wherefrom words turn back,/Together with the mind not having attained...”
(Tattiriya Upanishad 2.9, in Campbell, 1968, p. 6) there is the possibility of

bringing some life-energy to the seam between two worlds (only one of
which can be said to exist). That trace to which the artist of a life is drawn is
what I have flamboyantly called an “ectoplasmic listener.” The term suggests
both the deferment of actual presence and the cessation of resistance to the
“pure serene of memory” which becomes without content. Dunne opens out
the implications: “If we equate the lowering of resistance to the process of
remembering, then what we remember is not only the past but all of time
(past, present, and future), not only time but also eternity” (p. 116).
Dunne suggests above that eternity itself may be remembered, much
like the bliss—later called death—which I, however, cannot. Lifewriting is
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worthwhile indeed if such remembering is possible! Can the listening trace
transcend life? The paradoxes only multiply when attempts are made to
encom pass the "circumference which is nowhere.” Eternity is already
forgotten.

Perhaps D. H. Lawrence, a writer from his life's obsessions, expresses
the paradox best by describing my self-revenant as “The Ship of Death”
(1932):
We are dying, we are dying, so all we can do
is now to be willing to die, and to build the ship
of death to carry the soul on the longest journey.
There is no port, there is nowhere to go
only the deepening blackness darkening still
biacker upon the soundless, ungurgling flood
darkness at one with darkness, up and down
and sideways utterly dark, so there is no direction any more.
and the little ship is there; yet she is gone.
She is not seen, for there is nothing to see her by.
She is gone! gone! and yet
somewhere she is there.
Nowhere!

The labyrinth contains and is contained by this “nowhere.” Do I enter it
to rediscover tim elessness then return into time, or do I journey in creating
time, only to return to tim elessness? You, the listener, must tell me your

version. It is only between us that the thread can be unwound as I disappear
into self-forgetfulness. And it is only with you on the other end that I can ever
hope to return to myself again: for the first time, of course.

Chapter 6: Coda

through spiral upon spiral of the shell of memory that yet connects us

(H.D., “The Flowering of the Rod,” Casey, 1987b, p. /*)
We must lay in waiting for ourselves. Throughout our lives.
Abandoning the pretense that we know.
(William F. Pinar, Toward a Poor Curriculum, p. viii)

§Memory, Myth, and Methods. To conclude this exploration into
memory, I feel impelled to describe how I apply this work in my limited
experience with classes in autobiography. Vital to any approach to
autobiography as a curricular method is the understanding of memory and
directly related to memory, perhaps to the point of identity, is the sense of
self. My own work has thus far been with undergraduate education students
so has been limited by the large class size and by the lack of professional
experience.
To invoke within my students the sense of seeking for memory with as
few preconceptions as possible I have employed unusual approaches, both
in writing assignments and in classroom conversation. For dialogue, I have
been inspired by the work of Haroutunian-Gordon (1991) and my fee/for
listening has come from the suggestions of Felman (1982) and Dunne
(1988). Learning to imagine myself as a needed listening spirit—an
ectoplasmic listener—seem s to have ecouraged students to reflect deeply
and speak freely, and to limit my vocal suggestions.
306
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For methods, my debt is mainly to Richard Butt who inspired me in his
own class and whose methods have been described elsewhere (Butt, 1990;
Butt, Raymond, Yamagishi, 1988). But I have freely adapted methods
suggested by my own imagination and the work of recent psychoanalysis,
especially that of Mary Watkins (1976, 1990).
Early work in autobiography in curriculum openly acknowledged its
debt to psychoanalysis. Grumet in the mid-seventies saw “currere as an
application of ego psychology” and explained that she and Pinar were
“looking at the contributions of both consciousness and the unconscious to
the structures of the ego" (1976a, p. 113). The terminology is frankly
psychoanalytic, but such terms as “ego” and “unconscious” have become a
part of the public lexicon. Grumet (1976a) understood that the
theory and practice of psychoanalysis may also be viewed as a
double metaphor. It is a discipline that combines the specificity and
symbolic ambiguity of literature with the generalities and recurring
patterns of the social sciences. It is a bridge between the arts and the
sciences and offers us an approach and a vocabulary that allows us to
speak of human development in both its general and most individual
aspects. Its theory, from its earliest to its most recent formulations, is
concerned with polarities, its practice rooted in dialogue, (p. 112)
Though she goes on to enunciate her own “metaphorical"
psychoanalytic approach superseding many of the basic conceptions of
Freud, Grumet continues his basic dialogic format and the concern with
mediating opposites (or polarities). Freud, however, w as concerned with
cure or at least with control—sometimes his own—and Grumet, at least in this
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essay, seem s to emphasize developmental mediation, if not outright
liberation.
The basic conflict of the human psyche was early called by Freud
(1900/65) that between the ego and the libido, the latter of which was
considered the cause of anxiety and dangerous to civilized life. Later Freud
saw the ego as a mediator between the id and the social conscience of the
superego. The id, at least in the popular imagination, became raw
instinct—Lacan’s real— and thus a threat.
One of Freud’s major theses was that neurosis is the result of
repression of instinct without sublimation into some other activity, yet he
seemed often to agree with the above libelling of the id, especially in his
understanding of the social role of education:
Let us make ourselves clear a s to what the first task of education is:
The child must learn to control his instincts. It is impossible to give him
liberty to carry out all his impulses without restriction.. . . Accordingly,
education must inhibit, forbid and suppress and this is abundantly
seen in all periods of history. But we have learnt from analysis that
precisely this suppression of instincts involves the risk of neurotic
illness.. . . Thus education has to find its way between the Scylla of
non-interference and the Charybdis of frustration.. . . An optimum must
be discovered which will enable education to achieve the most and
damage the le ast.. . . A moment’s reflection tells us that hitherto
education has failed its task very badly and has done children great
damage, (quoted in Feiman, 1982, p. 24. Felman’s italics)
According to the orthodox view, then, the id or the instincts must be
held in check in order to attend to our scholastic duties. Surely everyone
who has been a student or holds any institutional position has experienced
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this conflict, and the successful do seem to be those who “inhibit, forbid and
suppress.”
I take this as the starting point of the first writing assignment for my
students. I am not concerned with the most recent research or the
metaphysical validity of the ego and the id, but I am concerned that, by
Freud’s definition, the ego is the only complex which has a voice (1900/65).
It has derived its vocabulary from the outside in, or, to put it another way, from
the superego or conscience. Often when we talk to ourselves in an
encouraging or reprimanding way, we reunite ego with its source and speak
to our recalcitrant or wayward inner being in the second person. Somewhat
playfully, then, I assign a dialogue for them to write “between the ego and the
id,” the id being given the nominative “I” as well as the ego or superego.
Even more playfully, I remind them of the old cartoons where a little demon
with the cartoon character’s face stands on one shoulder of the bewildered
animated animal and incites, “Do it!” Simultaneously, the other shoulder is
occupied by an angelic being with a similar face cautioning, “No, don’t:
Never, never!”
It’s an assignment hardly fair to the complexities of Freud, but, for me,
its seeming frivolity hides the fact that students in a classroom tend to speak
as students in a classroom—very conscious of who and where they are and
speaking primarily with the ego’s approval-seeking voice. The assignment
brings upon them the necessity for the repressed “other” in them to speak,
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even if they insist on the weakness, foolishness, appetition, or nihilism of that
other, t encourage a stance which is fair to the id by reminding them that the
id is a powerful energy-source so it is not being deployed in the wish to sleep
through class. “The id," I tell them, “represents your earliest yearnings, your
most powerful wishes; it is not concerned with order or propriety.”
Some would see this as the Dionysian opposing the Apollonian, and
this is certainly a functional perspective. Dionysos is the god of masks,
including the masks of students, and it seem s to me necessary for the
students to loosen the bindings on their student-masks for other potentials to
emerge. Grumet does not go so far in her recommendations, but she
intimates that the id is more than bestial instincts by generalizing it a s the
“internal nonego," or unconscious (1976a). The id, for me, is a usable
concept to open the doors of memory and aw areness and its name is left for
others to debate. My class is not an attempt to unleash libido or open the
storm cellar of the unconscious, but perhaps it may be said that I encourage
students to remember primal wishes so they may be closer to the well of life.
The classroom itself provides enough inhibitions that nothing
monstrous arises from the “demon on the shoulder" (so far). It is a successful
assignment if a student perceives that her daydreams (as well as her night
dreams) are manifestations of repressed or postponed wishes. This is basic
Freudianism, but my purpose is for the student to remember herself, a s a
perspective from which to continue our lifewriting.
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Freud may wish to continue educational repression and Brown (1959,
1966) may wish for the unrepressed, desublimated classroom, but I am in
agreement with Grumet that the teacher in an autobiographical classroom
need neither be oppressor nor erotic accomplice.
Though the term currere (Pinar, 1974; Pinar, Grumet, 1976) is no
longer in use by Grumet, Pinar continues to use it for the continuous process
of deconstruction and reconstruction an architect of self must go through
(1992b). Grumet (1976a) used currere to define her positioning of the
teacher as “respondent” and not as analyst, which indicates her belief that
autobiography and journal-keeping are self-developmental processes and
not conceptual inundations or libidinal parades. Freud, however, saw
himself in possession of the truths of the human mind and insisted his
patients recognize this (Freud, 1963). They were required to accept his
conceptual inundation and to understand him in the position of “the subject
who knows.”
Shoshana Felman (1982), a previous student of the late neoFreudian, Jacques Lacan, reports that Lacan felt that it is the placing of
oneself in the transcendent position of “one who knows" which brings about
the transference or projection phenomena:
“As soon as there is somewhere a subject presumed to know, there is
transference,” writes Lacan (S-XI, 210).
Since “transference is the acting out of the reality of the
unconscious” (S-XI, 150), teaching is not a purely cognitive,
informative experience, it is also an emotional, erotical experience. “I
deemed it necessary,” insists Lacan, “to support the idea of
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transference, as indistinguishable from love, with the formula of the
subject presumed to know. I cannot fail to underline the new
resonance with which this notion of knowledge is endowed. The
person in whom I presume knowledge to exist, thereby acquires my
love.” (S-XX, 64) (Lacan is quoted from S-XI, 210: Le S&minaire, livre
XI: Les Quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse, Paris:
Seuil, 1973, p. 210. S-XI, 150, and S-XX, 64: Le Seminaire, livre XX.
Encore, Paris: Seuil, 1975, p. 64. In Felman, 1982, p. 35)
Yet all our lives we have encountered teachers who were self
presented as “subjects presumed to know.” Of those, the ones remembered
most deeply have been as the result of a powerful projection or interchange
of emotion. They may have been very bad teachers indeed, and the reason
for their memory is the bitter disgust left behind at their pretensions. This
leads me to my second writing assignment: ‘Teachers Who Left Their Mark:
The Good, the Bad, and the Indifferent.”
Having given voice to the other within my students in assignment one,
I now attempt to engage their memories on significant others from the
pedagogical realm, so they may reconceive their modelling behaviors or
their aversion to a particular person from their past who strongly affected the
way they think and feel as learners and as people. The teacher need not
have been positive and need not have been encountered within the
institutions of education. I suppose my outlook is still Freudian here in that I
wish for my writers to re-cognize some of the persons internalized in them as
complexes. My outlook may also be seen a s Lacanian in that I hope they will
penetrate their opaque projections and discover their teaching model is also
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an uncertain learner like themselves, or that the brand-X teacher made
himself into one by his insistence on the finality of his knowledge.
My class would also be well into keeping journals by now to which I
respond privately and individually. They would be hearing stories and
opinions from each other in classroom dialogue and getting to know one
another somewhat. Some students resist encountering the “other’1of their
repressed self. Others resist encountering the formative “others" of the
outside world who have been introjected into complexes—guides or
shadows—within them. At the point where ideas are exchanged in class, still
others reject as unacceptably “other” the voice and opinions of fellow class
members. At this point I turn to C. G. Jung to understand this refusal of the
right of voice in others:
The present day shows with appalling clarity how little able people are
to let the other man’s argument count, although this capacity is a
fundamental and indispensable condition for any human community.
Everyone who proposes to come to terms with himself must reckon
with this basic problem. For, to the degree that he does not admit the
validity of the other person, he denies the “other" within himself the
right to exist—and vice versa. The capacity for inner dialogue is a
touchstone for outer objectivity. (1971, p. 297)
My third writing assignment is “Turning-Points: Autobiographical
Traces,”1 when I ask the students to pick a duration of time from their pasts,
long or short, and describe how they underwent a change of perspective in
that period. This change may have been brought about involuntarily—
i| take the term “autobiographical trace” from a 1991 summer workshop
with Professors J. Daignault and W. F. Pinar.
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something happened to them —or they may have quietly seen through a
deception, or made a decisive move toward a new destination, or simply
evaporated some long-standing necessity. Many students say they cannot
think of any time that things changed, but others freely survey the past
ignoring no joy and fearing no pain.
I insist that historicity is of no concern to us here. I tell them that it is
better to let the memory come to them than to simply pull it from the file and
recite it. This step is very similar to the first step advanced by Pinar in the
currere method, where he suggests employing the Freudian method of free-

association to let the memory speak: “The first step of the method of currere
is the regressive, the free associative remembrance of the past. We work to
excavate the present by focusing on the past, work to get underneath my
everyday interpretation of what I experience and enter experience more
deeply” (Pinar, ix. Pinar & Grumet, 1976).
The well of the past—memory—is very deep and leads to the most
philosophical part of educational autobiography, so I will consider that
covered by the previous chapters. It may be enough to note that only Freud
insisted on the facts, that for Jung and for Grumet, the past is shrouded in a
halo of fantasy presently projected and it is in such guise that it returns and
directly participates in the present moment. Grumet (1976a) explains:
In order to com pensate for this tendency to judge one’s own behavior
and to couch those judgments in absolutes, currere encourages an
"as if” orientation that regards autobiography ... neither a s pure fiction
nor as pure truth. The autobiographical story stands somewhere
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between personal myths and personal fictions. The myth is the story
that permeates a culture, a tradition, a family, a school. We take it up
and live it without realizing that the story persists only because we
have chosen to tell it. If the myth comes to us from without, our fictions
come from within; we are conscious of their creation and of ourselves
as their source. Every autobiography is both someone else’s story
and our own. We reread our own stories to find the mythic-fictive
threads that we have woven through them. By making our students
aware that their self-representations are not factual, absolute
renderings of what really happened, we hope that our students will
assume a more permissive and relativistic form of minding, making it
possible to review an event or action in one’s life history without at the
same repudiating it or affirming it. Our focus is the present, the
storyteller’s view of the world and of himself as revealed in his story,
rather than the actual event, (pp. 134, 135)
With this view of autobiography as the understanding of the “mythicfictive threads’’ of memory, we have gone beyond Freud in his insistence on
ferreting out “the truth according to Freud” to Lacan (1977) who seems to
consider knowledge forever incomplete. We have gone into the structure of
story-making and seen the face of other possibilities: Jung’s inner
complexes, the “others" of the anima or animus, the shadow, and the
archetypes of the collective unconscious emerge as mythic beings in their
own right with the potential for delusion or dialogue.
In other words, if I lean more toward the mythic/fictive and provoke
imagination into action, I have called up the resources of the most creative of
the post-Jungian schools, archetypal psychology (chapter 4). Archetypal
psychology considers the creative imagination to be the principle of life in the
active instant. Archetypal memory evokes figures who are imagined as
beings which guide the imagination into seemingly timeless forms and
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relations. The basis for its psychoanalysis is not science, but poetry and the
arts, and mythology:
The major move of archetypal psychology is that it places itself in a
poetic tradition and essays a psychology of the imagination, a
psychology which originates neither in cerebral physiology, ego
psychology, nor behavioral analysis, but in the workings of the poetic
imagination. Archetypal psychology assum es a poetic and
mythological basis of mind. (Kugler, 1978, p. 136)
My final major writing assignment takes license from this amorphous
school and combines some of the ideas of the first three papers into a
product which is, hopefully, both imaginative and positively decentering.
Poetic memory from assignment 3 is activated, the complexes from
assignment 2 may be awakened, and the inner dialogue of assignment 1 is
re-employed. I now assign them, however, an imaginal dialogue. Using the
work of archetypal psychologists Michael Perlman (1988) and Mary Watkins
(1976, 1990), I attempt to allow themselves to sen se the many beings in their
one. This is remembering through the patterns of emotion and fantasy
already present in the individual, but now this remembering gives these
patterns identity and voice. It is what Hillman (1979a) has called epistrophe.
Perlman’s interests lie mainly in the place of the imaginal and Watkins
is concerned with giving voice to the imaginal beings we already subtly
experience. Watkins and Perlman derive the term “imaginal" from the Islamic
scholar, Henry Corbin. As Watkins (1990) explains:
Corbin rejects the word “imaginary” when referring to these
phenomena because in modern non-premeditated usage the
“imaginary” is contrasted with the “real”. . . . By using the term
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"imaginal," Corbin hopes to undercut the real-unreal distinction, and to
propose instead that the imaginal not be assessed in term s of a
narrowed conception of “reality," but a broader one which gives
credence to the reality of the imaginal. (p. 4)
In such dialogues, the “I” position is transferred to whatever characters
the person-as-narrator feels needs to be heard. It is less a making-up of
personae than a recognition that we are always already involved in
dialogues within, that we a re —a s a value, if not in fact—dialogic beings:
“Before one becom es aw are of the characters within thought and action, one
often successively identifies with them,unconsciously becoming one and
then another” (Watkins, p. 168). In intonations and private soliloquys we act
out "the abandoned child," “the jealous wife,” or “repressed Socrates.” The
method does not seek to transfer knowledge but to discover it through
dialogues, dialogues in which, a s Watkins would have it, we already engage:
Side by side and woven through our dialogues with our neighbors,
these imaginal dialogues persist. We may find ourselves speaking
with our reflection in the mirror, with the photograph of som eone we
miss, with a figure from a dream or a movie, with our dog. And even
when we are outwardly silent, within the ebb and flux of our thought,
we talk with critics, with our mothers, our god(s), our consciences;
indeed we do so just a s steadily a s we once spoke to our dolls, our
imaginary companions, the people of our painted pictures. We may
find ourselves a s audience or a s narrator to conversations among
imaginal others—others not physically present but actually
experienced nonetheless. At times we may even notice ourselves
playing more than one role in these imaginal dialogues: now child,
now old one, abandoned one. (p. 2)
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Each persona assumed, it should be noted, seem s to carry along its
own baggage into the form of narrational memories. There are such vast
seam s of wealth to be mined from such a complex weave of memories!
I have another minor writing assignment which involves fictitious
journal entries from 20 or 30 years down the line: one entry from the self they
most fear they will become, and another from the ideal self. Both describe
who they are, their place, and who surrounds them.
These, then, are the psychoanalytic traditions I consciously
apply—going from Freud, through Jung, to the mythic archetypalists. It
should be noted that I also consciously bear in mind the pedagogic
guidelines originally suggested by Butt and Pinar and Grumet.
Moving briefly into the area of my general attitude as a teacher of
autobiography, I do not think any of the three psychoanalytic areas
mentioned above convey my openness to the task at hand. I do not
psychoanalyze my students whatsoever, not in terms of childhood
repression, collective archetypes, or the inner myth. I do not pretend to be
“the subject presumed to know”—I often tell my stories, too—and in this way
usually avoid the complications of transference or of students seeking a
father-confessor. When I respond to students’ journal writings, I limit myself
to encouraging further self-seeking, but I never judge and rarely give advice.
As respondent, I am not “Father Freud,” just as Grumet has made plain:
The respondent is not attempting to modify entrenched structures of
narcissistic character disorders, nor to break down ego defenses
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formed to allay overwhelming instinctual impulses. Working with
groups of students, the respondent has neither the time nor the
training to participate in the transferences that characterize the
therapeutic relationship. (1976a, p. 140)
By not being the omniscient possessor of knowledge, I do not
therefore become an “anti-pedagogue,” trying to undo the harm of the other
curricula. I perceive myself as teaching in the manner of Socrates:
Meno: Can you tell me Socrates, if virtue can be taught? Or is

it not teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but
men possess it by nature?
Socrates: ... You must think me happy indeed if you think I
know whether virtue can be taught.. . . I am so far from knowing
whether virtue can be taught or not that I do not even have any
knowledge of what virtue itself is.
Meno: Yes, Socrates, but how do you mean that we do not
learn, but that what we call learning is recollection? Can you teach
me how this is so?
Socrates: ... Meno, you are a rascal. Here you are asking me to
give you my “teaching”, I who claim that there is no such thing as
teaching, only recollection. ( Plato, Meno. In Felman, p. 21)

Felman’s experience is that psychoanalysis and pedagogy never
have been separate discourses. They have always had mixed elements:
“As myself both a student of psychoanalysis and a teacher, I would here like
to suggest that the lesson to be learnt about pedagogy from psychoanalysis
is less that of ‘the application of psychoanalysis to pedagogy’ than that of the
implication of psychoanalysis in pedagogy and of pedagogy in

psychoanalysis" (p. 26). She goes on to explain that both Lacanian
pedagogy and Lacanian psychoanalysis proceed through a very different
temporality than the conventional linear—cumulative and progressive—
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temporality of learning, a s it has traditionally been conceived by pedagogical
theory and practice:
Proceeding not through linear progression, but through
breakthroughs, leaps, discontinuities, regressions, and deferred
action, the analytic learning-process puts indeed in question the
traditional pedagogical belief in intellectual perfectibility, the
progressistic view of learning as a simple one-way road from
ignorance to knowledge. (Felman, p. 27)
The discovery of the unconscious should have ended the fantasy of a
progression of knowledge toward some ideal end some time ago. If we are
each understood as possessing, or, better, being possessed by an
unconscious, then we each “hide” most of that which we know—though “slips
of the tongue” and dreams reveal that knowledge. In Lacan’s terms, the
unconscious is “knowledge which can’t tolerate one’s knowing that one
knows” (Lacan, Seminar, Feb. 19, 1974, unpublished. Felman, p. 28). This
seem s to imply a purposeful kind of forgetting. This is like Freud's
unconscious but with a theory of signs attached, so that we always mean
more than we say: “The discovery of the unconscious ... is that the
implications of meaning infinitely exceed the signs manipulated by the
individual” ( Lacan, S-ll, p. 150. In Felman, p. 28). Everything remembered
includes something unremembered which is unintentionally implied. This is
to say that human knowledge is untotalizable.
Ignorance in this approach is perceived as active repression “with the
imperative to forget—the imperative to exclude from consciousness, to not
admit to knowledge" ( Felman, p. 29). Recalling Socrates, then, with his
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insistence a s of learning being recollection: "Teaching, like analysis, has to
deal not so much with lack of knowledge as with resistances to knowledge”
(p. 30).
Personally, I prefer the Jungian dynamic which suggests that we,
ourselves, are splinter creations over an unconscious of inconceivable depth
to the idea of an unconscious brought into creation through the Freudian
dynamic of repression. In terms of pedagogical interaction in
autobiographical sessions, however, the ultimate theory chosen makes no
difference. In class or in therapy, Jung or Lacan likely would understand
knowledge not as a substance but a s a structural dynamic which reveals
itself in the interplay of dialogue in which each speaker says more than he
knows. As Felman puts it:
Like the analyst, the teacher, in Lacan’s eyes, cannot in turn be, alone,
a master of the knowledge which he teaches. Lacan transposes the
radicality of analytic dialogue—as a newly understood structure of
insight—into the pedagogical situation. This is not simply to say that
he encourages “exchange” and calls for students’ interventions—as
many other teachers do. Much more profoundly and radically, he
attempts to learn from the students his own knowledge, (p. 32)
In this situation, for analysts and teachers, there can be no “subject
presumed to know.” This obliterates the imperatives of the expert not in the
practical terms of the good of society or useful to further one’s career, but in
terms of Lacan’s idea of the theoretic mode of “self-subversive self-reflection”
(Felman, p. 39). I understand this to mean a sort of undercutting of the
conscious ego to the use of becoming aware of oneself through action—both
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speaking and writing—with others.
Without the rationalizing, projecting, condemning, bombastic egocentre struggling for control of any situation, one is put into a situation of
silence. I do not mean here apathetic inaction, but a silence of attuned
listening. From this listening silence one’s own voice may be heard to
speak—ironic and exposed—a s that of an “other” attempting to tune in to the
rhythms which surround it, a s interesting and alien a s all voices.
I often—and I think many of us do—become unconscious in intense
discussion as my words gush forth inspired or dwindle to a confused trickle to
be suddenly inundated by the inspired estuary of some other voice. Often
the explicit meaning of such words is lost in what seem s to me like some
primeval conjuring of unrealized forces.
The water-imagery—gushing, trickling, murmuring—seem s
appropriate for this listening speech (appropriate to both pedagogy and
psychoanalysis) as it suggests the flow and intermingling which take place
when no one is a “subject presumed to know” and everyone’s shared
ignorance is a kind of mutual teaching. This is an ideal, of course, but one, I
think, worth listening for.

§C oncluslon? It is time to look back over the twisted terrain of this essay to
see if we can discern any patterns within the labyrinth of paths which have
been followed. Vital to the project of autobiography in curriculum are several
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questions which, at this point, seem to remain questions. This chapter is
entitled “Coda" rather “Conclusion” to indicate the journey has not reached
an end, that the questions produce more questions, which will, in turn evoke
responses unique to each person’s subjective environment.
It should be clear by now that I feel one’s ontological predispositions
determine what type of information will be termed acceptable, what type of
experience will be termed real, and what type of self will be honoured a s true
or authentic. The naturalistic fallacy which presupposes that only the
objective world of sen se data be named as universally real and true has
imposed a certain value system on inappropriate areas. It is this fallacy
which wishes to know the developmental worth of explorations in memory or,
for that matter, autobiography in curriculum.
Theorists of development, however, do not study simply what is, but
what should be. Mary Watkins (1976, 1990) feels that children do not reveal
a natural process of development to researchers but only the extent to which
they have been enculturated into such processes. She recognizes only that
physiological development in general follows some pattern. “Beyond this
rudimentary level of development, however, we find that values organize the
preferred telos” (1990, p. 80). Watkins suggests not a truer ontological
predisposition but a valuing of the “imaginal" aspects of experience which
have been devalued and pathologized in our modern worldview: “The value
and power of this imaginal reality has been severely circumscribed, and at
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times castrated, by the presuppositions of the modern scientific outlook which
our developmental psychology shares" (p. 173). In her view, there are other
aspects of memory and self to value:
If we follow the lines of development I have been suggesting we find
ourselves rehearsing not for Piaget’s scientific audience, not for actual
social discourse, and not for action or a harsh [Freudian] reality, but
rath e r... for imaginal life itself—that other life where we are also
housed, clothed, cared for. That other life of dialogue also creeps into
our gestures, our turns of phrase, the very structure of our thought, just
as surely as it presents itself in our dreams and waking dreams, in art
and poetry, novels, and prayer, (p. 83)
The value of what we do in curriculum, then, may be found in our life
values themselves. If we value creativity and even pluralistic awareness, the
kind of explorative autobiographical writing which has been suggested and
portrayed throughout this paper must be taken seriously.
Taking it seriously has been one of the motivations of this paper.
Some questions remain whose answers must be at least more firmly
approached. In our narrations of the past, how much freedom do we have in
the present to change that which has gone by? I am not referring here to
misrepresentation but the power of transformation available to the “architect
of self” (Pinar, 1992b) to construct or deconstruct the memories which
constitute the self.
William Casey’s (1987b) much-cited study of memory’s “thick
autonomy’’—as found, for example, in body memory, place memory, and
commemoration—seem s to indicate a depth of memory beyond reach of the
self-who-remembers. “In depicting memory as autonomous in this
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immersionist mode, we court the danger of losing ourselves in our own
description, our sense of intact self-identity may dissolve” (p. 289). Casey
seem s to backtrack from this position to claim a “bi-directionality” (p. 291) for
memory. He cites Lacan’s aphorism “what I shall have been for what I am in
the process of becoming" to claim autonomy also for the self: “I am free to
reconstruct and reconstrue what I have experienced: there is no set script for
my life as I elect to remember if (p. 291).
Whitehead (1978) makes explicit reference to this bi-directionality of
freedom in his metaphysics of unfolding occasions and denies the possibility
of complete freedom in the present over the past and thus the future: “But
there is no such fact as absolute freedom; every actual entity possesses only
such freedom as is inherent in the primary phase ‘given’ by its standpoint of
relativity to its actual universe. Freedom, givenness, potentiality, are notions
which presuppose each other and limit each other” (133). According to
Whitehead, we are inexorably involved with the past, although the past is
“creative” in that its near-infinite objective occasions can be brought together
into the process of a present concrescence—and each objective occasion
still contains the memory of its own creative concrescence. Casey’s freedom
“to reconstruct and reconstrue” is limited by both efficient causation and the
telos of the eternal objects. How free are we to “create” the past?

This sounds like the type of narrative freedom claimed by some
cognitive psychologists such as Bruner (1987) and which seem s to be
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implicit in the "collaborative autobiography” approach of Butt, Raymond, and
Yamagishi (1988), Butt and Raymond (1989), and Butt, Townsend, and
Raymond (1990). Memorial freedom may also be implied in the work of
Grumet (1991), not to seek greater facticity but “in order to diminish
coherence and the ideologies that accompany stories” (p. 108). Presumably,
while Butt et al. seek the freedom for teachers to interpret their memories in a
manner which enriches and improves their professional lives, Grumet seeks
such freedom to find an openness and receptivity in self-creation similar to
that described above by Watkins (1991) as “that other life ... of art and poetry,
novels, and prayer” (p. 83). And, one might add, political awakening.
Pinar’s (1992b) “architect of self” concept is more complex, involving
as it does both construction and deconstruction: “Only via deconstruction
can a reformulation of self begin” (p. 395). He remains somewhat murky,
however, on just what such deconstruction implies. It seem s more often than
not to be a psychoanalytic project which takes apart the pieces of self—as
found in memories, for example—to examine them in isolation and put them
back together in a less enclosed, schematized, and self-deluding manner. In
this, he sometimes seem s to consider his architectural deconstruction to be a
teardown meant especially for certain types, such as “the inflated ego of the
(often male) corporate personality” (p. 395).
The “reformulation of self”—despite our schematized delusions of a
solid, unitary self extending into the future—is precisely what is always
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occurring, according to ideas involved in Bergson’s duration, Whitehead’s
process, and the more recent formulations of an intersubjective self. Kirby
(1991) indicates the self is always in the process of self-narration, and can
never be complete. As indicated, Hillman portrays the self and its enclosing
memories to be a mask which must “seen through” to “face the gods" and
cure our narcissism (1980, 1989b).
Krell (1990), as a post-structuralist, feels that the self to which we
adhere is always deferred, or absent. It is that which we are “on the verge” of
becoming, or remembering, but never can, just as the present itself is
deferred. Deconstruction, for Krell, is the discovery of the actuality of the
self—in its non-actuality. Krell seem s to imply that a more acute present
aw areness is possible only through the receptivity to a self always already in
the process of deconstruction, and such deconstruction is not merely a
psychoanalytic deflation of the stuffed-shirts of our world.
On the other hand, Pinar’s version of psychoanalysis seem s more to
resemble that of the post-structuralist Lacan than that of Freud, Jung, or
Adler, especially when he avers to a self composed of both an egoconsciousness and an unconscious constructed like a language. The
Lacanian unconscious consists, however, of the unsaid or unspeakable:
Even when authentic and learned, it is a self we cannot be confident
we know, because it is always in motion and in time, defined in part by
where it is not, when it is not, what it is not. The self who welcomes the
dawn is a self constantly expanding to incorporate what it fears and
resists as well as what it desires. (Pinar, 1992b, p. 410)

328

This brings to mind Gilbert Durand (1976) whom I quoted in chapter 4
as saying: “For the sorcerer it is always dawn" (p. 102). Pinar’s architect may
not be a sorcerer but, when s/he is not understood as self-therapist, s/he may
represent an allusion to the a s yet unknown—and perhaps unknowable—
“entity” of the deconstructed self.
I have been indicating throughout this paper how we are constructed
a s masks over an unfathomable abyss, masks whose faith in the given reality
is dependent on the strength of intersubjective recognition, of one mask’s
acknowledgement by another. For m asks—often narrative schem ata—to see
through each other and themselves, they must deconstruct such cultural
schemata and be receptive to that “unspeakable" abyss. In other words, a
deconstructed self, and, perhaps, an architect of self, may be similar to the
“self-revenant” or “ectoplasmic listener” of chapter 5. Such a self is not really
a self at all in the manner in which it has been culturally defined—“a locus
where discourses intersect” (Nussbaum, 1988, p. 149)—but more resembles
a bodily point of awareness between such intersection and the abyss—or
“Absolutely Other” (Derrida, 1992).
Such a position is no observable position. For Durand, such a “life is,
to say the least, an exile" (p. 99). Such thoughts complexify the influence of
the unspeakable other, as it manifests between words, in nuance and
gesture, and perhaps in synchronicity and fate. Casey finally leans far from
such ancient determinisms and eternal returns and grants the self a
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democratic kind of freedom he calls “in-gathering": “Far from being fated,
then, my character is altogether an expression of my free remembering in its
in-gathering power” (p. 296).
Casey’s in-gathering seem s Ricoeurian, according to Krell (1990), and
Krell much prefers Nietzsche’s recognition and affirmation of fate: “I wanted
to oppose the affirmation of eternal recurrence and amor fati to what Paul
Ricoeur was calling ‘consent,’ a word that seem ed lukewarm and saccharine,
whereas Nietzsche’s was fire and wine" (p. xii). In this case, the freedom to
remember may be more akin to a freedom to dismember the shared
delusions which keep us hovering in our “reality” (Lacan, 1977) over the
unfathomable circumlocutions of the abyss.
I have attempted an elucidation throughout of what it means to
deconstruct the self’s memories and to willingly succumb to the Dionysian
body and to a position at the mythic doorway of something suggested, but not
encompassed, by Jung’s notion of a collective unconscious. This “position"
is somewhat distinguished from a participation mystique by being
paradoxically aware of its emplacement and aware of the varied personae,
with variable emotions and memories, available to enact.
Krell (1989) criticizes Casey for falling back on the metaphysical
tradition of presence by accepting “freedom” as a sort of essence. “It is not a
matter of oversight,” Krell says. “It is perhaps a matter of profound oblivion at
the heart of our remembering” (p. 268). He notes that Casey must separate
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memory from narrative, from the narrative self, to hold his position. For Krell,
there is neither freedom in remembering nor truth. Because memory arises
from the unknowable abyss of the eternal return, it is we who are
remembered. My personal memories elide into the Great Memory, the
Spiritus Mundi of Yeats (1916): “Which m eans that memory’s autonomy finds

me always only on the verge of remembering, even when I am in the thick of
memory’’ (Krell, 1989, p. 271).
What is the content of the "Great Memory” or the hovering anxiety of
“fate”? Self cannot remember beyond itself so there can be no content per
se. Instead, there can only be the “forgetting of self" previously alluded to
with reference to Nietzsche by way of Krell. The change may perhaps be the
much touted metamorphosis of this paper. This transmutation is not a part of
the plan of developmental psychology, but is more to do with amor fati or
what Hillman (1983b) calls soul: “Soul is the point. It’s not to further, to
lubricate adaptation, to make it slide along better. It’s more a matter of
evoking the sen se of individuality which com es with death, with fate. My
death. It’s very hard to stay with that" (p. 63).
This is where I find archetypal psychology and som e post-structuralist
angles meet: in a kind of anarchitecture of self (chapter 1). Soul, for Hillman,
is an attitude into death, but it is a land of the dead “peopled” with images as
he portrays in The Dream and the Underworld (1979a). This polytheistic
land of the dead later becom es his via negativa to the world soul (1989a)
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and here he finds himself siding with Lacan and Derrida against the earlier
monopoly of interpretation found in hermeneutics: “Hermeneutics is
monotheistic. I guess what Lacan and those Yalies, those Frenchies, have
been trying to do with their destructuralizing is getting hermeneutics off of its
monotheistic basis and into a kind of talking back to the image that is as
'crazy, ’ as polytheistic, as the image itself (p. 57).
With soul, metamorphosis, and fate, we find ourselves back in the
labyrinth from which we had sought to extricate ourselves in the last chapter.
Is this all talk, all empty theorizing going against the ineluctable evidence of
Prigogine and Stengers for the irreversibility of time? This question was
dealt with at length in chapter 3, but here let it suffice to say that even
Prigogine and Stengers were not content with the one-way road of time
leading to the inevitable disordering of energy found in entropy. They quote
Freeman Dyson from a 1971 Scientific American article proposing a potential
alternative:
It is conceivable however that life may have a larger role to play than
we have yet imagined. Life may succeed against all of the odds in
molding the universe to its own purpose. And the design of the
inanimate universe may not be as detached from the potentialities of
life and intelligence as scientists of the twentieth century have tended
to suppose. (1984, p. 117)
A major role of life may be its ability to construct interconnected
spirals. One of the roles of lifewriting in education may be to assist those
youthful or unconscious spirals of self to become aware of their storied
creation, of the narrative schemata which they are, to gain a sense of
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purposefulness—a sense that they too have stories within them to tell and
are themselves important players in a larger story. This is the egoconstructive, empowerment aspect of autobiography which seem s to have a
direct bearing on the confident performance of teachers in classrooms
(Goodson, 1988; Butt, 1991). This is Jung’s first half of life.
A second major role of life may be its ability to turn back upon itself in
modes I have been struggling to portray throughout this essay. Once the
spiral of self becomes aware of itself, it may seek the source of its own gravity
(Gunn, 1982) in a recoil against time making of life an endless labyrinth, as
portrayed in chapter 5. This is autobiography in which the “auto" is thrown
into doubt. It is an attempt to break the hold of the self through which it is
written by remembering in a mythopoeic, epistrophic manner, as exemplified
in the fictional autobiographies of Jam es Joyce or Zora Neale Hurston.
This is the very movement into invisible metamorphosis which Brown
has called the “Dionysian ego" (1959) or the awakening of Love’s Body
(1966). Action and emotion spring from another, more primary source.
Micklem (1979) portrays the flight of Hermes and his magic cap which
renders psyche invisible a s necessary to escape the stasis of psyche frozen
by the “intolerable image.” Alchemically, such an aw areness is represented
by opening the floodgates of the unconscious upon the “hydrophobic dog” of
the habitus, or habitual self. This metamorphic baptism does not render
unconsciousness, but opens the self to an array of streams whose source
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and end are out of sight—to mercurial inspirations and mercurial emotions.
The deconstructed self may even have attributes of the elusive spirit himself:
Mercurius acts as a fountain of renewal in that he symbolizes a
continual flow of interest, a sort of vital attention and evocative
awareness, moving to and from the unconscious. This flow appears
not only in the superhuman divine heights of the psyche, but also in its
depths, extending down into “matter”: that is to say, down past the
deposits of mankind’s past experience to those levels of man’s
fish-like pre-human past, and to the psychoid processes of the
sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems. Mercurius as the
arcane substance is the transforming link throughout. (Grinnell, p. 22)
In curriculum theory, the fictional journal-writing of Pagano (1991)
suggests such possibilities, as do the rewrites of Grumet (1991), though
whether the value is placed on a dramatic—or Dionysian—self is very much
in doubt. Perhaps the evanescing blueprints of Pinar’s architect comes
closest to actually opening the habitus to the self-forgetful, mercurial journey
into soul and—who knows?—beyond.
A Dionysian self, suggested by Brown (1959), to liberate the id from
repression through direct action, is already to be entering the territory of the
sacred, as suggested by Eliade in The Myth of the Eternal Return (1954).
This journey cannot, I think, be imposed on anyone, whether in the second
half of life or not. Outward-looking ego-clingers cannot be forced to see their
own transparency, though it often relentlessly reveals itself. This may be
“seeing through” or even deconstruction—lifewriting which “is very hard to
stay with” (Hillman, 1983b, p. 63)—but it is also a way once aligned with that
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which was designated as the sacred: Rife with paradoxes to the outwardlookers, as indicated by the sacred path which is constructed of contradiction:

But Zen’s way of viewing or evaluating things differs from the outward
way of intellection. Zen would not object to the possibility of an
“unconscious conscious” or a "conscious unconscious”—therefore, not
the awakening of a new consciousness but consciousness coming to
its own unconscious. (Suzuki, 1954/64, p. 197).
This has not been the mandate of education, of course: not
psychoanalysis, not imaginal dialogues, not deconstruction, and certainly not
anything smacking of the sacred. Schools were firmly constructed within the
myth of progress—outward-looking in a one-way time—as though even such a
secular myth did not have archetypal themes behind it. T. S. Eliot (1936)
felt that even in our most mundane theorizing we are involved in ultimates:
Questions of education are frequently discussed as if they bore no
relation to the social system in which and for which the education is
carried on. This is one of the commonest reasons for the
unsatisfactoriness of the answers. It is only within a particular social
system that a system of education has any meaning. If education today
seem s to deteriorate, if it seem s to become more and more chaotic and
meaningless, it is primarily because we have no settled and satisfactory
arrangement of society, and because we have both
vague and diverse opinions about the kind of society we want.
Education is a subject which cannot be discussed in a void: our
questions raise other questions, social, economic, financial, political.
And the bearings are on more ultimate problems even than these: to
know what we want in education we must know what we want in
general, we derive our theory of education from our philosophy of life.
The problem turns out to be a religious problem, (pp. 184, 185)
At the time of the above writing, of course, Eliot was prepared to return
the Western world to a Roman Catholic empire. I am not suggesting a
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desecularization of curriculum. As soon as we have a religion on which the
majority agree, there is, a s always, bound to be those who become
victimized by it. I wish to observe, however, that our memory reaches back
until its solid empirical present wavers and it finds itself forgetting. It may be
said to be forgetting into Memory as a sort of gravity, that is, in its oblivion it
finds itself remembered. Krell (1978) says that “with diligence and practice I
can remember what I never believed I could remember; with greater
diligence, and after much practice, I can also fail to remember. The ‘can’
confronts a ‘cannot’. In remembrance, as in perception, man is neither
sovereign nor subject, neither absolute activity nor total passivity” (p. 142).
I realize I am verging close with my talk of anima mundi and
archetypes to a transcendental conceptualization of the place of memory in
autobiographical theorizing. I have attempted not to translate the
transcendental to the empirical but only to allow my mythopoeic memory to
explore itself. Krell notes that, beyond that, to claim any assurance is to lose
the path of phenomenology:
Suffice it to say that phenomenology of memory must avoid the pitfalls
of both empiricism and transcendentalism. It must elaborate its own
methods for the description and analysis of memory sequences as it
progresses, without the illusory supports of empirically confirmable
fact or ultimate evidence (p. 142).
And suffice to say that the advocates of some form of lifewriting in
curriculum and curriculum theory may also "neither be sovereign nor subject"
and are driven into their own assumptions of memory because of the unique
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environments and phenomena of their experience. The diversity within this
burgeoning field of curriculum theory must be understood in this light only as
supporting the highest ideals of education as explorative and courageous.
Autobiography in education can only proceed within the reaches of the most
oblivious tolerance because the path is unknown and each explorer will
discover different ruins, and this goes for autobiographical theorists, as well.
The opposition, the resistance, to the return of memory should not be
found, it seem s to me, within the field of lifewriting researchers in curriculum
theory but in the “skyscraper-building” mentality of the institutional ego, itself:
A university isn’t just a place, and a school isn’t just a building. It’s a
collective system with its own systematic unconsciousness which
makes each person in school unconscious in a collective way, and
usually about the institution itself.. . . That’s what I mean by corruption
in training institutes: getting caught in a terrible unconsciousness, all
the while pretending to be developing consciousness and guiding
soul. It’s not that I’m clean and uncorrupt or holy.. . . It’s just that I’m
wary. I don’t know how to keep the eras alive in an institution.
(Hillman, 1983b, p. 34)
Guggenbuhl-Craig (1980) understands eros as the difference
between the soldier as mercenary murderer or idealist, between the
“trickster” as common cheat or con-artist and the playful unveiler of novelty
and surprise, and between the teacher who expects adherence to his
demonstration of established truths and the teacher who also learns and
shapeshifts in response to the life of the students. “It is Eros who makes the
gods—the archetypes—loving, creative, and involved.. . . As far a s we
mortals are concerned, gods are neutral, inhuman, distanced, and cold. Only
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when they are combined with Eros do we sense their movement, do they
become creative, intimate, and stimulating” (p. 27).
The work now being done to recover personal memory, to discover an
epistrophic anamnesis, may be the telos of an eros acting synchronistically
through our shifty unconsciousness to keep itself alive within educational
institutions: to promote amor fati and return to the world.
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APPENDIX: THE FUTURE OF TIME
One of the most disturbing and fascinating suggestions to emerge
from this essay is that memory in its farther reaches is not a human faculty at
all, but a primary force of the world, akin to gravity. In this sense, everything
we do, think, say, or perceive is in process through memory. Our sense of
self comes to us only as we remember it. Our lives are forever dissociated
from the “moment”: an immediacy of aw areness through the veil of the past.
We live, it seem s, through a sort time-delay in which self and world are re
cognized and emplaced before perception is allowed to occur.
Now, with Stephen Hawking (1988) suggesting that the universe is not
expanding but contracting, that is, heading toward its ultimate destiny as
unbounded energy, the whole question of humanity’s fate, amor fati, and the
eternal return seem to demand another way of looking at memory and
“eternal objects,” but even more importantly: our metaphysical assumptions
about time are opened for deconstruction. As David Wood (1989) foresees:
“Prediction is an uncertain art, but I would venture the suggestion that our
century-long ‘linguistic turn’ will be followed by a spiraling return to time as
the focus and horizon of all our thought and experience” (p. xi). The
deconstruction of the metaphysics of time, time as thought, may open the way
for the “moment,” as Wood says, “in ways that break utterly with
representation” (p. xi). This would shatter the myth of progress and schools
would need to be reconceptualized as spaces to experience 6lan vital.
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